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FRANCOPHONIE AND STRATEGIC DEPTH

Review directed by
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 ABSTRACT**Francophonie and strategic depth**

Review directed by:

Niagalé BAGAYOKO and Frédéric RAMEL

Strategic depth corresponds to a set of resources (territorial, material and human) that an international actor can use to keep a threat at bay. This depth is not neglected when adopting a strategic posture during peacetime, as it plays a significant role in forming or reinforcing a defence and security zone. The goal is not to achieve control over a territory but rather to build up relations and partnerships abroad. This review aims to provide a new angle on the Francophone component of strategic depth. The International Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF) acquired a new dynamic as an institution after the Hanoi Summit in 1997, enabling it to step onto the diplomatic and strategic stage. Going beyond the analysis of these transformations, the review primarily offers a new definition of the concept of strategic depth by widening its initial dimensions. Applying this concept of depth to the Francophonie (the international organization) and la francophonie (the area encompassing populations that speak French) is envisaged according to two complementary perspectives: the first is functional (the political role of the Francophonie, the enlargement of the Organisation, the use of the French language in military operations), and the second geographic (North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and America).

■ PREFACE: LA FRANCOPHONIE AS A FORM OF STRATEGIC DEPTH

Frédéric CHARILLON

Professor of political science and director of IRSEM.

What strategic value does la francophonie provide, for whom and in what fields? Described by some as a French fantasy – synonymous with either archaism or delusions of grandeur – and by others as a non-negotiable and consubstantial part of French identity on the international stage, la francophonie is something that bears the political spirit just as much as cultural influence, and it is important to remember that it is more than a uniquely French issue. From Quebec to Beirut, North Africa to West Africa, the French-speaking elite of Cairo to the corridors of the United Nations and the European Union – what purpose does it serve? While posing the question as such may seem utilitarian, there is no denying that the continued use of the French language in a world of diversity is evidence of its cultural, identity-defining, profound and even emotional aspects. Nonetheless, we believe it is important to reflect here on la francophonie as an asset, a vector and a force.

The pitfalls of an elitist francophonie

We must first of all be careful to avoid certain pitfalls. This firstly involves systematically assimilating the French-speaking world with a third circle of French diplomatic priorities which, after Europe and the Atlantic, extend across the former colonial empire. As we mentioned above, this would be an entirely “franco-centric” conception. Indeed, it is a complex affair. This is primarily due to the fact that diplomatic reflexes (not only in France, but abroad) persevere: aside from Quebec, parts of Switzerland and Belgium, it is the old French colonies that are most often evoked when the issue of la francophonie is raised. These reflexes are then fuelled by statistics, which are indeed objective: most current estimates predict that there will be 715 million French speakers in the world in 2050 (compared to approximately 220 million today), but 85 % of this population is found in Africa. These figures alone are fuel for the deep-seated perceptions on the topic. Lastly, we must not confuse on the one hand, a very tangible cultural and demographic reality (the francophone identity of a portion of Africa and the increasing percentage of the French-speaking world found there) and on the other hand, biased political declarations that give France a dual monopoly over both francophone authority and African expertise. Countries other than France can indeed speak in the name of francophonie (beginning, notably, with the African countries) and there are other countries apart from France that are fully familiar with Africa and the challenges it faces. It will be essential, in the years to come, to avoid confusion between the different issues. It will also be essential to show that la francophonie is not seen, neither in France or abroad, as the Trojan horse of purely French interests.

The second trap to avoid would be to perceive la francophonie in a negative light, as a vector of opposition or resistance to an “anglo-saxon” world. The use of the French language in multilateral fora is indeed diminishing, next to English, and also as a working language within the European Union. It goes without saying that it is easier to detect a hint of rivalry between these two languages over any others, firstly because French and English are the only languages spoken on all continents and secondly because they are often used in neighbouring regions (Canada, Africa, etc.). Lastly, it is entirely possible to draw a parallel between the political organisation for la francophonie and the Commonwealth. The announcement in 2012 that Canada and the United Kingdom would share joint embassies, together with British Prime Minister

David Cameron's reminder that "we are two nations, but under one queen and united by one set of values", further fuelled speculations on a return to empire rivalries and structures, especially after the British government announced its wish to come to a similar arrangement with Australia and New Zealand. The role of la francophonie is not to be a counter-Commonwealth; indeed, it is difficult to imagine a partner to engage in this type of undertaking today.

The third and last error would be to quantify la francophonie simply based on its continued use or decline in comparison to the use of the "local" language (e.g. Arabic in North Africa), English language learning worldwide or the use of English in the various international organizations. Since the 1997 Francophonie Summit in Hanoi at least, la francophonie has asserted itself as a political trend, a network, an approach, and as a "web of significance", to use the expression coined by Clifford Geertz.¹ Consequently, the question is no longer how many "divisions" of la francophonie exist today, but rather to question its purpose. The articles that follow aim to shine a light on this last issue.

Strategic functions of a revived francophonie

La francophonie is first and foremost a means of communication and a chosen affinity, both of which unite its members, without necessarily representing a cultural majority in their home environment. La francophonie is therefore a community that facilitates dialogue on values, potentially leading to complicity among its members to defend such values. In Cameroon, where there are 350 ethnic groups, the French language could act as the key to dialogue. Among the 20 observer members of the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) – which includes the United Arab Emirates and Georgia, who were joined by Qatar and Uruguay after the 2012 Summit of Kinshasa – French is even a sign of recognition among certain elites, and much more than a vernacular language. As we have already mentioned, it would be extremely narrow-minded to confine ourselves to observing with satisfaction that English does not hold this place, and a worse error would be to declare that its use is proof of unconditional political ties to France. A better way of looking at la francophonie is as a shared code that facilitates communication among those who use it.

Taking this idea further, la francophonie can be described as a network. As such, it opens up and demarginalises those who are part of it, potentially giving them access to a form of collective action that opens up new perspectives in the current global political process. Is this potential sufficiently tapped by current francophonie practices and the institutions that could respond? This is another issue. There is food for thought on the topic. Firstly, we can look at the formation of a "club" that is not necessarily dominant, but nor is it dominated, whose position as neither marginal nor hegemon is what makes it unique. In other words, la francophonie is valued in today's world, but does not attempt to hold sway over another language. Another avenue for discussion would be the establishment of a stronger support network among members, which would prioritise societies over regimes, as la francophonie is sometimes criticized for having been a "club for dictators". If we, as francophones, look at the unfortunate situation of Mali, we can see a possible window of opportunity that is more difficult to open within the UN. Indeed, we can envisage a united francophone group in support of greater African presence on the Security Council. The involvement of the OIF in Haiti, Tunisia and Madagascar to assist in the electoral processes shows that la francophonie as a political interest, which began in Hanoi in 1997 and was seized on in 2000 in Bamako, is not a pipe dream.

¹ Geertz C., 1973, *The Interpretations of Cultures*, New York, Basic Books.

These networks, which we must make an effort to maintain, because they cannot be strengthened by themselves, are spread across various sectors. This includes the network of diplomatic decisionmakers as well as those from the private, economic and industry sectors, who rarely meet. The military represents another network, as the successful conduct of fundamental initiatives – training, security sector reform (SSR) and the increase in the military apparatuses of certain regions that adhere to democratic and human rights values – all require the same complicity. In this regard, much has been said for the importance of the strong ties between the military authorities in Tunisia and Egypt and their American and European counterparts during the events of 2011. Could la francophonie be an alternative to reopen talks in political processes that have reached an impasse? Let us not give in to idealism. Despite the fact that a part of the Palestinian and Egyptian elite are known to speak French, and the high level of French speakers in Israel (sources estimate their numbers to be 10 to 20% of the population),² it is difficult to imagine that the magic of the French language alone could resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict. However, we can allow ourselves to have greater faith in the relaunching of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue via an internal initiative by its French-speaking members.³ The possibility of a new form of Asian dialogue, far removed from the Asean+8,⁴ could be launched from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. At a more modest level, it is a fact that la francophonie already plays a role in the training of diplomats, officers and other key players of international relations.⁵ Foreign officers attending courses at the War College in Paris are a perfect example. There is no question that the ties that have been created and the values that have been shared in this way should have a lasting effect on la francophonie at large.

*

All of these elements show that la francophonie does indeed, in our eyes, create strategic depth for those that give it life; it provides a space for support, potential solidarity and resources that, though immaterial, can certainly be mobilised, and therefore capable of providing desirable developments and resisting less desired norms or directions. This naturally requires a definition of la francophonie that is political, social and cultural. *Political* in the sense that this is a new type of strategic depth, one that is politically *chosen*, constructed and maintained by all its participants (and therefore to be of service to all). It is not strategic depth in the traditional sense of the term, which would be *provided* by geography (for example, the strategic depth provided by the Russian territory). Without a solid political base, chosen affinities, firmly made choices and shared positions against the major challenges, this depth would not exist. *Societal*, in the sense that it cannot materialise without the support from citizens and societies. If la francophonie was led by political decisions alone, without a corresponding social reality that consisted of a minimum of French speakers in at least certain circles, it would engender little credibility and give rise to speculations on the hidden agendas of its members, rather than a real strategic power in the making. *Cultural*, lastly, because it must have shared values at its core: they provide the base without which no political project would be

² See Mendelson D. (dir.), 2002, *La Culture francophone en Israël*, Paris, L'Harmattan.

³ Sixteen members of the Union as well as Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia (and the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, to complete the regional dynamic).

⁴ Which associates the ASEAN with eight other regional powers in the area (China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australian, New Zealand, plus the USA and Russia) a list which France is clear in its intentions to join.

⁵ In order to assist the States for which French is not an official language, the OIF launched a vast training programme for state employees and diplomats for whom French is a foreign language.

feasible. The significance we accord to international developments and the ways that they may be interpreted, as well as the references from which these interpretations are envisaged should be supported by the “webs of significance” understood by all its members – or else with their full approval of all of these references. This explains the difficulty, for example, of constructing an efficient francophone sphere with members that do not all share the same democratic values, or the same perception of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

La francophonie, when certain conditions are met, can therefore be politically useful, even vital, as well as being intellectually noble. Let us perceive it as such.

■ INTRODUCTION: THE NOTION OF FRANCOPHONE STRATEGIC DEPTH

Frédéric RAMEL

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“Our language flourishes yet is not fruitful; or rather, it has not yet born the fruit that it could easily produce.”

Joachim Du Bellay

Du Bellay, while stressing the potential of language, focuses on the aesthetic and the poetic. But today, his words could well be applied to other fields, including world politics. As a shared linguistic resource, the French language has helped transregional international organisations to flourish: initially at the impetus of developing countries via the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (ACCT) at the beginning of the 1970s, then in the context of a francophone project tailored to globalisation from 1997 on. This second process led to the effective establishment of the International Organisation for La Francophonie (OIF) in 2005 with the revised Charter for la Francophonie. The OIF defined a new field of action: human security, mediation and democratic assistance. In this domain, the Organisation has not quite yet “*born the fruit that it could easily produce*”, to quote the poet. However, its defining feature is an undeniable potential, or even differential, in comparison to other language-centred regional organisations that attempt to strengthen their international role, such as the Commonwealth, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) and the Arab League.¹

One aspect of this potential is worth examining as it breathes new life into conceptual reflection in the field of strategic thinking: strategic depth. This corresponds to a set of resources (territorial, material and human) that a strategic actor can use to keep a threat at a distance. This quest for depth remains one of the constant concerns during wartime, in order to access decisive elements in combat: “*available materials and the knowledge that transforms them into weapons, the right number of men and the art of turning them into soldiers*”.²

However, a strategic posture during peacetime does not mean that we no longer seek this depth. Strategic depth plays a significant role in forming or reinforcing a defence and security zone. The aim is not to achieve control over a territory but rather to build up relations and partnerships abroad. The emerging powers all share the desire to expand their strategic depth, such as Turkey³ or China with regard to Africa. The aim of this study is to give an outline of the various aspects of *la francophonie* as strategic depth. Let us not forget that depth as a concept is not limited to access to a territory. It also encompasses immaterial and institutional components, aspects that are demonstrated by *la francophonie* since its transformation in 1997.

¹ For more on this type of intergovernmental organisation, see Massard-Piérard F., 2007, « Les politiques des espaces linguistiques à l'épreuve de la mondialisation » *Revue internationale de politique comparée*, vol. 14 p. 1. For a comparative analysis of these organizations in the field of international security, see Tavares R. and Bernardino L.B., November 2011, “Speaking the Language of Security: the Commonwealth, the Francophonie and the CPLP in Conflict Management in Africa”, *Conflict, Security & Development*, 11 (5), p. 607-636.

² Malis C., 1995, « Raymond Aron et le concept de puissance », *Le trimestre du Monde*.
http://www.stratisc.org/act/Malis_POWERII.html.

³ Roubaud J-M., Fort M-L., May 2009, Le Rôle de la Turquie sur la scène internationale, information report from the French parliamentary committee on Foreign Affairs, p 16 : <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i2707.asp>.

The multiple dimensions of francophone depth

Without attempting to draw up an exhaustive list, the different francophone depths can be explained through eight complementary dimensions. The first is geographic and territorial in nature. This is the number of states that make up the OIF, which can be found on every continent and all across the globe: seventy-seven members and observers, or over a third of the members of the United Nations. Apart from the countries that have a historical tie to France, this also extends to other countries. The growing numbers of either members or observer states reflects the appeal of la Francophonie, including among non-French-speaking states (United Arab Emirates, Austria and Ghana, recently admitted as an associate member).⁴ This gradual enlargement across every continent bears comparison with an extension of the “francophone area”. As it originated in the territorial proximity of the OIF member states, we must distinguish it from the transnational francophone area corresponding to the French speakers outside these countries.

Cultural and linguistic depth was part of the development of the ACCT’s initial project. This dimension presents two complementary aspects: defending the French language in a globalised world where, until now, English has been holding sway; and secondly, promoting cultural diversity as a value. *La francophonie* is a laboratory for cultural diversity which actively fought for the ratification and implementation of the Unesco Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Together with the Portuguese and Spanish speaking world, it counters the English language and promotes linguistic diversity in the world.

Socio-economic depth implies solidarity between developed States (a minority in the OIF) and developing States (of which there is a majority). This resulted in the creation of the Francophone Economic Forum (FFA), the implementation of cooperative projects, both between developed and developing countries as well as between developing countries, and awareness for corporate responsibility in society.

Legal depth is about the common roots that can be seen in law production. French-speaking countries share a legal system tradition characterised by the influence of Roman (civil) law as compared to common law. This depth has a impact on the issue of security sector reform (SSR) – see hereafter.

The media aspect encompasses the vectors of communication (radio, television, Internet) and Francophone operators in this field. Its purpose is to spread Francophone values through its operators and communication programmes. These are databases on la Francophonie, the press and in particular TV5. Cultural sectors (including cinema, publishing, audiovisual, etc.) are another focus of the OIF. This aspect helps identify the elements that are likely to produce a feeling of francophone belonging.

The three other dimensions listed contribute to the transformation that came from the Charter adopted in Hanoi in 1997, i.e. the appearance of a francophone actor with a political purpose. As such, a normative dimension is perceptible. It involves promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law with the Bamako Declaration of 2000 which added a series of measures to the Organisation’s agenda with the aim of protecting these norms and the adoption of sanctions against those who violate them.

Political and diplomatic depth involves mobilising instruments for mediation and settling differences. For the most part, these tools are used together with other institutions.

⁴ See the contribution from Bagayoko N. and Veleva A. in this review.

The last element is the security aspect. It is connected to the two previous dimensions, and includes peace operations (peacekeeping and peace-building), security systems reforms, counter-terrorism operations and maritime security.

These last two aspects are of fundamental importance and are the basis upon which strategic depth in the strictest sense of the term relies. As one of the contributors to this depth, the OIF has launched a number of initiatives which we shall shed some light on, namely capacity-building.

The OIF's unique role as a contributor to strategic depth: capacity-building⁵

Capacity-building means implementing measures concerning the capacities of Member States in operations and in institutions.⁶

In operations, the United Nations comes up against two obstacles in terms of international security. The first resides in the multiplying number of peacekeeping operations which requires an increase in contingents. The second concerns the number of francophone countries where these projects are undertaken, which is currently six out of the fifteen peacekeeping operations administered by the Department today: Minurso (Western Sahara), Minustah (Haiti), Monusco (Democratic Republic of Congo), Unficyp (Cyprus), Unifil/Finul (Lebanon) and Unoci/Onuci (Côte d'Ivoire).⁷ Over half of the personnel deployed by the UN are located in French-speaking areas. However, there does not appear to be sufficient French-speaking personnel available to fulfil the needs of the Organisation.⁸ Worse still, the personnel deployed to these theatres do not speak French due to the linguistic sway held by the English language. This lack exposes the programmes to weaknesses. As indicated by former Undersecretary General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, *"we must accept that sometimes a passing knowledge of English will suffice and active knowledge of French is vital for the operation's effectiveness"*.⁹ The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) tackles the language issue. It recommends a more equal use of languages in operations and welcomes the OIF as an observer. This was the beginning of a solid partnership which led to the adoption of an ambitious programme by the OIF: better contribution by French-speaking countries in peacekeeping operations and increased use of the French language in peacekeeping operations carried out in French-speaking countries. This was made official during the Ministerial Conference of Antananarivo in November 2005 and regularly invoked since,

⁵ The developments that follow partly refer to the ideas put forward in Ramel F., 2012, "Task-sharing and peace operations: what rôle for the Francophonie", *International Peacekeeping*, 19 (3), p. 301-315; and in the French version, see: Morin D. and Liégeois M. (co-directors), 2013, *Guide du maintien de la paix 2012*, published by the Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix/ Peace Operations Network: <http://www.operationspaix.net/anciennes-editions-guide-du-maintien-de-la-paix.html>.

⁶ These measures are part of a process to make the French language a core language in peace operations, i.e. an appropriation by Member States and the OIF of the instruments used in this field of action. On this process, see Morin D., Theroux-Benoni L-A., Zahar M-J., June 2012, "When Peacekeeping Intersects with la Francophonie: Scope, Significance and Implications", *International Peacekeeping*, 19 (3) p.287-300 ; Massie J. and Morin D., september 2011, « Francophonie et opérations de paix : vers une appropriation géoculturelle », *Études internationales*, 42 (3), p. 313-336.

⁷ This does not include the other UN programmes carried out in offices in Burundi, the Central African Republic or Guinea.

⁸ Morin D., Theroux-Benoni L-A., November 2009, « Maintien de la paix et espace francophone », *Bulletin du maintien de la paix*, n°96.

⁹ Guehenno J-M., June 17 2009, « Synthèse » closing speech of the Regional forum organized by le Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix, Bamako..

from paragraph 16 of the Declaration of Saint Boniface to the final declarations of the Francophone Summits.¹⁰ This policy can be seen in appeals made and also training initiatives.

The OIF seeks to encourage its Member States to strengthen cooperation with the United Nations. In order to “*manage the interface between francophone countries that are potential contributors of troops and the UN*”,¹¹ the OIF established a working group that brings together the OIF Member States’ Permanent Delegations to the UN in New York and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 2005.

The OIF also promotes training and promotion of the skills required for peace operations. At the military level, the OIF organised two regional forums in 2009 on the topic of francophone participation, in Bamako and Yaoundé, in collaboration with the United Nations and the Francophone Peace Operations Network.¹² It has since provided support for initiatives that aim to promote the creation of networks and ensure francophone training centres complement each other or develop interaction with the United Nations training system and standardise francophone programmes in line with UN norms and standards.¹³ Another of its aims is to promote and support the signing of bilateral partnerships on training issues and the acquisition of resources. There are already a number of examples in the francophone world that show the potential of this assistance that the Organisation can offer.

Since 2004, Belgium and Benin have been working together in north Katanga (Belgium by sending heavy equipment, Benin by deploying troops and light equipment). Although this cooperation was suspended for budgetary reasons in 2009, such an effort illustrates of the ways in which cooperation can be established between north and south in defence issues. As pointed out by General Babacar Gaye, former commander of the Monusco forces – now Military Advisor in the UN Peacekeeping Department – “*the OIF could encourage and sponsor similar programmes among its Member States*”.¹⁴

These actions to strengthen training and thereby human competences in peacekeeping operations do indeed appear to have produced positive results in recent years. In October 2012, 32 contributor States out of 115 were members of the OIF.¹⁵ This number reaches 45 when the observer members of the Organisation are added (39.13%). In August 2011, these States provided 20.1% of all personnel.¹⁶ In October 2012, this percentage rose to 34.83%.

These positive figures, however, indicate two types of limits. The first is quantitative, illustrating the dissymmetry among Francophone states: the “southern” countries provide the personnel while the “northern” countries prefer to give resources and logistics.¹⁷ The second is qualitative, as the personnel provided by the Francophone states do not necessarily have the appropriate level of French for operations: the new Member States, without counting the new observer States of the OIF, have a minority of native

¹⁰ See the Final Declaration of the Quebec Summit (2008).

¹¹ OIF Delegation for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights, *Contribution de l’OIF aux opérations de maintien de la paix*, p. 10 <http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENTTEXTE/4667.pdf>.

¹² See the minutes of the Bamako Forum.

¹³ For example, the OIF organized a seminar in June 2011 in Paris that dealt with these issues.

¹⁴ Gaye B., 2008, « Vers une intégration renforcée de la Francophonie aux efforts de la communauté internationale », *Revue internationale et stratégique* n°71, vol. 3, p. 115.

¹⁵ According to United Nations data which takes “contributor” to mean any State that provides troops, military experts and police personnel.

¹⁶ It is important to note that these figures include two countries that are members of both the Commonwealth and the OIF and provide a large number of contingents: Egypt and Ghana.

¹⁷ Morin D., Theroux-Benoni L-A., Zahar M-J., *op. cit.*, p. 294.

French speakers.¹⁸

The OIF also plays a major role in strengthening the institution-related capacities of Member States. It helps institutions to function correctly: in the drafting of texts, the application of organic laws that are to determine the action of the latter, training, funding or the provision of computer resources. Therein lies one of its comparative advantages since the 1990s, be it in terms of electoral assistance or statebuilding in a post-conflict situation. This commitment to the legal field gives priority to electoral assistance as well as training judges and strengthening the capacities of the constitutional courts. This involvement involves assistance in setting up institutional networks concerning the state of law.¹⁹ The initiatives in the legal field are part of a global effort undertaken today in SSR, i.e. the measures that help promote peace and stability via public and democratic control in the police, defence and justice domains. This effort was officially recognised in point 18 of the Quebec Declaration in 2008. In the same vein as Bamako and Saint-Boniface, the OIF does not intervene on the format of the forces but rather on their legal and democratic supervision. These reforms, while ensuring the durable and effective recovery of security, also aim to strengthen the transparent management of funding allocated to these forces, the respect of human rights while carrying out their duties and parliamentary control of security stakeholders. They act as a shield against corrupt power or coups d'Etat, which suspend the constitutions. Until now, the SSR models directed by independent contractors were essentially inspired by British tradition. Francophone states, however, particularly in Africa, are unique, specifically at the organisational level (Francophone police are based on a dual system made up of the police and the gendarmerie) and the procedural level (Roman-Germanic traditions and local customs). By working with the United Nations system and various civilian participants, the OIF assisted the SSR process in the Central African Republic (awareness campaign directed at journalists on the issue at hand, assistance in strengthening training capacities within the Central African police academy), in Guinea (experts sent to participate in the audit of civilian police reform) and in Guinea-Bissau (assessing SSR needs), in particular. Cross-cutting initiatives are also undertaken, such as capacity building in the supervision of parliaments and police capacities through the International francophone police training network (Francopol).

This operational and institutional capacity-building relies on a deep network of expertise that OIF supports. The OIF regularly organises seminars intended to showcase francophone expertise in preventing and resolving conflict, and particularly academic expertise.²⁰ This outreach to the academic and expert community is based on the observation that although the role of high-level personalities is essential in a peace process, it alone is not enough. Support from expert knowledge in the field is essential in the field of mediation.²¹

¹⁸ Michel Liégeois describes these States as “minofrancophone” states. See Liégeois M., June 2012, “Making Sense of a Francophone Perspective on Peace Operations: The Case of Belgium as a Minofrancophone State”, *International Peacekeeping*, 19 (3), p. 18 and sq.

¹⁹ Since 2003, the OIF has been systematically working with representatives of francophone institutional networks, such as the African association of high francophone jurisdictions, the Association of Constitutional Courts using the French language partially or the International Conference of Bar Associations Sharing a Legal Tradition. These institutions deal with the control, regulation, mediation and promotion of human rights as well as training, management and dissemination of law. We note that the OIF supports fifteen networks (altogether four hundred institutions in sixty countries). See: OIF, February 2012 *Quinze réseaux institutionnels de la Francophonie pour contribuer à la promotion de la paix, de la démocratie et des droits de l'Homme*, Paris, OIF.

²⁰ See in particular «Retraite sur la médiation dans l'espace francophone» in 2007 and 2012 (Geneva) and the «Atelier sur la médiation en Afrique francophone» in 2008 (Caux) coorganised by the OIF and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

²¹ Buyoya P., 2010 « Le processus de paix au Burundi », in Vettovaglia J-P. (éd.), *Médiation et facilitation dans l'espace francophone : théorie et pratique*, Brussels, Bruylant, p. 488-489.

The purpose of depth: strengthening the strategic continuum

As it carries out its action in association with other international organisations, the OIF is not at the heart of the issue when it comes to restructuring global security. In the division of labour, it has a reserve-level status. However, this status does not prevent objectives in terms of depth from being identified. The analysis of the action carried out by the OIF shows that peace is seen as a process. The OIF can therefore become involved at any point in the strategic continuum, which stretches from conflict prevention to peace-building.

Two initial trends can be seen. Firstly, initiatives exist that focus on internal conflict and crisis situations in Member States. This first aspect concerns the nature of contemporary armed conflict. The latest annual SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) report indicated that for the past ten years, only two conflicts out of a total of twenty-nine were interstate conflicts, while conflict within states continuously increased in the same period.²² Secondly, the OIF has the capacity to intervene at any moment of the crisis or conflict. With the creation of a General Secretariat in 1997, the OIF gradually increased its capacities for action. It began by extending its permanent delegations to international organisations such as the UN (New York and Geneva); the European Union (Brussels), the African Union and the Economic Commission for Africa (Addis Ababa). The new prerogatives for the Secretary General also led to the creation of the Delegation for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights which supports its action.

In regard to conflict prevention, the OIF essentially adopts structural measures, in that they are intended to develop democratic life with the Member States, through the strengthening of the rule of law, free and fair elections, and ensuring democracy is an internal affair and full respect for human rights.²³ These objectives also reflected the desire for francophone influence, which is founded on the resources mentioned above in terms of capacity-building in the Member States.

However, the OIF also has an operations component with both political-diplomatic and security dimensions. Several missions may be undertaken: good offices (establishing the right conditions for dialogue between parties without proposing a resolution), mediation (looking for solutions beyond good offices) and exploratory missions (in view of election preparations). The Organisation also adopted specific measures in the Bamako Declaration in the event of a breakdown in democracy (article 5): particular measures (Togo and Mauritania in 2005; Madagascar and Guinea in 2009) or sanctions via the suspension of agencies (Mauritania between 2008 and 2009; Madagascar, Mali and Guinea Bissau in 2012).

Further to these observations on operations, the OIF's various projects present a number of unique aspects. Firstly, they must be undertaken upon the official request of the protagonists in the conflict in the case of election missions. Secondly, other actors are called to act at their side: an OIF operator – the International Association of Francophone Mayors (a pivotal actor of decentralised cooperation that strengthens grassroots knowledge) – and an institution that gives opinions in the francophone structure – the Parliamentary Assembly of la Francophonie. Bringing together the deputies of the various Member and Observer States, this assembly helps establish and strengthen democratic institutions and organises good offices missions. Another source of information that is required to assess political situations comes from

²² Themner L. and Wallensteen P., 2011, "Appendix 2A. Patterns of major armed conflicts, 2001–10", *SIPRI Yearbook*.

²³ Before the Hanoi Charter was adopted in 1997, election observation missions were undertaken (supported by a series of guidelines): Benin (April 1995); Niger following the president's assassination (February 1996); Mali, election assistance (1997). Response to emergency situations, however, was systematized after 1997. The first resolution of the Permanent Council of la Francophonie was made on June 22, 1998 in order to support the legitimate government of Guinea Bissau.

civil society actors with whom the OIF has created a partnership. This resulted in the regular organisation of the Conference of International NGOs with an advisory status in the OIF, known as the *Conférence des OING*, and enables “*legitimate political expression [...] and a force for critical vigilance*”.²⁴ Thirdly, the OIF has an early warning system that helps information flow and strengthens methods of response.²⁵ Fourth, there is evidence of a preference for facilitation, mainly through special envoys.²⁶ The latter cannot be appointed without the personal involvement of the secretaries general who can easily call on state and government leaders due to their past positions. Fifth, the OIF does not yet intervene in a significant manner in the economic domain (though it does undertake initiatives to promote sustainable development). This vast range of intervention is unrelated to the comprehensive approach or the security and development nexus, as may be understood at the European Union or even NATO in terms of crisis management.²⁷

Deploying these initiatives has not been without a series of difficulties. The first obstacle encountered was operations-related, concerning mediation. While the OIF wishes to play a secondary role and avoid operations with a large number of mediators, it cannot escape the competitive approach of independent contractors. The Togo incident is a typical example. The 1998 presidential election which saw President Eyadema elected led to a serious political crisis with the opposition. The Secretary General of the OIF, Boutros Boutros-Ghali decided to start initial mediation by sending Moustapha Niasse, followed by Idé Oumarou²⁸ as another facilitator when he was appointed Prime Minister of Senegal. Other mediators were also sent by the European Union, Germany and France. It soon became impossible for these four mediators to work together. The OIF mediators’ analysis of the situation went unheard, as they were up against former ambassadors or well-known figures that were not fully dedicated to the task at hand or else acted without any reciprocity. This aberration led Boutros-Ghali to act alone for a period, at the risk of leaving himself open to harsh criticism from his partners.²⁹ The Guinea Bissau situation also illustrates the polarity between international organisations. After the election of President João Bernardo Vieira in 1998, political violence broke out in support of the putschist claims of General Ansumane Mané. Given the country’s history, Boutros-Ghali looked to the Community of Portuguese-speaking states for support and left for Portugal in the autumn of 1998. He could not quell his partners’ suspicions over the indirect action of Senegal and also France in support of the putschists, despite an agreement signed between the protagonists on 3rd November, 1998.³⁰ These experiences give credence to the idea that “*cooperation can cause rivalry in terms of appointments, missions and resources among organisations, which begin to compete against one another*”.³¹

A second obstacle is found in the material resources required. Whether this is at the diplomatic level or in capacity-building, the OIF’s intervention in task-sharing requires funding to support its action. While there are positive trends to take note of in recent years, the resources do not appear to be sufficient for the

²⁴ OIF, 23-25 June 2010, Acts of the 7th Francophone Conference of OING and OSC, Geneva (Switzerland), p. 4.

²⁵ OIF Delegation for peace, Democracy and Human Rights, September 3 2010, *Francophonie. Agir pour prévenir*, report of the high level expert panel on the issue of transitioning from early warning to rapid response, Paris, OIF: http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Rapport_du_Panel.pdf

²⁶ Greminger T., Mottet C., *op. cit.*, p. 335.

²⁷ Major C., Mölling C., 2009, “More than wishful Thinking? The EU, UN, NATO and the Comprehensive approach to Military Crisis Management”, *Studia diplomatica* n°3, vol. LXII, p. 21-28.

²⁸ Oumarou was replaced by Lansana Kouyaté following his death.

²⁹ On Togo, see Boutros-Ghali B., 2004, *En attendant la prochaine lune...*, Paris, Fayard, p. 190, 483, 608 and 634.

³⁰ Boutros-Ghali wrote : « *J’ai eu le sentiment de labourer dans la mer.* » (“I had the impression I was laboring in a sea.”) *Ibid*, p. 199.

³¹ Biermann R., 2009, “Inter-organisationalism in theory and practice”, *Studia diplomatica* n°3, vol. LXII, p. 8.

declared objectives.

How this publication contributes to the analysis of strategic depth in the Francophone world

This publication opens with a chapter that focuses on the concept of depth in strategic thinking. Thierry Widemann mentions the classic approaches that define depth as keeping a threat at distance. This corresponds to the construction of a strategic buffer zone associated with the protection of the hinterland. However, another viewpoint of this chapter involves highlighting new perspectives. Today, the concept of depth can be redefined. Leaving aside boundaries and the exclusively territorial dimension, depth can have immaterial and institutional elements that also help keep threats at a distance. This perspective thereby allows the concept of depth to be applied to other elements, including la francophonie.

Continuing on from this more inclusive idea of depth, the chapter by Hugo Sada provides a historical perspective of la francophonie. Rather than giving a series of accounts from his time as delegate for peace, democracy and human rights, he provides a thought-provoking article that places priority on influence. He also explains that the francophone project can only be properly launched if the linguistic “cornerstone”, as well as the intergovernmental and societal components of la francophonie, are reinforced.

The following four contributions deal with certain areas representative of the specific challenges of the strategic depth of la francophonie. The article by Flavien Bourrat focuses on the Maghreb. Despite the colonial history and the effects of the Arab Spring that contribute to the doubt cast on the French language, he maintains that it is pivotal. It has a pivotal role first of all in state institutions, followed by international interaction. French is therefore a vector of communication, negotiation and even mediation. A second field of application is on the African continent, a major area where the majority of speakers will be concentrated by the middle of the century.³²

Catherine Guicherd places a more precise emphasis on three aspects: the action of la Francophonie in institutions (OIF) in the areas of conflict prevention and peace building; the impact of the “francophone reality” on peacekeeping or peace support operations; and the national decisions taken by member states of la Francophonie on major issues relating to peace and security in this zone. From this description we can identify the main obstacle that strategic depth faces: the competition between the OIF and other regional or sub-regional organisations of which francophone countries are members.

Pierre Journoud focuses on Vietnam and provides a detailed article on how a country can use la francophonie as a vector of strategic depth. On the one hand, the rapprochement with and integration within the OIF are a revival of the foreign policy launched in 1986. La Francophonie thereby helps improve strategic communications and access to a country. On the other hand, the involvement of Vietnam in the francophone world helps strengthen the “strategic buffer zone” against China. This is less of a material solution than legislative and legal assistance, as law becomes a resource for Vietnam in its conflict with its neighbours.

While Pierre Journoud’s article illustrates the practices of strategic depth by one member state on its own territory or in proximity to it, Stéphane Jans speaks of those countries seeking similar action but with a

³² Jacot M., and Brafman N., July 1 2012, « Francophonie. L’Afrique, phare de l’avenir », *Lemonde.fr* : http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2012/06/29/l-afrique-phare-de-l-avenir_1727193_3210.html

different configuration. He analyses the initiatives undertaken by Canada in Haiti. Going beyond the reference to human security and the desire to place itself as a proactive actor in the Americas, the author puts forward another explanation: Canada's homeland security issues. The Haitian community is already quite strong in Canada, but is experiencing severe socioeconomic difficulties. The rise of criminality in Haiti via trafficking of all kinds (drugs, weapons, humans) has a direct impact on the situation in Canada. In other words, the Canadian government's preventative action on Haitian territory is an attempt to keep the spread of these conflict-provoking processes at bay.

The last two chapters are thematic in nature. One of the ways to maintain strategic depth in a classical way involves expanding its space. For la Francophonie, this expansion occurs through a process of enlargement. This process, which has an impact on every continent, is particularly dynamic. This sometimes raises questions, as well as arousing admiration, from British leaders when compared with the Commonwealth. It does, however, generate discussion. Niagalé Bagayoko and Alexandra Veleva identify a number of factors that motivate states to participate in OIF structures (member, observer or associate member status). However, more fundamentally, the authors show that this dynamic cannot be limited to a territorial dimension. It reveals an open identity of la Francophonie which intends to attract new countries to its own political project.

Brice Poulot studies the linguistic underpinnings of francophone depth, the sharing of the French language being a prerequisite to its operational readiness. He presents the tools for teaching military language: in particular, French military language (FLMi), or the training of the allied troops in French. Brice Poulot proposes another concept of language that removes it from its usual context as a vector of cultural diplomacy. Language has a strategic dimension as a resource on overseas theatres but also as a vector of influence on how to approach armed conflict.

■ THE CONCEPT OF DEPTH IN STRATEGIC THINKING

Thierry WIDEMANN

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The notion of strategic depth evokes a specific moment in a process – the origin of which can be traced back to prehistoric hunters – that forced man to establish a space between him and a threat, be it animal or human. This explains the predisposition, which was evident in the Palaeolithic era, to throwing weapons.¹ The distance created would not only keep the thrower out of reach of a claw, a bite or a weapon but would also enable him to anticipate an attack. The hunter, and later the warrior, therefore had the possibility of feinting, or choosing the moment of the offensive – this was already a form of tactics and manoeuvre. From this archaic beginning, the essential role of keeping threat at bay appeared. Man needed to be able to switch space for time. In other words, he established or restored his freedom of action.

However, this was improvised depth. It was via the architectural notion of a *glacis* that tactical depth entered the geographical space. A *glacis* is an open slope in front of a fortified building, castle, fortress or town. Its purposes are to firstly clear the field of view so that any movement or approaches by a predator are visible, allowing the attack to be anticipated, and secondly to expose the attacker to the defenders' fire. Laying siege therefore involves first of all neutralising this dual function by creating obstacles in height or in depth (fences or ditches), which conceals the approach to the fortification and shelters it from adverse fire.²

In the 20th century, the term “*glacis*” appeared in contexts other than tactical, in the expression “strategic *glacis*”. It is mainly used to describe the Soviet Union’s protective measures that made use of the Eastern European states during the Cold War. In France, we often come across the expression “European *glacis*” in relation to what the 1972 White Paper calls the “second level” of defence policy (the first being made up of the national sanctuary and the third the global aspect of defence).³

The now explicit concepts of strategic *glacis* or strategic depth were implicit for a long time, though real in their consequences: the defensive system invented by Vauban in the 17th century was founded on a clear idea of what these concepts were.⁴ Before Vauban, Renaissance England was well aware of the effects of depth obtained from the sea when, for example, the philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626) said about England’s insular position, that she “*may take as much or as little of the war as she will*”.

The first instincts in terms of the nature of strategic depth most likely appeared when it is a question of geographic location, in this instance by a stretch of land, sea or a mountainous region, e.g. the great Russian plains to the west for the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the ocean for the United States and for Switzerland, the Alps, seen as a vertical form of strategic depth.

If geography provides no strategic depth, it can be created artificially. In history, this is the role of a certain kind of fortified structure. These were not “passive” fortifications, as seen in the first feudal castles where the military function is to serve as a refuge, but rather “active” fortifications, the purpose of which was to control a

¹ On the origins of war in prehistory, see Keely L.H., 2002, *Les Guerres préhistoriques*, Paris, Éditions du Rocher.

² Bois J-P., 1993, *Les Guerres en Europe, 1494-1792*, Paris, Belin, p. 258-266.

³ *Livre blanc sur la défense nationale*, 1972, Paris, Imprimerie du Cedocar, chapitre 1^{er}.

⁴ On Vauban’s strategic conceptions: Barros M., Salat N., Sarmant T., 2006, *Vauban: l’intelligence du territoire*, Paris, Service historique de la Défense.

territory.⁵ They began as great linear fortifications built by the empires, such as the Great Wall of China or Hadrian's Wall. More recently, the Bar-Lev line is a good example, as Israel's fortified border, which was crossed during the Egyptian attack of 1973 and which had in fact been established to compensate for a lack of strategic depth.

Some fortifications also fulfilled this "active" purpose. Château-Gaillard, for example, was built on the banks of the Seine by Richard Lionheart to protect Normandy. The fortress, by its position, controlled the river, a then indispensable logistic route, as transport by land was rarely practicable. An invasion of Normandy would have first required taking control of the location, which Philippe Auguste did in 1204. In this sense, such a castle alone represented the strategic depth of the defence.

However, to control a territory, a network of fortification is the most effective method. The greatest example in history is the Vauban Fortifications (known in French as the "iron perimeter"). This was a network of fortifications that supported each other, preventing any invader from advancing without risking being cut off from an exit. This meant the attacker would have to lay siege before the fortresses, which both placed him in a position of vulnerability and also slowed down the invasion operations: it is a perfect example of strategic depth, and this is how Vauban conceived of it, even if it was not yet established as a precise concept.

When faced with an urgent threat situation, strategic depth can be created on the adversary's terrain. This is what the Ben Gourion doctrine proposes in Israel, a country haunted by the absence of such depth: "bring war to the enemy", i.e. increase the manoeuvre zone with depth taken from the enemy.⁶ In the 1980s, NATO "FOFA" (Follow-On Forces Attack) doctrine, inspired by US AirLand Battle doctrine, aimed to strike forces located in the depth provided by the Warsaw Pact.⁷ This doctrine was mainly political, since Germany refused to allow strategic depth to be created on its own territory. NATO, then, had to find a way to develop this depth in enemy territory.

Whether it is constructed on home ground or in the adversary's land, strategic depth can also be formed through "deconstruction" – such as the scorched earth tactics employed by Fabius Cunctator during the second Punic War, by Vercingetorix against Caesar and by Russia in 1812 and the Soviet Union in 1941. This tactic is often used together with harassment. The purpose of this combination is to prevent the adversary from refuelling and resupplying, forcing him to give up his attempts or to engage in combat in adverse conditions. These manoeuvres can also be carried out on the enemy's territory. When, under the reign of Louis XIV, Turenne and then Louvois ransacked the Palatinate,⁸ it was a defensive strategy in the Rhineland to prevent the Empire and its allies from holding onto it.

Scorched earth and aggression are indeed tactics, as they encompass two methods of implementing an indirect strategy, which can be described very generally as an attempt to defeat the enemy using methods other than face-to-face combat.⁹ To give a precise definition, an indirect strategy is often the refusal to engage in symmetric warfare on the main theatre, opting instead for asymmetric warfare on a different theatre. By creating this oblique setup, we could define indirect strategy as one that aims to establish or re-establish strategic depth.

⁵ Contamine P., 1986, *La Guerre au Moyen Âge*, Paris, PUF, p. 219.

⁶ Razoux P., 1999, *La Guerre israélo-arabe d'octobre 1973. Une nouvelle donne militaire au Proche-Orient*, Paris, Economica, p. 36-37.

⁷ On the FOFA doctrine: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *New Technology for Nato, Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack*, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987.

⁸ Cenat J-P., 2005, « Le ravage du Palatinat: politique de destruction, stratégie de cabinet et propagande au début de la guerre de la ligue d'Augsbourg », *Revue historique*/1 n° 633, p. 97-132.

⁹ Liddell Hart B., 1998, *Stratégie*, Paris, Perrin, p. 398-406.

By gradually surpassing the geographical reference, strategic depth is also created through intelligence: here, it is no longer a question of exchanging space for time, but by being prepared time is exchanged for space. Such “depth” is of course unpredictable, as evidenced in intelligence failures in history’s greatest strategic surprises, failures which are not generally due to the nature of the information but rather how it is processed in the chain of hierarchy. Among the most eloquent examples are the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany or the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.¹⁰ In a literary example of strategic depth, the *Desert of the Tartars* by Dino Buzzati, the enemy’s progression had been detected, but without any consequences. The presence of strategic depth, such as the great lines of fortification, can also lead to a dangerous illusion of security.

The notion of strategic depth is therefore closely linked to that of strategic surprise.¹¹ It is essential to reduce the effects, and surprise can be useful to create such depth when it is lacking. The aim of the surprise Israeli attack during the Six Day War was mainly to create a glacis against the Egyptian and Syrian armies, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was not to defeat American forces but to establish strategic depth in the Pacific to gain freedom of action in Asia for the empire.

The nature of strategic depth takes on another meaning with nuclear ballistic missiles. The launch of the first artificial satellite by the Soviet Union in 1957 made the United States realise that they had just lost the strategic privilege accorded by their insularity, constantly fearing an “atomic Pearl Harbor”. Antiballistic missile programmes, followed by the Reagan administrations idea of a space shield baptised “Star Wars”, were an attempt to establish strategic depth – which the ocean could no longer offer – in space. Today, we might wonder what form strategic depth might take in cyberspace where growing networks are a source of both power and weakness.

Lastly, strategic depth requires another concept, which appears to be its geographical opposite: that of the hinterland or inland region.

The term “hinterland” is commonly used in economic geography¹² and mainly applies to the port (or airport) amenities that make up the continental depth. It is distinct from the foreland, the regions or areas linked to the ports.

Applied to geostrategy, the hinterland – in the sense of the inland region – is the area that, in the event of a major attack, provides a space to retreat into and a possibility to mitigate the impact of an offensive that cannot be stopped. Though its location is the opposite of the front, by nature, it contributes to the concept of strategic depth. It is therefore made up of two geographical spaces, one to confront the threat – the strategic glacis (or foreland) and the other, the hinterland, providing room for manoeuvre to the rear. If we strip away the geographical notions of the term, the strategic function of the hinterland cannot be reduced to its territorial dimension. It also evokes the space, in a more abstract sense, from where our strength is drawn and where power is restored, materially and psychologically. Evidence of this can be seen in the decision by Pericles, during the Peloponnesian War, to shelter Athens and its port behind fortifications, give

¹⁰ On these operations, see Glantz D., House J., 1995, *When Titans Clashed – How the Red Army stopped Hitler*, St. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas; Zimm A.D., 2011, *Attack on Pearl Harbor : Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions*, Philadelphia, Casemate.

¹¹ Brustlein C., October 2008, « La surprise stratégique. De la notion aux implications », IFRI, *Focus stratégique*, n° 10.

¹² “Hinterland” article, in Brunet R., 1993, *Les Mots de la géographie : dictionnaire critique*, Paris, Reclus-La Documentation française, p. 255.

up territory to the enemy and seek out the resources for power in the maritime empire; and again when Stalin decided, during the German attack, to shift the factories of strategic interest to the east, as far as Siberia. A hinterland is also, for a guerrilla movement, the indispensable external sanctuary where it finds shelter, supplies and can rest and regain strength.¹³ This was the role of Cambodia and North Vietnam for the Viet Cong, or today, the role of Pakistan for the Taliban.

The notion of hinterland therefore also has a dimension that surpasses the territorial aspect to become the site where an army sources or restores its moral strength. These cannot be reduced to a psychological element and can extend to a feeling of belonging to a shared value system. We then move from a dialectic relationship between the notions of strategic glacis and hinterland to the idea that both are subsumed in the encompassing concept of strategic depth. When we extend the concept to include belonging to a value system, it acquires a cultural dimension: it ceases to be a physical space and becomes an axiological field. This is how we can define strategic depth as a capacity for resilience in relation to threats that may not be exclusively military, but also economic and cultural. If strategic depth also refers to a cultural space, the sharing of a common language is therefore evident. Richelieu seems to have been intuitively aware of the strategic function of language, when he wrote in his *Testament*: “ [...] *I found France to be smaller than herself; everything had shrunk, except for the land of its language; this went beyond the borders of France, and it remained the French language; formerly oppressed peoples denied that they were part of us, and their language was ours; French, they were enemies of French; France was arming itself against itself, the enemy was using ourselves against us* [...]”.¹⁴

As we can see, the concept of strategic depth is of relevance today in more ways than its original sense. In a way, it was subjected to a process of dematerialisation. Firstly, in relation to geography, when it ceased to be simply keeping a physical threat at bay. Next, in the military dimension, where the concept continued in the line of strategy, which gradually moved away from the theatre of armed conflict to incorporate all of the courses of action targeting the enemy's will, to become, according to Jean-Paul Charnay, an “*art of coercion and provocation*”.¹⁵ This shift is a reflection of the change in the relationship between war and strategy, in the 1950s: it is no longer war that contains strategy, but strategy that contains war.¹⁶ Today, what is referred to as influence strategy, of which soft power is one aspect, has become a popular course of action for countries in a world where the use of armed force has seen its economic, moral and legal cost rise considerably.

However, influence strategies can no longer be reduced to a state's interests alone. Suprastate cultural entities, such as la Francophonie (even though the Commonwealth is another example), have specific interests that are not to be confused with the sum of interests of the States that make them up. They are characterised by possibilities of action, in particular legal and media-related, to support conflict prevention and as such are a form of strategic depth. While the latter is no longer strictly geographical nor an exclusively military concept, nor is it tied to the desires of any particular state, this does not take from its primary function as a way to keep a distance and anticipate any resorting to the violence of war.

¹³ Coutau-Bégarie H., 2002, *Traité de stratégie*, 3rd ed, Paris, Economica, p. 490-491.

¹⁴ Cité par Nordman D., 1999, *Frontières de France. De l'espace au territoire, XVI^e-XIX^e siècle*, Paris, Gallimard, p. 483.

¹⁵ Charnay J-P., 1973, *Essai général de stratégie*, Paris, Éditions Champ Libre, p. 171-195.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 68.

■ REBUILDING LA FRANCOPHONIE WITH POLITICS

Hugo SADA

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“History is that reality in which the universal must always present itself determinedly.”

Hegel, *Reason in History*

The notion of strategic depth, in its original military sense, has evolved notably with the geopolitical upheaval the world has seen (in particular at the end of the Cold War), globalisation and the technology revolution. In this context, in which power is no longer a question of territory and guarding state borders no longer of primordial importance, sheer power must be accompanied by influence – or “soft power”. This must be established and deployed well beyond state borders, and in an international system characterised by the multiplication of strategic actors.

La Francophonie, historically founded on a common language and shared values (the legacy of the Enlightenment and the humanist universalism beloved of Léopold Sédar Senghor) and which contributed to the emergence of a unique approach in the new multilateral system marked by its complexity and fragility, should be regarded today as one of the new strategic actors –as yet a relatively minor one – but which has great potential.

The francophone idea was born during the colonial period, but never really prospered in it. The idea of la Francophonie (“a French Commonwealth”) came from the decolonisation period and was promoted by well-known figures of those regions such as Senghor, Habib Bourguiba and Hamani Diori, who held a vision of the connection between France and its now independent former colonies, leaning towards the post-colonial rather than the neo-colonial. Faced with the vagaries of De Gaullist choices in terms of decolonisation, it was long confined to the non-political sphere, i.e. a non-priority, non-strategic position in the foreign policies of the states concerned, and was therefore marginalised on the international stage. The creation of the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (ACCT) by the Treaty of Niamey in 1970 formalised this reductive vision (in methods and aims) of the notion of la Francophonie. By institutionalising la Francophonie, it gave states and governments further power to contain its expansion and waste its creative and visionary energy in an institutional debate that lasted three decades.

This paradoxical turning point came after a long period in which the idea of la Francophonie was based on the notion of soft power via prolific creation of association and networks (journalists, academics, parliamentarians, etc.) that would be likely to actively participate in politics outside the realm of the state.

La Francophonie, which was strongly marked by its colonial roots (on the one hand, the myth of geographer Onesime Reclus’ coining of the term “francophonie”, and the African majority in the Niamey structure; on the other, the reduction of the field of intervention of the first Francophone institute), had, during the decolonisation period and especially during the Cold War and the bipolar system, almost no political space and due to its apolitical nature was not strong enough to carry a project or a goal that would capitalise on the legacy of the enlightenment and the humanist universality of Senghor. It is indeed politics that has

played a determining role in the recent changes in la Francophonie, and which, by introducing it to the political realm, gave it new legitimacy and a new capacity for influence, allowing it to become an acknowledged and original actor on the international stage.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the dislocation of the bipolar system, the emergence of a new multilateral world and the speed of technological progress produced new approaches as well as new demands in terms of peace and security, democracy and human rights. Globalisation, preponderantly liberal, placed the issue of regulation and governance at the centre of international concerns.

These events have influenced the conception and classic functioning of international organisations. As for la Francophonie, they imposed a rapid and profound transformation of its configuration and the purpose it could fulfil in the new global environment.

It was first confronted with the need of many states, now freed from the bipolar system, to find new forms of alliances, solidarity and frameworks for exchange and dialogue (non-exclusive) to better integrate and find their place within the multilateral context. This trend resulted in significant progress in several areas. The first step was the organising of summits from 1986 among the heads of state and government of countries with French as a national language (known as the Francophonie Summits), which raised the Francophone groups to the highest political level. Next came enlargement, with the membership of a growing number of countries (see the article by Niagalé Bagayoko and Alexandra Veleva in the present review), encouraged not only by the language factor but also political factors, in particular the desire to join a "club" that could be influential in the new international environment. Furthermore, it was the spirit of openness and development in the struggles for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and Africa that were embodied by la Francophonie, calling for a more outspoken and active commitment to politics. In this sense, it evolved not only in terms of the actions it carried out but also in its mode of operation and its structure, namely with the creation of the Secretary General position, to embody the management of the political action of the International Organisation for la Francophonie (OIF). Two eminent political figures held this position in succession: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, followed by Abdou Diouf.

Thirdly, from the 1990s on, the combined effects of the liberalisation of cultural exchanges and the resistance that they produced (e.g. the discussion on the cultural exception, the theme of the Francophonie Summit held in Mauritius in 1993) and the rise of identity-related issues (the "murderous identities", to quote Amin Maalouf) and religious radicalisms led to the politicising of cultural and linguistic issues. La Francophonie had no option but to tackle head on these developments of the culture issue (and its linguistic dimension), a cornerstone of its own original identity.

The transformation of the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation to the International Agency for la Francophonie, followed by the Hanoi Summit in 1997 and the new Charter for la Francophonie adopted by the Ministerial Conference of Antananarivo in 2005 all indicated the necessary reconstruction of la Francophonie to follow a political agenda. By establishing the International Organisation for la Francophonie and leaving behind its status as an agency for cooperation, it became fully invested in the political realm of international relations, expanding its territorial space by increasing the number of its members on all five continents and a significant French-speaking presence outside its Member States (the United States, Algeria, Israel, etc.).

Looking at the texts that were drafted and adopted during this reconstruction phase, and which now govern the programmes initiated by la Francophonie, we can see that politics is a clear priority, along with a desire to closely follow the new international challenges of the post-Cold War period.

The 2005 Charter for la Francophonie enshrines this evolution, in particular in its preamble ("To give La Francophonie a full political dimension, the heads of state and government [...] elect a Secretary General, a cornerstone of the Francophone institutional system"), and in the definition of its objectives (Article 1) and in Article 7 on its political functions. Article 8 relegates cooperation to a secondary rank as a method of executing the political objectives set out by the heads of state and government, fully observed by the Secretary General.

- The Bamako Declaration, on democracy, rights and freedoms, signed in November 2000 became the core text and regulatory framework of the political action of la Francophonie, and is now an international reference since its coming into effect.
- The 2006 Saint Boniface Declaration on conflict prevention, human security, the responsibility to protect, the Cairo Declarations of the Francophone Ministers (1995) and the 2008 Paris Declaration – which emphasise the central role of justice in a state of law, as well as democracy, human rights and international criminal justice – specify the directions and general outline of the organisations actions in the political field. The Summit Declarations regularly affirm and formalise the commitments of states and governments, thereby keeping the political dynamic up to date and more visible.

As a continually changing structure, yet to reach completion at the conceptual level, la Francophonie has a logical role in the post-Cold War, globalised international system. This gives multilateralism, as a political project founded on key ideas (peace and security, universal human rights, democracy, etc.) all the factors that should determine the progress of world governance. Its aim is to be a centre for shared values, from which it can specifically or alternatively target its effective contributions to resolving the problems encountered in achieving these ideals. The way in which it implements its action shows how it intends to manage this task.

The purpose of this article is not to provide a detailed analysis of the political actions of la Francophonie, which are in fact regularly presented in the Secretary General's activity reports and reports on the situation of rights and freedoms in the French speaking world.¹

However, we should remember the pyramid system that the political side of la Francophonie operates on, aiming to assert its legitimacy and extend its influence. This system was historically constructed as part of the coming into effect of the Bamako Declaration, and then extended to the Declaration of Saint Boniface. The Secretary General of la Francophonie plays a pivotal role. Beyond executive powers, the Secretary General stipulates the political commitment of the member states and governments of the OIF. He/she ensures the organisation's programmes conform to the core texts and common values. He/she promotes political coherence of positions taken and interventions, and increases their visibility and their impact.

A specialist structure within the Organisation ("*the right arm of the Secretary General*", according to Abdou Diouf) monitors, observes, evaluates and analyses, proposes and handles the Secretary General's interventions.

¹ Available at www.francophonie.org.

This system is deployed in “web” form, using the permanent delegations in key multilateral institutions (New York, Geneva, Brussels, Addis-Ababa), the multiple groups of French-speaking ambassadors, the routine mediation and expertise missions, the active participation in international contact groups in crisis situations, the development of francophone cooperation (up to ministry level) on major international issues and at major international conferences, and in advocacy roles (for example with the Commonwealth to G8 and G20 leaders, or as part of the Deauville initiative for the “Arab Spring”), etc.

Neither a UN-type organisation nor a regional or specialist organisation, nor development agency, la Francophonie resembles a network in the way it is constructed (see the foreword by Frederic Charillon) which combines intergovernmental, para-state and non-governmental actions that aim to add a political value to international relations. The organisation faces great constraints (the competition of multilateral actors, limited capacities with regard to the francophone potential) and is confronted with the problems due to its enlargement to include a growing number of marginally French-speaking countries, and even in some cases reticent to share the declared values. By developing its political action and the political dimension of its actions, it gives new meaning and appeal that are suited to the new global realities to the original francophone project that presided at its creation.

At this stage of its development, the perspectives for strengthening the Francophone project – that is, the ability of la Francophonie to become a representative, legitimate, credible, efficient and useful actor of international life – require clarification on at least two key points which determine its strategic coherency, and therein its faculty to see its strategic depth valued.

- Since la Francophonie is not a foreign policy priority for its member states, but rather a peripheral element, it must strengthen and rationalise the organisation and functioning of its interstate and non-state structures in order to show its own member states its usefulness, play a significant role with other international organisations and strengthen its legitimacy within its own space.
- While globally, demand for the French language remains encouraging, the use of French is starting to decline in Asia, Europe and in international organisations, and is faced with difficulties in Africa, where, according to OIF estimates, a vast majority of the world’s French-speakers will be concentrated in 2050. Even if there is an evident move towards linguistic diversity, which encourages French to be maintained as one of the main international languages, the linguistic cornerstone of the francophone project (its “bedrock”, as Abdou Diouf likes to call it) must be rethought and re-evaluated so that it can form a greater part of the process of Francophone rebuilding through politics.

■ FRANCOPHONE STRATEGIC DEPTH IN THE MAGHREB: THE FRENCH LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW ON THE WORLD

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The Maghreb – to be understood here as the central region, i.e. encompassing Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia¹ – in its geography, history, culture, economy and politics, constitutes a regional subgroup of primary strategic importance for la Francophonie. Beyond this fact, the French language issue has an important place, as it not only determines the nature and level of the relations between these states and their former colonial power, but also because within this same zone, the economic, cultural and political stakes it represents are huge.

The central Maghreb region, alongside sub-Saharan Africa,² is the second-greatest French-speaking region in the world outside France. It is of course very difficult to provide exact figures on this topic. There are no official data in the countries concerned about the number of French speakers and the most common estimate is about 35 million speakers.³ In both cases, the extent to which the French language is practised stems directly from the presence of France as a colonial power over a long period. The Maghreb is distinct from its African neighbours because, while French was – notably in Algeria – the official language during colonisation, it is no less historically attached to the Arab-speaking world, since Arabic⁴ has been the official language since the independences (the French language is not mentioned in any of the three constitutions).⁵ The other, quite paradoxical, fact is that the use of the French language expanded during the post-independence period with the development of mass schooling, even while the national policies aimed, through Arabisation programmes to varying degrees of intensity, to restore the identity and sovereignty that had been usurped.

This unique situation was therefore of great complexity, helped along by the geographical proximity of France, the high number of persons of Maghreb origin that live there or are French citizens and by the density of human and economic ties that exist across both sides of the Mediterranean. However, it is also a source of ambivalence and even tensions, a pivotal point between cultural identities and varying, often diverging histories and collective psyches. The concept of “la francophonie” is a sensitive one in the Maghreb countries, because it touches the heart of the image of national identity as seen by the governing

¹ Libya, which is part of the regional sub-group referred to as the “Greater Maghreb”, which also borders the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), is not part of the French-speaking area and therefore is not referred to here. This is not the case for Mauritania, also a member of the UMA and a buffer state between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, which we shall deal with later on.

² We should ideally add a middle space between these very distinct regions which would be described as the “Sahelo-Saharan” region, as its strategic scope is today in the spotlight due to the political and security developments taking place there, and where French is clearly the language of interregional communication.

³ According to estimates established outside the countries in question, considering that official figures provided by state authorities on demography and sociocultural indicators, issues deemed sensitive, often do not correspond to the reality.

⁴ The term “Arabic” refers to two juxtaposed linguistic realities. First, there is literary Arabic, or Modern Standard (MSA), a modernised version of the classic language which, while largely contained to written expression, is the official language in all Maghreb countries. Secondly, the spoken languages – also known as dialects – even though they can be written are the de facto mother tongues of the inhabitants of the Maghreb alongside the Berber languages. While they are clearly the national languages of these countries, these spoken languages remain excluded from the official and educational domains.

⁵ Bianchini L., 2007, « L’usage du français au Maghreb », *Constellations francophones* n° 2, p. 12-20.

power, the elite, society and the relationships between these different components. Indeed, it is probably the only region in the world where the language issue – beyond the position held by the French language – carries such emotional energy, and brings with it equally determining issues for the future.

La francophonie in the Maghreb: a living, yet controversial, reality

If we compare the situation of la francophonie in each of the Maghreb countries, we can see great similarities despite national specificities and the diversity of historical backgrounds and political regimes. Among these common features, a notable one is the quantitative, rather than qualitative, expansion of the use of French, despite the deliberate efforts to encourage Arabic speaking with policies, though they are generally inconsistent and inefficient. Other features are the lack of recognition of French at government level, despite its continued use in government agencies and the education system (where it is compulsory from primary school), and the simultaneous use of elitist and mesolectal dialects, the latter being marked by the added neologisms and alternated (and simultaneous) use of French with dialectal Arabic, and lastly, fluency in the French language as a vehicle of social promotion and openness to the outside world.⁶

Algeria

As the sole Maghreb country not to have joined the organisation for la francophonie, Algeria is no less considered the second francophone country in the world, in terms of numbers of speakers. Nonetheless, a real linguistic pluralism, accepted and maintained by the population, has continued to be challenged in the last fifty years by the government authorities. These authorities transformed language use (setting French and Arabic against each other, as well as Arabic against national dialects and Berber languages) into an issue of political legitimacy and an ideological clash that is not found in neighbouring countries where the language issue is far from posing “nuisance potential”.⁷ The successive Arabic language policies conducted since 1968, with the latest being the law on the “spread of the Arabic language” voted on in 1996, have not made an impact on the significant role that French continues to play in society and public life. As a result, we have an evident contradiction between the official statements in which the language of the former coloniser is treated with contempt and belittled (even though it continues to be used at the highest state level) and a social perception which sees it as synonymous with social achievement, modernity and openness to the outside world.

Morocco

While French is generally widespread within the elite and the business sector, it is less present among the general population than in the two other countries of the central Maghreb (Tunisia and Algeria). This discrepancy can be attributed to a shorter duration of French presence and an illiteracy level that remains high. Like in Algeria, the repeated attempts to encourage Arabic speaking from the 1960s onwards, encouraged by ideological motives along with the unspoken desire to maintain privileged access to the spheres of knowledge and, therein, power, have not destabilised the position held by the French language.

⁶ Rahal S., September 2001, « La francophonie en Algérie: mythes ou réalités? », Conférence de l'Agence universitaire de la Francophonie, Beirut.

⁷ Zeghidour S., September 4 2011, « Des think tanks projettent déjà l'image d'un Maghreb plus berbère », *El Watan*.

The government now handles the issue with more flexibility, in a context of reduced tension between French and Arabic speakers.

Tunisia

Like in Morocco, the status of the French language has until now been part of “*a relatively stabilised context where it is officially a foreign language with preferential status*”.⁸ As such, the position of “second language” that is the de facto status of French is not inconsistent with the spread of Arabic within the Tunisian administration. The use of French, similar to the neighbouring countries, depends on geographic and social criteria, with supply and demand being distinctly higher in the north of the country and within the upper middle class.

Mauritania

Mauritania, a state that straddles the Sahel and the Sahara, is the interface between the Maghreb – to which 80% of its population, of Arab-Berber origin, are linked ethnically and culturally – and sub-Saharan Africa, from where the remainder of its inhabitants originate and with which it has closer ties in terms of economic and labour exchanges. Mauritania’s relationship to la francophonie is based on parameters that are mostly similar to those observed in the central Maghreb. While it is a member, like Morocco and Tunisia, of the International Organisation for la Francophonie (OIF), French is not, according to the 1991 Constitution, one of its official languages, limited to MSA, even though 20% of Mauritians are of Black-African origin and do not speak it. Bilingualism is however upheld in government administration and education, while officially French is considered the language of connection with the outside world. The country’s language policy, which intends to make Arabic compulsory for all in primary education, comes up against resistance among the Black African population who, while recognising Arabic as their religion’s language, see it as discriminatory and insist on the universal and transnational dimension of French.

Moving away from the “colonial back yard”: fostering a spirit of openness to the outside world

The main problem, when attempting to approach the strategic dimension of la francophonie, is to reduce it to a colonial preserve, or a traditional French zone of influence, the legacy of its colonial history. Such a vision, which until recently has resonated quite strongly in France, errs not only by its anachronism but also by the fact that it reduces the promotion of la francophonie to merely a way to defend French national interests and the need to be a counterweight to the increasing use of English. Consequently, it is natural that it causes offense and incomprehension on the southern banks of the Mediterranean, mainly providing arguments for those who denounce the use of French as a relic of bygone history, the neo-colonial Trojan Horse, or even the main vehicle to spread cultural values that go against what is defined as the main identity of the nation: Islam and Arab identity.

Nonetheless, this must not cause us to push aside the role that France has played and will continue to play as a generator of linguistic and cultural references in the Maghreb, which seems to be a reality that globalisation, like other developments underway in this part of the world, should not discredit.

⁸ Veltcheff C., 2006, « Le français en Tunisie: une langue vivante ou une langue morte ? », *Le français aujourd’hui* n° 154, Armand Colin, p. 83-92.

Furthermore, if we move away from the banks of the western Mediterranean to touch on other French-speaking regions, we can see that in those places where the French presence – or, rather, its influence⁹ – truly lasted, the Maghreb presence abroad (outside of Western Europe) remains the strongest. This can be seen by the many Moroccan and Algerian emigrants (often university graduates) to Quebec, but also in the high level of economic, political and security-oriented investment from Morocco and Algeria in French-speaking Africa. On the other hand, the marked presence of la francophonie – currently on the decline – among the Middle-Eastern elite, including where they were particularly high in number such as in Lebanon, does not appear to have appealed to the French speakers of the Maghreb.

In order to better grasp the scope of la francophonie in relation to the strategic parameters that concern the Maghreb (including the fields of security and defence, in particular), we shall return once more to the use of the Arabic language. The spread of standard Arabic learning, though historically and culturally founded, did not yield the desired result, both in terms of language fluency or fulfilling needs in the field of higher education. Meanwhile, French learning took a sharp fall, both qualitatively and quantitatively, even though its use, which was already widespread within the elite, expanded independently and without instruction. In the end, it is the manner in which language learning was handled, as well as its underlying objectives where political and identity-related criteria took priority over the teaching aspect, which yielded such a result. For example, in Algeria, the country in the Maghreb with the highest number of French speakers and yet which does not belong to the OIF, the language issue remains the most sensitive; it is evident that it is an ideology rather than a language that was taught in previous decades. This process led to multilingualism which has never been fully accepted by the authorities, causing a certain amount of confusion among the population. More worryingly, French is often seen as the language of social prestige, guaranteeing the speaker a high-powered role in society and power (in a way, we might refer to it as a class marker). Contrarily, Arabic is too often seen as the language of closed identity and resentment,¹⁰ which could damage the social cohesion of the countries concerned.

For several years, language teaching – learning from past mistakes – is more dedicated to learning rather than political criteria, and the benefit of knowing French is less objected to than before, except among political groups for whom religion is the key reference. At the same time, in a context of globalisation, the use of English is progressing within certain targeted classes of the population, not as a language to compete against French,¹¹ but as a way of communicating in the fields of economy and finance. English is mostly seen as a tool necessary for work, rather than a conveyor of cultural and social communication, which is the case for French.

The French language in the Maghreb must be regarded and considered, while accepting multilingualism, as the language of openness to the world, rather than a language that carries exclusive influence benefiting the former colonial power (as is sometimes felt in English-speaking countries and the countries of the Middle East, and condemned by certain political movements within the three countries). In fact, this is another point where this region is distinct from the Mashrek, where Arabic takes on, alongside English, the role of a language that brings openness to the world.

⁹ The absence of persons of Maghreb origin in the countries of former French Indochina (even if Moroccan veterans that served in the French Army remained in South Vietnam until the mid-1970s) can be explained by the recent political history of these states, a marked geographical and cultural distance and also the fact that *la francophonie* was less present there than in the rest of the colonial empire.

¹⁰ Grandguillaume G., October 2004, « Les langues au Maghreb: des corps en peine de voix », *Esprit*, p. 98-99.

¹¹ This was in fact the goal in Algeria, when English was introduced into primary education in 1994, for ideological purposes.

The idea is simply that the countries of the Maghreb reappropriate, at the official level, a language that belongs nonetheless to their national heritage, alongside Arabic and Berber languages. France, meanwhile, must fully realise that la francophonie is a matter of domestic policy for the countries of the central Maghreb, and stop appearing to promote a process that could easily appear paternalist, vertical and intrusive.

It is not enough, however, to rest on the laurels of what some may consider a past glory. While until now there was a sentiment of permanence concerning la francophonie and la Maghreb, it must adapt and improve, because although the practice of French has not declined in terms of numbers of speakers, its quality is often lacking. It should also address those who do not speak French, to avoid a greater linguistic fracture and more, a social fracture that is already visible¹² to many French speakers. As an example, in Morocco, those who speak only French must learn Arabic in order to avoid being cut off from the rest of the population. It should also tackle the competition from Middle-Eastern, Arabic language satellite channels which use identity-related and religious references shared by the Arab world, or the Muslim world, which are gaining audiences. This does not mean that the majority of Maghreb populations are abandoning French-speaking channels (which, admittedly, are more difficult to receive than before) in favour of Gulf television, but the public now have a much greater choice of channels than in the past, without necessarily having exclusive preference for them.¹³

Lastly, the context of political transition caused by the Arab revolutions may give a new dynamic to the linguistic disputes and ideological orientations that are opposed to la francophonie – in particular in the key education sector – with the rise to power of political-religious movements that decry the use of French in public life, even if their representatives often speak it fluently, a very frequent paradox in this region and a sign of the complexity of the language issue.

The Francophonie: an asset in strategic dialogue and regional security cooperation

If we look at the issue of la francophonie in the Maghreb from the angle of strategic depth, it is tempting to look at it from the viewpoint of the political-military balance of power, i.e. the *glacis*, for France's use and benefit alone, where local actors are divided into allies, adversaries and rivals according to whether or not they speak French. However, if the francophonie issue in this region, given the historic, emotional and ideological weight it continues to bear, must still be handled with caution. It must now be envisaged by all actors within this linguistic zone as a factor to facilitate rapprochements, trust and cooperation, in particular in security and defence.

This perspective may be facilitated by the fact that within the state power, such as the diplomatic or defence sphere, and particularly in the armed forces, French remains the first choice as working language and the language of internal¹⁴ and external communication. While this is true for the three countries of the central Maghreb, even while their national legislation imposes the use of Arabic as the sovereign language in these domains and others (namely the justice system), it is particularly strong in Algeria, where, as we have already seen, the French language continues to be highly controversial. We can also see that the Algerian People's National Army, a cornerstone of the state and the ultimate guardian of nationalist values,

¹² Ksikes D., June 2005, « Pourquoi les francophones contrôlent le Maroc », Casablanca, *Tel Quel*.

¹³ For example, the TV channel RAI (Radiotelevisione Italiana) is very popular in Tunisia, helping viewers to become more familiar with the Italian language.

¹⁴ The Royal Armed Forces, as well as the Royal Gendarmerie and the Moroccan auxiliary forces use French as a working language.

remains one of the most Gallicised sectors – at least among the senior officers – of the state.¹⁵ Mauritania, however, for reasons linked to its recent history, has seen its military and security apparatus become largely Arabic-speaking, to the detriment of French. This situation is the result of cooperation established with Arab countries such as Algeria and Iraq, but also due to the decline, since the end of the 1990s, in the number of servicemembers of Black African origin, a group which previously made up the majority.

The fact that these countries have a history of longstanding and often well-developed cooperation in the military and security domains with France, and their armed forces were significantly marked by the French influence in their training and way of functioning, is not enough to explain this situation. The defence apparatuses in the Maghreb play a notable role within the state apparatuses, and this state of affairs is likely to continue, no matter how the political landscape evolves. For several years, the Maghreb armed forces have been devoted to the modernisation and professionalization of their human and material resources, in a context of weakened and uncertain regional strategy. As a result, there is growing need for contact with the outside world, in the form of training, exchanges and joint exercises.¹⁶ The language aspect is therefore of greatest importance, as requesting training from France implies being trained through French. French is therefore a vital key to the outside world for senior and mid-level officers in the armed forces of the Maghreb. The effort to promote French in these categories of state actors should be made sooner rather than later, i.e. rather than simply proposing training in France, the personnel interested in completing these programmes in the countries concerned should have the sufficient linguistic baggage to consider them.

We should also take into account the fact that the good levels of French currently practiced by the officers in the Maghreb armed forces is due to the training they received before the reforms of the 1970s and 1980s. While this situation is set to continue for another while, especially given that high-ranking officers are replaced later in Maghreb countries (and in the Arab world in general) than elsewhere, the capacity to speak French is an issue that will remain throughout the generational shift to officers trained in the Arabic language.

Training in France

This has long been a reality for the Moroccan and Tunisian armed forces. This approach is made easier by the fact that higher military education in both countries is based on the French model. Student officers and cadets in military schools (special military academies, naval school, and air force academy) are selected in a competitive exam, for which a good level in French is required. For further education (staff college, war college) the officers sent to France by the Tunisian Ministry of Defence are selected among the top students of their classes, with their level of French being a determining factor.

However, Algerian officers have only returned to training in France since 2000, in the fields of gendarmerie, healthcare and at the War College, as well as in military academies and specialist schools. There has been a rise in the number of staff trained this way, but it remains modest, given the difficulties in France to increase the number of places available, and in Algeria to provide personnel that have an acceptable level

¹⁵ Bourrat F., 2012, « L'armée algérienne : un État dans l'État ? », *Les Champs de Mars*, n°23, Paris, La Documentation française, p. 21-37 ; Leveau R., 1973, *Le Sabre et le Turban*, Paris, Éditions François Bourin, p. 210-212.

¹⁶ For all three countries, training is also available in the USA, and in Algeria's case, in the Russian Federation, which implies fluency in the languages of these two states. Members of the People's National Army in Algeria, including its technical staff, must have working knowledge of the Russian language, due to the special partnership that has existed between the two countries since 1962 in the defence sector, and in particular armament.

of French.¹⁷ This clearly demonstrates the ambiguity of the situation of the French language in the Maghreb which, despite the increase in the number of French speakers, is faced with a decline in the language level, particularly evident at the professional level. Military personnel are no exception, be they Algerian, Tunisian or Moroccan. Without any sweeping generalisations, there is quite a difference in this area between the new generations of officers and their predecessors, which can be ascribed to the deterioration and the vagaries of language teaching, in particular caused by the Arab language policy introduced in the 1970s and 1980s in all three countries.

French language teaching in the Maghreb military environment

French teaching is provided as part of the bilateral defence cooperation that exists between certain countries and France. The perceived decline in level means French classes are necessary, even compulsory, for future officers wishing to train in France, so that training received in their higher military education can be of use to them. The strengthening or the reintroduction of French teaching is therefore a major line of effort in French defence cooperation in the Maghreb, in particular in Algeria where there is a vacuum to be filled.

In Algeria, while contribution from French teachers in the military environment has temporarily ceased, Algerian teachers financed by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Directorate for Security and Defence Cooperation teach the French language at the Ecole Militaire Polytechnique. In Tunisia, classes are provided by the French Institute of Tunisia, as part of a bilateral agreement. Officers in the French delegation for cooperation also attend this course, in particular for written expression. In Morocco, this course – the terms of which are similar to those applied in Tunisia – also includes personnel from sub-Saharan African countries that are connected to the defence sector in Paris and Rabat.

La francophonie, facilitating relationships between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa

The last point in the above paragraph is particularly demonstrative of the possibilities that exist for French to become more than a language of communication but the regional language for cooperation, including in defence and security matters. La francophonie, once it is no longer perceived as a tool that is solely used to project French policy in the region, could therefore become the foundation on which the ties between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa are built and grow stable. Already we can see that the dense relationships and exchanges maintained between the Maghreb countries and their French-speaking African neighbours, in particular in the Sahel where security issues are particularly chronic following the events in Mali, are generally done so through French. This may, surpassing the differences and rivalries that exist, facilitate crosscutting, interregional cooperation, and even mediation,¹⁸ initiatives that are made necessary by the current climate.

Faced with these security challenges that concern a geostrategic ensemble that covers the entire western Mediterranean Sea and the Sahel-Sahara region, French is seen as the natural choice for communication,

¹⁷ With the exception of Algerian Gendarmerie personnel, whose candidates speak French very well. This same system can be found in Morocco's Royal Gendarmerie, an elite body that often recruits from the upper classes of society.

¹⁸ The National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) recently called for mediation from the Secretary General of the OIF in the conflict against the Malian government. The MNLA, to support its proposition, made the case that the OIF brings together the majority of the regional actors affected by the conflict and is not militarily engaged in the conflict.

next to Arabic¹⁹ and Berber languages,²⁰ in particular on either side of the Sahara.

The “5+5 Defence”²¹ programme is therefore a sort of group lab, although the Sahel countries – with the exception of Mauritania – do not participate. Not to exclude English and Arabic, considering the presence of non-francophone countries, the French language has a determining role, be it in making the cooperation projects a reality or in the strategic reflections that are carried out through French. There is also the fact that, in continuing to speak French, the partners of the southern bank of the Mediterranean acknowledge an understanding, even a shared sensitivity that encourages progress in their common projects.

¹⁹ While Arabic continues to be the official language of communication between the Maghreb states, they all – with the exception of Libya – also use French to converse in the military and security fields. Outside the official spheres, Arabic is widely spoken by trans-Saharan traders, who are mostly of Arab origin.

²⁰ The Touareg, or Tamasheq, language, a Berber language, is spoken by several million people across the three countries of the Sahel (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso), and two Maghreb countries (Algeria and Libya).

²¹ The “5+5 Defence” programme, launched in December 2004, is the latest of a number of partnerships that unite the five countries of the northern banks (Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal) and the five countries of the southern banks (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia) of the western Mediterranean. The activities conducted concern four fields of cooperation in terms of security, namely: maritime surveillance, air security, the contribution of the armed forces to civilian protection in the event of major catastrophe and training and education.

■ THE STRATEGIC DEPTH OF THE FRANCOPHONIE IN AFRICA

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In the introduction to this review, Frédéric Charillon suggests the strategic depth of the Francophonie be measured by its capacity to constitute a “*reservoir of support, a space of potential solidarity and supply of resources [...] that are non-tangible but can nevertheless be mobilised*” to yield political processes, as they are based on a sense of belonging to a society, through the cultural cornerstone of a language and common values.¹ This definition is subtle and nuanced, conceptually appealing but also extremely difficult to put into operation. Testing its validity would require not only measuring the impact of “institutional Francophonie” through the actions carried out by the International Organisation for la Francophonie (OIF) based on the orientations of the Francophonie as a political collective,² but also:

- the initiatives, decisions and engagements of Francophone states taken individually on major international and regional issues;
- the initiatives, processes and actions performed by organisations “in the Francophone family”,³ agencies for the Francophonie,⁴ or groups working together with the Francophonie being their common denominator;⁵
- “civil society” initiatives in the wider sense, both in their collective incarnations and the medleys of individual decisions on higher education, investment, decentralised partnerships, cultural events, etc.

The difficulty of assessing this impact becomes greater when taking into account the fact that power is not simply a question of military or security assets, but rather an array of capabilities that also include economy, finance, communication, social cohesion, etc. Therefore, truly measuring the strategic depth of Francophonie – on the African continent and elsewhere – would require systematically cross-referencing all actors with all domains of engagement and influence.

This is not, however, the only element of complexity: for this measurement to be reliable, the “activity indicators” (to use project-management language) alone do not suffice; the short and medium term effects (“result indicators”), and possibly the long-term consequences (“impact indicators”) of engagements

¹ See the foreword of this review.

² In this article “the Francophonie” will be used to describe institutional Francophonie, i.e. OIF, and “Francophonie” the broader set of actors legitimising their initiatives primarily upon their belonging to the French-speaking world, and those initiatives themselves.

³ In the same manner that the term “agencies belonging to the United Nations family” refers to the organisations that work within the United Nations circle, whether they are officially part of the UN system or not.

⁴ As a reminder, the following specialised operators work on behalf of la Francophonie: The international association of francophone mayors (AIMF); the University Agency for la Francophonie (AUF), the international television channel TV5 and Senghor University in Alexandria.

⁵ For example, l’Association des hautes juridictions de cassation des pays ayant en partage l’usage du français (AHJUCAF), l’Association francophone des Commissions nationales de promotion et de protection des droits de l’Homme (AFCNDH), l’Association des ombudsmans et médiateurs de la Francophonie (AOMF), le Réseau francophone international de formation policière (Francopol), etc., which we will mention later on.

undertaken in the name of Francophonie must also be evaluated. Further still, chronological series should be used so that comparisons can be made over time, as it is not the strategic depth of a given actor in a given moment that is meaningful, but rather over a period of time. It is then important to isolate the “Francophone identity” element or “Francophonie motivation” from the other elements that shape the actors’ behaviour. Motivational elements stemming from a desire for “Francophone solidarity” and from other intentions should be distinguished – except for institutional Francophonie where they overlap by definition. Lastly, to measure results and impact, it would be necessary to answer the negative “What if there was no Francophonie?”, considering that the Francophonie is but one of an ever growing number of actors involved in Africa, in particular in the field of peace and security.

The ambition of the present article is much more modest. Aiming to spur reflection rather than to draw definitive conclusions, it attempts to measure the strategic depth of Francophonie on the African continent by focusing on three parameters:

- the action carried out by institutional Francophonie (i.e. OIF) in the fields of conflict prevention and peace-building;
- the impact of “the Francophone reality”⁶ on peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, which should be dealt with specifically, taking into account, firstly, the promises made in these domains at the Quebec Summit in 2008⁷ and secondly, the fact that 75% of the UN’s peacekeeping staff are deployed on the African continent;⁸
- the national decisions of the Member States of la Francophonie on important issues relative to peace and security in Africa.

An important axiom pertaining to the concept of “strategic depth” will be crucial in the approach: besides its classic strategic dimension, which gives precedence to *the idea of protection against a threat*,⁹ the strategic depth of an actor includes a central element of competition, essentially expressed in terms of its relative presence, influence and identity in contrast to those of other actors. From this perspective, it is possible to go beyond the analyses that see Francophonie as a tool to combat the “Anglosphere” and the cultural Anglicisation of the world,¹⁰ and observe that the real challenge for Francophonie is the competition it faces from regional and sub-regional organisations, coming from Member States’ affiliations in multiple institutions which, while declaring themselves to be mutual “partners”, are engaged in a permanent battle for recognition on the world or regional stage.

⁶ In French, the term “*le fait francophone*” (the Francophone reality) has been suggested by Justin Massie and David Morin to refer to the forming, through specific actions, of this “geocultural community” that Francophonie represents, through la Francophonie itself and more generally; Massie J., Morin D., September 2011, «Francophonie et opérations de paix: vers une appropriation géoculturelle», *Études internationales*, 42 (3), p. 315; for a more specific reference in the context of peacekeeping operations, see Morin D. and Theroux-Benoni L-A., November 2009, «Maintien de la paix et espace francophone», *Bulletin du maintien de la paix* n° 96, p. 1-2.

⁷ Declaration from the 12th Francophonie Summit, 17-19 October 2008, <http://www.sommet-francophonie.org/fr/documentation.php>.

⁸ Based on UN statistics for November 2012 (71,752 soldiers and policemen out of a total 95,556).

⁹ See also the article by Widemann T., in the present journal.

¹⁰ For a definition of these terms and an analytical approach of the different perspectives, see Massie J. and Morin D., *op. cit.*, p. 314-318.

Institutional Francophonie in crisis management

On the basis of the commitments made in Bamako in 2000, followed by those made at Saint Boniface in 2006¹¹ and renewed and expanded at successive summits, OIF has undertaken a considerable number of initiatives with the objective of assisting the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the political transition or the consolidation of democracy among its members. As such, its agenda and practices in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding have mainly aligned with those of the main international institutions – as have those of France itself, as B. Charbonneau and T. Schafer have noted.¹² This alignment is a measure of credibility, as well as a pitfall as it becomes increasingly difficult for the Francophonie to stand out and claim its own strategic space.

Distinguishing, somewhat artificially, political reaction to the violation of democratic principles, mediation and electoral assistance programmes, the following picture emerges:

Firstly, a welcome political determination has asserted itself to take seriously the commitment made at Bamako to reject any unconstitutional change of government and to draw consequences from it. OIF thus successively suspended the memberships of Togo (from February to April 2005), Mauritania (from August 2008 to December 2009), Guinea (from January 2009 to January 2011), Madagascar (since April 2009), Mali (since March 2012), Guinea Bissau (since April 2012) and the Central African Republic (in April 2013), while maintaining a form of engagement with these countries that it deemed appropriate to help them overcome their respective crises. This form of response is without doubt useful to “send a political message” to the circle of Member States, but it is hardly different from the positions taken by the concerned regional economic communities (REC) – namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) – and even less still by the African Union (AU), which has stood out clearly since the Lomé Declaration (2000) in its vehement and immediate condemnation of all coups d’Etat on the continent.¹³ Furthermore, the relative impact of this response compared to that of the European Union (EU) or other major fund providers, on which the financial survival of the state in question depends, is questionable.

While the presence of la Francophonie in mediation processes on the continent is increasingly evident (notably since Saint Boniface), its form and impact are evolving in a context marked by a proliferation of mediation actors – of which specialists have long identified the risk.¹⁴ Thus, OIF contributes to the resolution of conflicts that affect French-speaking African countries (Madagascar, Guinea, Mali, etc.) not as a lone actor but within established multilateral cooperation initiatives. This does not mean that it cannot carry out its own action with traceable benefits. For example, its political and technical engagement ahead of the Inclusive Political Dialogue in the Central African Republic in 2008 certainly contributed to bringing the parties together and facilitating the beginning of a dialogue.¹⁵ In Chad, in 2008, the compromise reached

¹¹ Bamako Declaration on Democracy, Rights and Freedoms in the Francophone space (in French): and the Saint-Boniface Declaration on conflict prevention and human security: http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Declaration_Saint-Boniface.pdf

¹² Charbonneau B. Chafer T., 2012, “Introduction: Peace Operations and Francophone Spaces”, *International Peacekeeping*, 19 (3), p. 279.

¹³ The Lomé Declaration on anti-constitutional changes of government was in fact adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU in July 2000, while the AU was being created. The AU Charter and the African Charter on democracy, elections and governance adopted in January 2007 strengthened this message and clarified it.

¹⁴ See, for example, Siegfried M., Kirchhoff L., Wählich M., Lanz D., November 2008, *Evaluating Peace Mediation*, Swisspeace Foundation. The risk (sometimes referred to as “forum shopping”) is essentially that the parties to the conflict take advantage of the differences in opinion among the mediators to harden their positions.

¹⁵ Secretary General of the OIF’s reports: 2008-2010, p. 33, <http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Rapport\SG\2008->

between the parties on electoral legislation can be attributed to the Francophonie. Although this compromise turned out to be quite frail, the endangered electoral process was relaunched on the basis of the substantive agreement of August 2007.¹⁶ OIF action can even prove decisive, as was the case in Guinea in October 2010 when its mediation led to the nomination of Malian General Sangaré as head of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), providing a way out of the deadlock between the two contenders after the first round of the presidential election.¹⁷

In general, however, its action seems more and more subsidiary to that of other actors with a greater political or financial weight. For example, in Chad in 2007-2008, OIF played “supporting role” to France and the EU, whose political-military action made it possible for the internal crisis to be surmounted.¹⁸ In Côte d’Ivoire, one of its traditional bastions, despite the efforts deployed,¹⁹ its voice was barely audible during the long election crisis from 2005-2011, and the solution was found only when those actors with the capabilities and will to combine political pressure with the use of force – France and the United Nations – played their part. Since 2003, in fact, OIF’s role in Côte d’Ivoire has been mostly secondary behind the UN, ECOWAS and France itself, both in the mediation that led to the Linas-Marcoussis agreements and in the deployments of peacekeepers that followed.²⁰ Of the troubles in Niger in 2009-2010, in the aftermath of the institutional crisis and the coup d’Etat, what is mostly remembered is the vigorous intervention of ECOWAS, supported by the AU, to enforce a return to the constitutional order.²¹ OIF, in this context, appeared in a rather negative light when it decided against suspending Niger from the Organisation following the February 2010 coup d’Etat.²² A similar dynamic can be observed in Mali since the beginning of the crisis in 2012, with ECOWAS taking the lead in addressing the political situation while the response element entailing a military deployment has been led by the UN and the AU. Algeria not being a member of OIF, the latter’s involvement in the crisis, which has implications for the entire Sahel region, is not facilitated. Even in situations where the Francophonie could previously exert its influence, its weight appears to have weakened with the rise of regional actors. In the Comoros, for example, while OIF had set the pace of negotiations during the 1999-2001 period within an often difficult relationship with the OAU/AU,²³ “the balance of power” was reversed in 2003, with the AU clearly setting out the parameters for resolution of the crisis, until its military intervention on Anjouan island (Operation Democracy in Comoros) in 2008 put an end to it – simultaneously signalling the

2010_.pdf ; 2006-2008, p. 37, http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/paix_dem_dt_homm_rapport_2006-2008.pdf

¹⁶ Secretary General’s situation report: Application of recommendations issued by the Secretary General in the report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of peace and sustainable development in Africa, A/64/210, 11 August 2009, paragraph 16.

¹⁷ Prier P., 20 octobre 2010, « Guinée : un général malien pour sauver le deuxième tour », *Le Figaro.fr* : <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2010/10/20/01003-20101020ARTFIG00725-guinee-un-general-malien-pour-sauver-le-deuxieme-tour.php>

¹⁸ This, at least, is the impression gained upon reading the Secretary General’s activity report for the corresponding period: Diouf A., 2009, *Rapport du Secrétaire Général de la Francophonie, de Bucarest à Québec*, OIF: http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Paix_dem_dt_homme_Rapport_2006-2008.pdf, p. 34, 38.

¹⁹ Kazadi N., « La médiation de la Francophonie en Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2007) », in Vettovaglia J-P. (dir.), 2010 *Médiation et facilitation dans l’espace francophone : théorie et pratique. Prévention des crises et promotion de la paix*, Bruxelles, Bruylant.

²⁰ Tavares R., Bernardino L.B., November 2011, “Speaking the Language of Security: the Commonwealth, the Francophonie and the CPLP in Conflict Management in Africa”, *Conflict, Security & Development*, 11 (5), p. 619; operation paix website, « Historique de l’opération ECOMICI » Réseau de Recherche sur les Opérations de Paix: <http://www.operationspaix.net/17-historique-ecomici.html>.

²¹ ECOWAS Commission, February 17 2009, Extraordinary conference of the Heads of State and Government, Final Communiqué, Abuja: http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/images/118/communiqu%C3%A9_cedeao.pdf ; African Union, February 19 2010, Communiqué of the 216th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council..

²² RFI website, March 2 2010, « La bienveillance mesurée de la Francophonie vis-à-vis du Niger », *rfi.fr* : <http://www.rfi.fr/contenu/20100302-bienveillance-mesuree-francophonie-vis-vis-niger>.

²³ With strong involvement of France, which was badly perceived by the OAU/AU. See Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011, *The AU and the search for Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi and Comoros*, Genève, p. 37 and sq.

end of OIF's efforts to find a negotiated solution.²⁴

Just like in the field of mediation, la Francophonie is present on a number of terrains assisting election processes on the African continent. Including information, contact, assessment, observation and technical assistance missions, there were around fifty OIF initiatives in the election domain in Africa in the 2006-2012 period.²⁵ Yet again, however, it is difficult to distinguish OIF on a terrain now involving a multitude of intergovernmental and non-governmental actors (Carter Centre, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, etc.) and where the AU and the RECs seek to make their presence increasingly felt.²⁶ Sending a high-level observation mission led by a prominent public figure – which was the case for the presidential election in Mauritania in July 2009²⁷ – can of course send a valuable political signal, in the same way as publishing a biannual report on the situation of democratic practices, rights and freedoms in the Member States is a sign of sustained vigilance.²⁸ However, in all these fields, it is increasingly difficult to stand out from others.

Fundamentally, the added value of the Francophonie in domains related to the strengthening of democratic processes and institutional transitions appears to be largest in the specificity of the expertise it offers. Once again, the "competition" is high. However, firstly, a significant number of "rivals" have no suitable staff, French language teaching material or the necessary contacts; secondly, the institutional and legal history shared by African countries and two main French-speaking countries in the North – France and Belgium – means that adapting the legal and institutional structure of the target countries to new norms is easier if it is done within this legacy. Institutional and legal transformation as part of democratic transitions may be one of the domains where the "strategic depth" of la Francophonie can be most effective, but also where it is the most difficult to measure as its vehicle is not only OIF, but also the many channels composed of the institutional networks belonging to the "Francophone family": the International Conference of Bars of Common Legal Tradition (CIB), the Association of French-speaking Constitutional Courts (ACCPUF), the Francophone Association of National Human Rights Committees (AFCNDH), the Francophone Association of Ombudsmen and Mediators (AOMF), the Association of French-speaking Courts of Auditors (AISCCUF), the Francophone Network of Media Regulators (REFRAM), the Francophone Electoral Knowledge Network (RECEF) (established in August 2011), the International Francophone Network for Police Training (Francopol), etc., to which must be added the Parliamentary Assembly of la Francophonie (APF), which contributes to the capacity-building of African Parliaments.²⁹

From this brief overview, it is obvious that, through the operations of its specialist networks, the Francophonie, has an important "bottom-up" normative power on the African continent. But this power is diffuse and its effects will only be visible in the long term. By contrast, in terms of visibility as well as immediate effectiveness on conflict management, its comparative advantage is limited, and has even

²⁴ The frustration is tangible in the OIF Secretary General's activity report for the 2006-2008 period. See http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Paix_dem_dt_homme_Rapport_2006-2008.pdf, p. 34.

²⁵ Data gathered from the Secretary General's reports for the corresponding years (the observation of two rounds of an election is counted once).

²⁶ The AU dispatched its first long-term election observation mission in early 2013 in Kenya, demonstrating its commitment to undertaking even the most demanding of interventions, which previously were the preserve of more experienced organisations.

²⁷ Led by Pierre Buyoya, former president of Burundi, the mission counted some 70 observers, including a number of known political figures.

²⁸ Report published since 2004 by the OIF Delegation for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights, <http://www.francophonie.org/-Publications-et-documents-.html>.

²⁹ For further reading on the initiatives launched by these actors, aimed at strengthening the rule of law and democratic practices, see the corresponding sections on the biannual reports of the Secretary General, <http://www.francophonie.org/-Rapport-d-activites-du-Secretaire-.html>.

decreased over time despite the efforts made. This relative loss of ground is due to two factors. The first is related to the gradual rise of regional and sub-regional African organisations, in particular the AU and ECOWAS (SADC too, which also overlaps with the OIF's geographical area), across all fields of conflict prevention and management and peace-building.³⁰ This rise has been supported politically and financially by the major international actors (EU, Canada, USA, and the UN). The second is due to the nature and extent of the crises that affected a number of African members of the Francophonie in recent years (Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Niger, Mali, Chad, etc.); these have all been complex crises, where organisations capable of using the full array of crisis management instruments, including armed deployment to help secure political transition processes, have a comparative advantage. In many cases, the EU, the UN and increasingly often, the AU have led the charge, demoting the other actors, such as OIF (or the Commonwealth) to a supporting role. These actors, often represented by prominent public figures, continue to exercise a certain amount of influence, but have neither the advantage of neutrality or power – the two alternative tools a mediator must possess to be effective³¹ – not to mention comparable financial resources.³² At best, they can serve as a channel to convey certain political messages and provide targeted institutional support.

The Francophonie and peacekeeping

Since Saint Boniface, and even more so since the Québec Summit in 2008, the Francophonie has made the increased participation of its Members in UN and African peace operations one of its major objectives.³³ This drive, strongly supported by Canada, seconded by France and alternately by specialist networks,³⁴ was originally motivated by a technical weakness that needed addressing, i.e. the underrepresentation of French speakers among UN peacekeepers, despite a growing demand in the deployment and expansion of missions such as MINUSTAH in Haiti, MONUSCO in the DRC and UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire. Gradually increasing this participation has also become a political aim, motivated by OIF's desire to take its part in the global movement to shift the UN's responsibility in conflict management to "regional organisations and agreements" since the mid-1990s.³⁵

³⁰ Tavares R., and Bernardino L.B., *op. cit.*, p. 630.

³¹ Mediation specialists identify two (or three) types of approach, the main alternative being reduced to two: that of the "power mediator" who has enough power to impose a solution on the parties to the conflict, and that of the neutral mediator, seen as less threatening in order to win the parties' trust and guide them to coming to a solution together; see, for example, Siegfried M., Kirchhoff L., Wählich M., Lanz D., *op. cit.*, p. 10.

³² The budget allocated to the OIF's "mission B" (Promote peace, democracy and human rights) was €39.7m over the 2007-2009 period, or 13 million euro per year; http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/2006_Programmation_OIF9-2.pdf

³³ See, for example, the two sub-regional African forums organised in June and November 2009 in Bamako and Yaoundé respectively, available at: <http://www.operationspaix.net/21-activites-et-seminairesforum-regional-de-bamako.html>; <http://www.operationspaix.net/21-activites-et-seminairesforum-regional-de-yaounde.html>. A series of high-level seminars on the "political challenges of Francophone participation in peace operations" was also initiated for the 2012-2013 period by the OIF, France and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), see: <http://www.gcsp.ch/Leadership-in-Conflict-Management/Events/Conference-Series-on-Francophone-Countries-and-Peacekeeping-Political-and-Operational-Challenges-Addis-Ababa>.

³⁴ Namely the Peace Operations Network (ROP), a network of expertise and information-sharing on peacekeeping, based at the University of Montreal, <http://www.operationspaix.net>; and the Francophone Peace Operations Expert and Training Network (REFFOP), an online platform designed in the framework of OIF.

³⁵ See the latest UN Secretary General's biannual report on the topic: http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/7490~v~Cooperation_entre_IOrganisation_des_Nations_unies_et_les_organisations_regionales_ou_autres__S_2012_614_.

To what extent do the actions carried out contribute to expanding the strategic depth of la Francophonie on the African continent? This question lends itself to a more thorough empirical investigation than existing analyses, and for this, research initiated in an English-speaking context (!), provide a base.³⁶

Let us begin with the figures put forth to stress both the increase in needs and deployments.³⁷ As Michel Liégeois correctly points out, being a member of OIF is neither a reliable indicator of the capacity of personnel deployed to speak French, nor of their capacity to communicate with populations who, for the most part, have had at best a brief introduction to French at school and speak either in another dominant international language (English, Arabic, etc.) or in vernacular languages.³⁸ Based on a relatively sophisticated estimate using available data, the researcher observes that on average, only 12% of peacekeeping soldiers or police staff from OIF member states are actually French speakers.³⁹ In addition to the fact that French speakers are a minority in some of the major Francophone countries (Canada, Switzerland, Belgium, etc.), an estimate based on simpler parameters, using a very modest reference point that would be the fluency in French of 20% of the population, shows that only 10% of UN peacekeepers are actually French speakers (military staff and police) (9,972 out of 95,556).⁴⁰ Looking at UN missions deployed in Africa, the proportion is slightly higher, at 11% (8,186 out of a total of 71,752). For missions in “French-speaking” countries (with the same 20% floor of French speakers at a minimum), it reaches the much more significant figure of 45% – as such, it is comparable to the 42% of UN peacekeeping staff deployed in French-speaking countries in Africa. Statistically, this would mean that every second peacekeeping soldier in a French-speaking country does speak French, but this is of course purely theoretical considering the assumptions above. As Michel Liégeois concedes, one could come up with more precise estimates, but membership in OIF is not a performance indicator related to a good command of the French language in the peacekeeping field.⁴¹ In this context, OIF’s rationale for increasing Francophone participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and its efforts to achieve this seem to belong to a strategy of geopolitical positioning along the lines of the Hanoi Summit (1997), rather than to reflect an empirical reality.⁴²

Strangely, a similar argument does not appear to have been explicitly expressed for African Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Up until the deployment of MISMA in Mali, those remained limited, in the French-speaking area, to the modest MICOPAX (800 staff at the height of its deployment) in the Central African Republic.⁴³ One possible reading would be to consider that the OIF has already achieved its goals in terms of the deployment of the African Standby Force (ASF). Rwanda, since the outset, has been a major contributor to the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which became a joint mission in 2007 of the UA and the UN in Darfur (UNAMID) and has continuously represented 15-20% of its personnel. Burundi has been one of the main armed forces providers to AMISOM in Somalia since its creation in 2007, deploying 5.432 soldiers, or 30% of its personnel in September 2013.⁴⁴ However, it is evident that in both cases, with at best 5% of French

³⁶ See the special edition of *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 19, no. 3, August 2012.

³⁷ See, for example, Massie J., Morin D., *op. cit.*; Morin D. Theroux-Benoni L-A., *op. cit.*

³⁸ Liégeois M., June 2012, “Making Sense of a Francophone Perspective on Peace Operations: The Case of Belgium as a Minofrancophone State”, *International Peacekeeping*, 19 (3), p. 323, 327-328.

³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 321-322.

⁴⁰ 20% is the maximum, for both contributor countries and host countries. Sources: Observatoire de la Francophonie *Rapport sur la langue française dans le monde*, 2010, 1st part, “Le dénombrement des francophones”; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (figures from November 2012, <http://www.un.org/en>).

⁴¹ Liégeois M., *op. cit.*, p. 323.

⁴² On the OIF’s geopolitical and “geocultural” positioning, see Massie J. and Morin D., *op. cit.*, p. 317.

⁴³ Mission decided by the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX), deployed under the auspices of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), taking over in July 2008 from the Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC), deployed under the authority of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC).

⁴⁴ Figures extracted from UN statistics for Rwanda and statistics held by ROP for Burundi.

speakers,⁴⁵ these two countries have decided to deploy for reasons of their own – for Rwanda, to solidify its reputation as a peacemaker away from a Francophonie which it sees as mostly hostile, even if it remains a member;⁴⁶ for Burundi, to reap the benefits of a coincidence of interests with France, which is keen both to keep a foothold in the region and see the pool of African peacekeepers increase, whereas Bujumbura could re-train and equip its defence forces with the support from Paris. A similar observation had been made by Michel Liégeois on Belgium's decision to join UN peacekeeping via UNIFIL in 2006.⁴⁷

If one still wanted to contend that OIF matters, one would need to go beyond statistics and examine at least three other elements: the importance of the language in carrying out the mission, the number of management posts held, and influence on peacekeeping concepts. Only a few remarks on each of these elements are possible in the context of the present article.

Firstly, there is the importance of the language in carrying out the mission. French-speaking authors often argue that the mastery of the language is fundamental to communicate with local populations and the authorities for “complex” contemporary peace-building missions.⁴⁸ This argument is certainly valid for the civilian personnel on these missions, who interact daily with the local and national population and/or authorities. However, it is not this personnel, which is rarely under scrutiny, that the statistics refer to. The argument also holds for “individual” police staff, who generally work as advisors or mentors for their local counterparts. To a lesser extent, it may also be true for the members of the Formed Police Units (FPU) that may have to attempt to calm an agitated crowd. The statement is increasingly less valid when applied to military contingents, whereby only commanding officers and headquarters staff need to speak both the official country language and the language of the mission political-strategic command chain in order to be effective. Rather than considering overall peacekeeper statistics, therefore, a true indicator of representativeness should be based on identifying specific functions (civilian, military or police) within the mission for which a good command of French is essential. This would be a relatively painstaking and somewhat delicate process, politically speaking. Nevertheless, it would be in OIF's interest to look into the matter.

Secondly, management positions: figures, again, are lacking and the topic is sensitive. Assessing the strategic depth of Francophonie in peace operations would mean identifying the key positions within the mission, not only at command level but also at the level immediately below, which often plays a fundamental part in decision-making. For the African missions, one should also examine the presence of French speakers at strategic and planning headquarters. As regards UN missions, the global picture is quite mixed in terms of the presence of French speakers among leadership teams on the African continent. In the French-speaking zone, they are not absent, nor are they in a dominant position. At MONUSCO, for example, one of the two Deputy Special Representative positions has been held by a French speaker since late 2009 and that of Police Chief since 2010; however, the mission (including in its previous form, MONUC) has been led by non-Francophone speakers since 2003 except for very short interim periods. At UNOCI, the military operations command post has frequently been held by a French speaker, since the mission was created, although this is not the case of its political leadership.⁴⁹ Subject to further confirmation, it appears

⁴⁵ According to statistics provided by the Observatory of la Francophonie, *op. cit.*, p. 11, 14.

⁴⁶ Rwanda requested and obtained membership in the Commonwealth in 2009; it also decided to make English the primary teaching language from primary school level.

⁴⁷ Liégeois M., *op. cit.*, p. 326-327.

⁴⁸ For example, Morin D., Theroux-Benoni L-A., Zahar M-J., June 2012, “When Peacekeeping Intersects with la Francophonie: Scope, Significance and Implications”, *International Peacekeeping*, 19 (3), p. 291. The authors mainly draw on the work by Pouligny B., 2006, *Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People*, Bloomfield, Kumarianvery often cited in this context.

⁴⁹ The successive holders of these positions can be found on the ROP website: <http://www.operationspaix.net/123->

that the key position of Chief of Staff for the Special Representative has never been held by a French speaker in either case. As for UN missions in non-French-speaking African countries, it is difficult to find a single French speaker in a high level position.⁵⁰

To some extent, the AU seems more concerned with the need to balance French and English speakers at the helm of peacekeeping missions. AMISOM, for example, has been headed by a French-speaking mission chief since it was created in 2007.⁵¹ Can the Francophonie's success be observed in this political mandate? Or should the limits of its influence rather be observed in the military sphere? AMISOM has been under the military command of Uganda since its beginnings and Kenya, obtained the position of deputy commander as soon as it joined the mission (in mid-2012), whereas Burundi, whose contribution to the mission is on a par with that of Uganda's in both duration and determination, was by-passed.⁵²

The evolution of strategic direction positions at the AU's headquarters provides no further reason for optimism for French speakers. The transfer of responsibilities from Gabonese Jean Ping to South African Nkosazana Dlimini-Zuma in mid-2012, following a tough diplomatic battle, was seen by many Francophones as a defeat. At the same time, the position of Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission stayed with Kenya, the Political Affairs portfolio went to Gambia and that of Peace and Security remained with Algeria. It is therefore obvious that Francophone influence within the AU has been ebbing. As for the development of the ASF, it has been headed by a South African since the creation of the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) in 2003. As the main AU PSOs have been deployed for significant periods of time in non-francophone areas,⁵³ and the support from outside partners is fully internationalised, English has become the main language for ASF deployments.

Language, as we know, is one of the main vehicles by which culture is transmitted. This leads to the importance of concepts, the third conveyor of influence mentioned above. The influence of ideas and practices originating in the English-speaking world is evident in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In the field of PSOs in their strictest sense, a strong "transmission belt" was the series of workshops held in 2005-2006, when the AU set out the doctrine and core operational procedures of the ASF. These workshops were fully supported by all the international partners – English-speaking, French-speaking and others – but their conceptual underpinnings were inspired by the UN, which was at the time modernising its peacekeeping doctrine under the strong intellectual influence of US-based researchers⁵⁴ and an active input of British expertise – true, great support was also provided by Canada. The choice of the term "peace support (PSO)" rather than "peacekeeping" in the African context is not unrelated to these intellectual origins. In the wider spectrum of domains covered by APSA, there was no need to wait for the "roadmap" specifying its content in June 2011,⁵⁵ to see that the main concepts concerning peacebuilding, including the key issue of security sector reform (SSR), were part of the AU's doctrine, beginning with the Framework Document for Reconstruction and Development adopted in 2006.⁵⁶ The SSR concept, as highlighted by

opertaions/dirigeants-de-l-operation-onuci.html

⁵⁰ See the ROP site for each of these missions: <http://www.operationspaix.net/operations-en-cours.html>

⁵¹ The post of Special Representative for Somalia and head of AMISOM was held by Nicolas Bwakira, of Burundi from 2007-2009, then Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, of Mali, followed in November 2012 by Mahamat Saleh Annadif of Chad. <http://www.operationspaix.net/1-opertaions/dirigeants-de-l-operation-amisom.html>

⁵² The post of AMISOM Commander was finally entrusted to Burundi in December 2013.

⁵³ The deployment of the two AU operations in Francophone areas, MISCA in CAR and MISMA in Mali, was relatively limited (Dec. 2013-Sept. 2014 for MISCA and Dec. 2012-July 2013 for MISMA) as those mission were meant as bridging solutions until the UN could deploy.

⁵⁴ Namely from New York University's Centre for International Cooperation.

⁵⁵ The roadmap was finalized by the experts in June 2011, its core ideas having been approved in a high level meeting in Zanzibar in November 2010.

⁵⁶ Document available at: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pcrd-policy-framwowork-eng.pdf>.

Sophie Besancenot, was imported by the French-speaking world from English-speaking thought processes and practices.⁵⁷ Adapting it to a different mould continues to pose difficulties, not only in France, as she describes, but in a parts of French-speaking Africa.⁵⁸ This is notably the case in the perimeter of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the only REC to be almost exclusively French-speaking, and whose representatives frequently feel marginalised during discussions at AU level.⁵⁹

To conclude, subject to more in-depth investigation, the “Francophone reality” observed by David Morin and Lori-Anne Thérout-Bénoni in the domain of peacekeeping⁶⁰ would appear to be only weakly materialised in Africa. Considering it an instrument of “strategic depth” would require moving away from the essentially quantitative approach that has prevailed until now to try and assess qualitatively the role of French speakers in conceptual and decision-making positions within peace operations.

Political and security choices with regard to Francophone affiliation

The third indicator chosen to assess the strategic depth of the Francophonie in Africa rests in the degree of influence that the membership of a state in its political-cultural community exercises on that state’s position and decisions in the major political, economic and security-related issues concerning Africa or, in the case of an African state, major international issues. Once again, a detailed assessment would go far beyond the scope of this article, but partial evidence can be collected. Let us look at three case studies bearing on priority issues for the states observed.

Case number one: the election of a new President of the AU Commission in 2012. As discussed above, this election was marked by a fierce competition between the outgoing Francophone President, Gabonese Jean Ping, and the South African candidate, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, stemming from a rising power on the continent, who notably criticised the former for his lack of firmness in handling the Libyan and Côte d'Ivoire crises. Without entering into the successive surprise turns in this election, it seems that membership in OIF may have played a certain role, creating a degree of support for Jean Ping from Francophone countries, but this must be put into perspective. Firstly, in purely mathematical terms, had the 29 members of OIF out of the 54 AU members voted as a single bloc, the Gabonese candidate would have been elected for another term. By contrast, support from countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia and Algeria for the Gabonese candidate⁶¹ was mainly due to their concerns over the added clout this would give to South Africa on the continent and the noncompliance with the tacit rule that none of the five top AU budget contributors should hold the presidency – independently of cultural and linguistic factors.⁶² Ultimately, SADC’s rallying power, under South

⁵⁷ Besancenot S., June 2012, “An Anglophone Invention? The Difficult Emergence of a French Security Sector Reform Practice”, *International Peacekeeping*, 19 (3), p. 348-350. At the AU, one of the major transmission belts appears to have been the United Nations Development Programme, in turn influenced by DFID, rather than the OECD, as was the case for France according to Sophie Besancenot's analysis.

⁵⁸ Guicherd C., 2013, « Renforcer les appareils sécuritaires en Afrique centrale : quelle réponse des partenaires ? », in Gnanguenon A. (dir.), *Les Défis stratégiques africains : la gestion de la conflictualité en Afrique centrale*, Études de l'IRSEM n° 25, p. 85-100.

⁵⁹ Author's personal experience during a four-and-a-half year appointment to ECCAS.

⁶⁰ Morin D., Theroux-Benoni L-A., *op. cit.*, p. 1-2.

⁶¹ As the ballot was secret, the final choice of each is not known.

⁶² Among the many comments, see: The Guardian, July 16 2012, “African Union chooses first female leader”, *the Guardian.co.uk*: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/16/african-union-first-female-leader>; Ashiru O., August 12 2012 “Perspectives on Nigeria at the African Union”, *thisdaylive.com*: <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/perspectives-on-nigeria-at-the-african-union/122201/>; Boisbouvier C., Boisselet P., Kappès-Grangé 1., January 29 2012, « Union africaine : duel au sommet entre Ping et Dlamini-Zuma » *jeuneafrique.com* : <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2663p033-035.xml0/>

African leadership, far outweighed the only francophone-majority REC, ECCAS, when it came to uniting its member states, including the “heavyweights” belonging to both organisations, Angola and the DRC.

The second case is the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in late 2010/early 2011, which both worried and captivated Africans. Membership in OIF, while not devoid of influence, would appear to have played only a secondary or accessory role in relation to other factors determining the strategic positions of the key stakeholders and, eventually, the outcome. Thus it is as much on the basis of the Bamako Declaration and its subsequent commitments as in accordance with the “African Governance Architecture”,⁶³ which share a commitment to democracy and the rule of law, that ECOWAS and the AU, in the immediate aftermath of the election results announced by the National Electoral Commission, called for the parties – i.e., the supporters of outgoing president Gbagbo and those of Alassane Ouattara – to respect the result of the elections carried out in line with the process set out by the United Nations in 2007.⁶⁴ Another point is that while the French call for the use of force at the UN was a reflection of France's analysis and interests,⁶⁵ Resolution 1975, authorising this use, was supported in New York by both France and Nigeria. Indeed, Nigeria was determined not to see ECOWAS' authority and position, which it had largely contributed to shape, challenged by Laurent Gbagbo. Ultimately, the factors explaining African countries' positions on the mode of resolution of the conflict seem to have been primarily related to international and sub-regional geopolitics, rather than to language policy. This is one way of explaining the South African campaign to try and project the AU in the lead of crisis management attempts, at a time when pressure was rising from Western countries on the UN to adopt a resolution authorising the use of force to neutralise Colonel Gaddafi's regime in Libya, undermining the hopes of the continent to “find African solutions to African problems”. The solution preferred by Pretoria, however, in the form of a mediation by five heads of state from the five sub-regions of the continent,⁶⁶ was caught short by the acceleration of events in the UN context. South Africa's attempted involvement in ECOWAS's (and in particular Nigeria's) backyard, and its pursuit of an agenda that apparently favoured President Gbagbo – at odds with the sub-regional institution's position – is a credible explanation for the outcome.⁶⁷ Incidentally, it can be noticed that African states' positions in the conflict were marked by old partisan solidarities – e.g. the relative proximity of the South African and Angolan leaderships to President Gbagbo – which were not so different from the partisan alignments visible at the French level.⁶⁸

Another type of situation is related to the peace and security engagements of Francophone states from the North on the African continent. These are essentially France, Belgium, Switzerland and Canada. The matter

⁶³ On APSA, see: <http://www.iag-agi.org/spip/Les-valeurs-partagees-et-l.html>.

⁶⁴ Statements issued by the AU Peace and Security Council on 9 December 2010 and 28 January 2011, available at: <http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/41-resources>; Meetings of the heads of state and government of ECOWAS on 7 and 24 December 2010:

<http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=188&lang=fr&annee=2010>

⁶⁵ These interests included a certain desire for revenge against Laurent Gbagbo, with whom relations had deeply deteriorated since late 2004.

⁶⁶ The high level group set up by the AU Summit on 30-31 January 2011 included President Compaoré of Burkina Faso, President Déby of Chad, President Zuma of South Africa, President Kikwete of Tanzania and President Ould Abdel Aziz of Mauritania.

⁶⁷ Voice of America, February 8 2011, “ECOWAS: S. Africa Undermining Ivory Coast Mediation”, *voanews.com*: <http://www.voanews.com/content/ecowas-president-says-south-africa-undermining-ivory-coast-mediation-115634659/134784.html> ; Lynch C., 23rd February 2011, “On Ivory Coast diplomacy, South Africa goes its own way”, *Foreign Policy Magazine*.

⁶⁸ AFP, December 3 2010, «Socialistes français et Laurent Gbagbo, une histoire ancienne», *lepoint.fr*: http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/socialistes-francais-et-laurent-gbagbo-une-histoire-ancienne-03-12-2010-1270695_20.php

cannot be treated exhaustively here, but it is worth looking at a few strategic features of the French, Belgian and Canadian engagements.

On the French side, a striking aspect is a parallel withdrawal of national engagements (at least up to Operation Serval in Mali) and the development of multilateral engagements, mainly in the EU's context. This is particularly the case in the realm of peace and security, so much so that it would not be an exaggeration to say, as Niagalé Bagayoko and Sebastien Nivet suggest, that France seeks to turn Africa into an experimental ground for the EU's common security and defence policy (CSDP).⁶⁹ This has been the guiding principle since Operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003 up to the EUCAP Sahel SSR and training mission deploying in Niger since 2011 and later extended to Mali, including EUFOR DRC in 2006 and EUFOR Chad/CAR in 2008-2009:⁷⁰ those missions were all deployed at France's initiative and France was the majority contributor in terms of personnel, logistics, planning and diplomatic mobilisation. There is no question that the CSDP missions in Africa have been facilitated by the colonial legacy of France (and Belgium, in the case of the DRC). Whether they aim to perpetuate it in another form is entirely possible, but this could only be a secondary motivation, ranking behind the desire to promote CSDP as a fundamental element of European construction, while addressing risks of concern to all France's EU partners (even though not all systematically share the same assessment of their nature and degree). The operations carried out in the DRC, for example, were a response to a strategic assessment shared by all EU countries concerning the importance of stabilising the country as a condition to achieve peace and security in the Great Lakes Region, and even across all of Africa. This assessment resulted in a lasting multidimensional engagement, including military stabilisation missions, SSR mission (EUSEC RDC and EUPOL Kinshasa/DRC), electoral assistance, "shuttle diplomacy" through a special envoy, the allocation of considerable bilateral and multilateral resources to finance reconstruction, as well as the European contribution to MONUC/MONUSCO over the years.⁷¹

As for the EU commitment in the Sahel – deployment of the EUTM mission providing assistance in restructuring and training of the Malian armed forces, and significant logistical and financial support in the deployment of MISMA through bilateral channels⁷² –, while it was certainly accelerated by the French intervention in Mali in January 2013, it is based on a common European strategy ("Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel"). In the implementation of this strategy, Spain had taken a lead role alongside France.⁷³ The EU commitment to the Sahel is fully in keeping with what was, prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the "third pillar" of EU policy ("Justice and Internal Affairs"), including the Schengen Agreement and the counterterrorism policies implemented since 2001 and accompanied by increasingly weighty financing through the Instrument for Stability/Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.⁷⁴ In terms of capability

⁶⁹ Bagayoko N., January 2005, « L'Afrique, nouveau terrain d'expérimentation de la PESD » in *L'eupéanisation de la défense*, IRSEM Les Champs de Mars n°16, Paris, La documentation française ; " ; Bagayoko N., Gibert M., May 2009, "The European Union in Africa: the linkage between security, governance and development from an institutional perspective", *Journal of Development Studies*, issue 5, volume 45, , p. 790-815 ; Nivet S., June 2010, « Relations entre l'UE et l'Afrique subsaharienne dans les domaines de la sécurité et de la défense », *Défense nationale*, n° 731, p. 69-70.

⁷⁰ For details on these missions, see the European External Action Service website:

<http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?lang=fr>

⁷¹ For more information on the EU's development programmes in the DRC, see the website of the EU Delegation in Kinshasa: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/congo_kinshasa/projects/overview/index_fr.htm; for CSDP missions, see: <http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?lang=fr>. For the year mid-2012 to mid-2013 alone, the MONUSCO budget amount falling to the five greatest European contributors to the UN peacekeeping budget (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom) came to over €350 million.

⁷² The EUTM, which was in preparation for several months, was launched by the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 17 January 2013.

⁷³ The EUCAP Sahel/Niger head of mission was a Spanish officer from its launch in July 2012 to November 2013, and in March 2015 Spain had the largest contingent in the EU military training mission in Mali, EUTM Mali (125 out of 519).

⁷⁴ See the 2011 annual report on the Instrument for Stability, Brussels, July 24 2012:

development programmes, a dual observation can be made. On the one hand, the transfer of the RECAP⁷⁵ training programme to the EU as part of the "Amani Africa" exercises has been accompanied by a slow but sure dilution of the French influence as the teams have become more and more international,⁷⁶ and the concept transformed through successive changes. The challenge for the Francophonie will be to ensure that the system in place for Amani II reserves the possibility for French speakers to properly contribute, in particular by having French documentation accessible in time.⁷⁷ On the other hand, the availability of significant EU resources (namely through the African Peace Facility)⁷⁸ allows France to pursue certain programmes, despite the reduction of its own resources. However, these programmes appear overall to be too focused on tactical levels and technical specialities to have an impact in terms of strategic depth in the sense previously studied.

Shifting the analysis to Belgium, it is possible to observe, like for France, a dual trend to promote the EU as an international player and use European policies to support national objectives. This trend is, however, carried out in a broader perspective, including not only security, but also diplomatic action and development assistance. For example, Belgium has unquestionably been the driving force to promote EU engagement in the Great Lakes Region in general, and in the DRC in particular. The personal involvement of Louis Michel, as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1999-2004), and as European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid (2004-2009), considerably shaped both Belgian national policy and EU policy towards the region. The figure of Louis Michel illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of a Francophonie impersonated by senior politicians: both highly visible and influential, these politicians are capable of having a serious "strategic" impact; for the same reasons, however, their action is evidently subject to criticism.⁷⁹ In any case, the involvement of French-speaking Belgium in the Great Lakes certainly helped the Francophonie's strategic depth to endure in the region, whilst the multinational nature of conflict management there since the late 1990s has tended to submerge French speakers under a growing majority of English-speakers. This, however, appears to be a side benefit of the national and European objectives pursued by the Belgian state rather than the result of a direct attempt to ensure the impact of Francophonie.

Politically, Canada seems to be the driver of Francophone engagement in conflict prevention and peacekeeping. The Saint Boniface agenda on human security, the creation of the *Réseau des Opérations de Paix* (Peace Operations Network), the commitment of the Ottawa Summit to increase Francophone presence in peacekeeping, etc. are all products of Canadian initiatives. This has not happened by coincidence but is the result of a skilful use by Canada of the channel of la Francophonie to create awareness among the Member States on issues that, at least for a certain period, shaped the image Ottawa wished to project to the outside world: strong advocacy of UN peacekeeping demonstrated by its presidency of the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations ("C34") for a number of years, expansion of the human security agenda that Canada strived to spread internationally in the 1990s.⁸⁰ Looking at the projection of these political engagements in Africa, what can be observed? Firstly, Africa accounts for a relatively modest part of Canada's engagement in manpower and financial resources compared to other

http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/docs/ifs_annual_report_2012_en.pdf

⁷⁵ *Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix*.

⁷⁶ This trend is bound to continue, with the transfer of the European planning team from Paris to Brussels, from Amani I (completed in 2010) to Amani II (which was launched in late 2011).

⁷⁷ Personal experience of the author. Having participated in several sessions of the Amani I exercise, the author observed how difficult it was for the French speakers to avoid being marginalised.

⁷⁸ For details on the Facility's commitments, see: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries-territories-and-regions-where-we-are-active_en

⁷⁹ See Onana C., 2012, *Europe, Crimes et Censure au Congo*, Paris, Duboiris.

⁸⁰ See Ménard S., September 2008, *La Sécurité humaine aujourd'hui*, Université du Québec à Montréal: http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/Collaboration_speciale_-_SecuHumaine_-_Menard.pdf, p. 20-25.

regions of the world, such as Central and Latin America, with the exception of Sudan (North and South).⁸¹ In March 2009, the Global Peace and Security Fund (an umbrella fund covering the Global Peace and Security Programme; the Global Peace Operations Programme and the Glyn Berry Peace and Security Programme) financed initiatives totalling approximately (in Canadian dollars) 45 million for Afghanistan, 33.5 million for Haiti, 108 million for Sudan and 36 million for the rest of Africa – 1.3 million of which went to a Francophone country (DRC) and 17 million for pan-African programmes that could reach both French-speaking and English-speaking countries.⁸² More recent figures indicate a continued preference to concentrate funding on Sudan and the DRC, however without specifying the budgets allocated to the DRC.⁸³ The allocation of 1 million to AMISOM in 2011 is proof of the special attention given by Canada to the East and the Horn of Africa.⁸⁴ Otherwise, Africa, and especially French-speaking Africa, appears as the “poor cousin” in terms of military and police peacekeeping deployment: 47 personnel in total in November 2012, with 9 in MONUSCO and 9 in ONUCI.⁸⁵ Despite these limitations, Canada’s involvement in human security and peace operations on the African continent bears the inherent potential to bolster Francophone presence in these domains, not because it favours French as a common language – as remarked above, this only happens occasionally – but due to the bilingualism of its personnel and approach. Thanks to this asset, Canada can offer support indiscriminately to French or English speaking countries as necessary (e.g. for UNAMID in Sudan, Canada supported Senegal and Burkina Faso alongside Uganda and Kenya; similarly, the Pearson Centre’s “African Police Forces for Peace” project was aimed at both French and English speakers),⁸⁶ and it can fully incorporate bilingualism in the programmes it carries out or supports, especially at strategic level (e.g. the NJIWA exercise to strengthen planning and conduct capacities of the ASF, held in October-November 2012;⁸⁷ the training ASF mission leaders (Senior Mission Leaders - SLM programme)).⁸⁸

To conclude this general outline – which would truly require further empirical investigation –, it seems that belonging to the Francophonie, while it gives Member States room to manoeuvre on the African continent, is not the determining factor of their engagement. This is true both for Northern countries and for African actors themselves. In both cases, the geopolitical considerations that stem from national interests on the one hand, and the role of regional integration organisations on the other, are much more powerful driving forces than the attraction or rejection of the Francophone world. French-speaking Member States of the EU, the AU or ECOWAS value membership in these communities in priority, over membership in OIF.

⁸¹ For greater detail on the development of this policy, see Stéphane Jans’ article on Haiti in the present review.

⁸² Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, February 2011, *Évaluation du Programme pour la paix et la sécurité mondiale*, p. 18, 20.

⁸³ Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Commerce et Développement du Canada, « Le Groupe de Travail sur la Stabilisation et la Reconstruction (GTSR) en Haïti » *international.gc.ca*: <http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/where-ou.aspx?lang=fra&view=d>

⁸⁴ Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Commerce et Développement du Canada, « Le Canada et l’Union africaine » *international.gc.ca* :

⁸⁵ The number had dropped to 9 in February 2015: 1 in MINUSMA and 8 in MONUSCO. Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping is extremely limited: 149 in total in November 2012 (90 in February 2015).

⁸⁶ Translator’s note: The Pearson Centre ceased to operate as of November 28, 2013.

⁸⁷ www.pearsoncentre.org.

⁸⁸ <http://peaceau.org>.

Conclusion

The dynamics of regional integration, European on one side and African on the other, are currently reshaping the central space which created the political-cultural environment in which the Francophonie arose, and from where it deploys its institutional action. The EU's affirmative stance, not only as an economic, but also as a political and security actor,⁸⁹ together with the slow but irreversible strengthening of the AU and the RECs, have led to the emergence of new centres of gravity that give direction to the action of Member States in peace and security affairs on the African continent. The development of privileged partnerships between the EU and Africa in the general context of APSA in the past ten years lends an even greater attraction force to these centres.⁹⁰ In relative terms, the power of other solidarities, such as formed by the sharing of a common language, is fading as a determining factor of action.

Despite the promises made in Hanoi in 1997, and assiduously reiterated since, to give a political dimension to la Francophonie, the real effects of this pledge on the African continent remain short of the intentions expressed. This does not necessarily mean that the pursuit of the Francophonie's strategic depth is in vain. However, it may mean that its most effective conveyers are not political action alone but, increasingly, expertise-based programmes contributing to translating new concepts and establishing new structures to underpin the development of democratic institutions and strengthen national and collective approaches to conflict management and peacebuilding.⁹¹ This is a long-term, barely visible action, but one that will have far-reaching effects, as it has normative value.

These efforts notwithstanding, it is impossible to ignore the fact that none of the Francophone countries (in the sense defined above) counts among the economic "heavyweights" in Africa, a privilege reserved for South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt, and that only a few feature among the continents "middleweights" (Senegal, possibly again Côte d'Ivoire), while the social and economic prospects of the majority of Central African countries – which are mainly French-speaking – and Western African – which are partially French-speaking – remain uncertain, and even mediocre.⁹² It is reasonable to suppose that, in the end, the strategic depth of the Francophonie in Africa will depend on the capacity of those countries to compensate for this disparity in economic capacity, which is the only way for them to acquire a voice in decision-making bodies.

⁸⁹ In particular due to the Lisbon Treaty.

⁹⁰ On these partnerships, see for example Nivet S., *op. cit.* .

⁹¹ On this point, see the introduction by Frederic Ramel to this review.

⁹² Cilliers J., Hughes B., Moyer J., 2011, *African Futures 2050*, Institute of Security Studies, Pardee Centre for International Futures, p. 27-36.

■ FRANCOPHONE STRATEGIES IN VIETNAM

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From myth to reality

Of all the continents, Asia – with two to three million French speakers out of the estimated 220 million in the world today – has the least amount of French speakers, despite its population of around three billion. These humble figures however hide a different reality from one country to another. France's imperialist history, especially during the colonial era, created affinity and cultural and linguistic synergy which are still strongly felt, though to a lesser extent than in the past, in the member states of the International Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF): in Cambodia (406,500 French speakers, or 3% of the population), in Laos (173,800; 3 %) and in Vietnam (623,200; 0.7%), not to mention Vanuatu (110,000; 45%) and Thailand (562,000; 0.8%), which became an observer member in 2008.¹

In terms of French language learners, there are about 100,000 in Cambodia, 40,000 in Laos, 50,000 in Thailand, 145,000 in Vietnam and beyond the Indochina peninsula, 15,000 in Singapore (where French is now the primary foreign language taught in schools) and in Malaysia, 25,000 in Indonesia, 50,000 in South Korea, 55,000 in China, 200,000 in Japan and 536,000 in India, where it continues to be the primary foreign language taught, despite the loss of its status as "first compulsory foreign language", in 1989, replaced by the official languages of the Indian states. In short, French is maintaining, evening strengthening its role as a language of culture, a doorway to an elitist education.² While the French presence in Asia today depends mostly on language and educational cooperation projects, and the resolute determinism of francophone investors – which also explains its modest reach – Vietnam is a unique case, because despite history's vagaries, it was one of the rare, if not the only country in Asia to get fully behind the Francophonie as a political movement, in both the bilateral and multilateral aspects.

Many still believe that colonial Vietnam was majorly French-speaking. Some enjoy the idea that Vietnam as an independent and reunified state would have remained as such. Helped by these distorting prisms, these myths continue to persist. However, the figures speak for themselves: a little over 600,000 Francophones out of 90 million inhabitants. Growing numbers of French tourists³ are beginning to realise that Vietnamese people speak mostly Vietnamese, and the language of Shakespeare has practically replaced the language of Molière. Even in the association that unites ten South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which Vietnam joined in 1995 – English has always been the only official working language.⁴ For the postcolonial states that were

¹ OIF, 2010, *La Langue française dans le monde*, Paris, Hachette. In Thailand, the appeal of la francophonie is encouraged by the Francophilia of the royal family. The same is true in Cambodia, where King Norodom Sihamoni, the former ambassador for his country at UNESCO in Paris, speaks French as well as his father before him, Norodom Sihanouk, who supported the francophone movement from its early years, alongside the notable Léopold Sédar Senghor.

² Figures provided by the Department for Cultural Cooperation and Action in the French Embassy in Bangkok, and completed by statistics sourced and published online in late 2008 by the Bureau international de l'édition française (BIEF).

³ 99,700 in 2001; over 211,000 in 2011, placing France at the top of the European countries, behind Asian tourists, and in second place among western countries behind the United States (source: General Statistics Office: http://www.vietnamtourism.com/f_pages/news/index.asp?loai=2&uid=20114).

⁴ In 1967, the five founding members of ASEAN adopted this decision spontaneously and pragmatically, without making it official in the Bangkok Declaration that founded the association on August 8 1967. The use of English did not become official until November 2007, in Article 34 of the Charter of ASEAN: Kirkpatrick A., June 2008, "English as the official working language of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean): Features and strategies", *English Today* n°2 vol. 24, p. 27.

long under Anglo-American cultural influence, such as Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and even Indonesia, and later Brunei and Burma, this was a natural choice, even if it did stem from different policies towards English culture and language, and extremely varying levels of language competency in each country. For the countries of former French Indochina, English made its grand entrance earlier than we tend to imagine, from the second half of the 1950s, taking advantage of the growing involvement of the United States in the region.

This modest number of French speakers in Vietnam does little to show the slow and inexorable decline since the end of the colonial era, sped up by the success of the English language in the world. From a purely numerical perspective, the general trend would seem rather favourable since the end of the Cold War: French speakers were estimated at 70,000 people in 1990, generally older in age, equal to a mere 0.1% of the population.⁵ What is even more surprising is the number of students of French was lower during the colonial period than it is today. Even if historians agree to acknowledge that in Indochina, “*the French government made a significant effort to increase French teaching*”,⁶ especially if we compare the situation to neighbouring China or the Dutch East Indies at the same period,⁷ only 70,000 students were learning French in 1942, or 10% of all Vietnamese students and less than 1% of Franco-indigenous secondary education in Vietnam.⁸ In 1954, the year the Geneva Conventions were signed and the political-strategic torch was passed from France to the United States in South Vietnam, there were only around ten thousand enrolled in French public education, and slightly more in religious education.⁹

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam did however devote itself to the Francophonie: it renewed its cultural and language cooperation projects with France in stages, before becoming a member of the OIF. It made the French language a key to opening up the country in the 1990s, going as far as suggesting that ASEAN introduce French as a second official working language, when it was making its application to the regional association.¹⁰ Vietnam is not *francophone* in the linguistic sense, but the desire of its leaders have until now shown, despite plenty of obstacles, that they are devoted to a true level of Francophonie and to promoting the OIF, evidence of their belief that it can serve great purpose in their foreign policy: it encourages the regional and international integration of Vietnam; strengthens the strategic glaxis that Vietnam is trying to create, a country that has had to take up arms against the imperialist ambitions of France, the United States and China. It is the paradox of this Francophonie which is otherwise “ambiguous”,¹¹ or at least extremely pragmatic, that we must now try to explain, beginning with the mention of the role of the French language and culture in the constitution of contemporary Vietnamese identity.

⁵ Figures from the High Council of la Francophonie quoted in Figures: collective, *Information Report n°1* by the Senate Committee for Cultural Affairs, 1997-1998- fact-finding mission carried out in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on la francophonie and French teaching: http://www.senat.fr/rap/r97-001/r97-001_toc.html.

⁶ Brocheux P., Hemery D., 2001, *Indochine, la colonisation ambiguë, 1858-1954*, Paris, La Découverte, p. 215.

⁷ Thao T.V., 1995, *L'École française en Indochine*, Paris, Karthala, p. 149-150.

⁸ This figure does not take into account the 85,000 students who received beginner French lessons in elementary Franco-indigenous education (Brocheux P., Hemery D., *op. cit.*, appendix X at the end of the work). On the origins and evolution of colonial education in Indochina: Bezançon P., 2002, *Une colonisation éducatrice? L'expérience indochinoise (1860-1945)*, Paris, L'Harmattan.

⁹ Journoud P., 2002 «Face-à-face culturel au Sud-Vietnam, 1954-1965», in collective work, *Entre rayonnement et réciprocité. Contributions à l'histoire de la diplomatie culturelle*, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, p. 155.

¹⁰ Kirkpatrick A., *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹¹ As described by Trang P.T.H., 2005, *La francophonie au Vietnam, du fait colonial à la mondialisation: un enjeu identitaire*, political science thesis under the supervision of Professors Jean-Paul Joubert and Tran Van Minh, Université Jean-Moulin Lyon 3, p. 15, taking inspiration from the title of the work by Brocheux P., Hemery D., *op. cit.*

Continuity and revival of the Francophone objective

The language battle, from colonisation to the Sino-Vietnamese war

The language and culture aspect, though it was not the driving force behind colonisation, was a part of the “civilising mission” that the colonial project included, from the outset. While the French geographer, Onésime Reclus, official creator of this neologism in 1886, had no belief whatsoever that “the Francophonie” could be spread in and across “Cochinchina”, as opposed to Africa,¹² others liked the idea that spreading the French language would help build an “Asian France” in Indochina, solidly connected to “European France” through a “community of ideas and sentiments”. Emile Aymonier, director of the Colonial School, understood perfectly the importance of cultural diplomacy based on the spread of language, long before the Minister for Foreign Affairs decided to make it one of the key principles of French cultural policy in the world after 1945: “*The complete transplantation of our language in Indochina is the only thing that can compensate for the cost and the heavy sacrifices of men and money that this distant conquest caused us; furthermore, they will compensate us a hundredfold. [...] Our Asian subjects, on their way to becoming our fellow citizens, will have access to books specially written for them, and more, they will drink directly from the fountain of French spirit, science and intellectual life...*”¹³ The utopian vision of total Gallicisation of the Vietnamese elite, a project dear to Governor Albert Sarraut, soon met with reality, especially in this land where the number of native French never exceeded the 50,000 mark. Instead, a unique form of bilingualism developed. The traditional *chu nom*, based on sinograms, gradually gave way to *Quoc Ngu*, the Latin script for Vietnamese with diacritical signs, formed in the 16th and 17th centuries by Portuguese and French Catholic missions to encourage evangelisation, and supported in the early 20th century by the colonial authorities in education and the press, as an easier language for daily use. In an unexpected twist, the Vietnamese intelligentsia and patriots took this simplified language and turned it into “an instrument of expression, communication and combat”, a modern national language that was constantly strengthened by words borrowed from French, especially in the scientific and technical fields.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the adoption of the French language and culture, limited to a small group of elites, nurtured close ties between Vietnamese and French. The sincere and unwavering attachment of this minority to the French language, from which it was nonetheless cut off in North Vietnam during the Indochina wars, even transcended the political-military vicissitudes that Vietnam experienced during the second half of the 20th century. For this generation of patriots, the French language and culture gave them a means to not only strengthen their unique culture in relation to China, but more importantly it gave them access to a form of modernity which was previously ignored by Confucian education that was relatively fixed— literary, scientific and technological as well as political and revolutionary modernity.¹⁵ This culture brought with it, in the words of Ambassador Albert Salon, “*powerful antidotes to the exercise of domination*”,¹⁶ which the dissident pupils of the Franco-indigenous educational system incorporated in their revolutionary combat, like their master Ho Chi Minh:¹⁷ “*France*

¹² “We saw Blacks and Reds adopt the language of non-colonial conquerors, but they were infant tribes without cohesion, patriotism, history, art or literature. The Cochinchinese do have traditions, a written language, fanaticism, and they are supported by 500 million brothers, the Chinese, who speak a language similar to their own. Our 1,550,000 Cochinchinese and our 900,000 Cambodians will undoubtedly never speak French as their national tongue; it is more likely to be Chinese” Reclus O., 1886, *France, Algérie et colonies*, Paris, Hachette, p. 418 – extract translated from the French. Like many of his contemporaries in the 1880s, Reclus had realized that widespread French in Indochina would be impossible, but he misjudged the success of Chinese.

¹³ Aymonier E., 1890, *La Langue française et l’enseignement en Indochine*, Paris, A. Colin, p. 6-7 and 10. Extract translated from the French.

¹⁴ Brocheux P., 2011, *Histoire du Vietnam contemporain*, Paris, Fayard, p. 44.

¹⁵ Brocheux P., Hemery D., *op. cit.*, p. 302 *et sq.*

¹⁶ Salon A., 1981, *L’Action culturelle de la France dans le monde*, PhD thesis, Paris I, p. 1487.

¹⁷ Thao V.T., *op. cit.*, p. 296-297. Venerated in Vietnam as the founding father of the Indochinese Communist Party and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh found great appeal in certain French literary works of the 19th century. For example, he referred to *Les Misérables* as a “magnificent” work upon reading it in 1908, while he was a student at Hue (Dang T.H, Dang A.D, 2001, “La réception de Victor Hugo au Vietnam”, *Victor Hugo en Extrême-Orient*, Paris, Maisonneuve & Larose, p. 64).

brought oppression, as well as freedom”, Vietnamese anti-colonialist intellectual Nguyen An Ninh judiciously remarked in the early 1930s.¹⁸ In southern Vietnam, no longer imposed by part of the Vietnamese intelligentsia, la francophonie – language, education and culture – managed to resist the policy enforced by its governments to spread Vietnamese language and culture, and the spread of English encouraged by the United States in a cultural offensive that was closely related to a significant military and economic aid policy. In the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, rapidly supplanted by the radical “Vietnamization” of the education system in 1945¹⁹ and a few years later by the introduction of Chinese, Russian, German and even English in schools,²⁰ it all but disappeared until the end of the Vietnam War.²¹

A short time after the military reunification of April 1975, while a largely French-speaking Cambodia fell into the murderous folly of the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese authorities attempted to convince their French contacts of their desire to free themselves from the doubly controlling Chinese and Soviet influence by rebuilding ties with France: they had to seize the opportunity while the “*last generation of French-speakers*”²² were still present. However, hopes for economic and cultural cooperation that were confirmed during the visit of remarkable francophone and Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong in 1977 in Paris, were brutally destroyed by the beginning of the third Indochina war, less than two years later. In the early 1980s, the now exclusive alliance with the USSR led the Vietnamese government to relegate French to third position in schools, to be replaced by compulsory Russian, declared a “strategic priority” language, and English, while Chinese disappeared from secondary school curricula, a victim of the war of February 1979 between the two former allies. As a result, the francophone leanings shown by the authorities after the reunification could not become anything more before the beginning of the economic and cultural liberalisation of the regime in the mid-1980s, and the end of the wars in Indochina.²³

A climate that encouraged a limited revival of bilateral francophonie

Thirty years of war, followed by a decade of Cambodian occupation and collectivisation policy drove Vietnam to the verge of ruin. Economic and financial collapse was narrowly avoided thanks to the decisions made by its leaders – after the death of Lê Duan and when the Communist Party of Vietnam held its 6th National Congress in December 1986 – in favour of a new policy of economic and cultural openness: the *Doi Moi* (“Renovation”) policy.²⁴ When Chinese aid programmes ceased following the naval battle of 1988 in

¹⁸ Brocheux P., *op. cit.*, p. 82.

¹⁹ This, as Pierre Brocheux correctly states, “*might be considered the logical outcome of an obvious situation that the most perspicacious of French people had been aware of from the beginning*” (P. BROCHEUX and D. HEMERY, *Indochine, la colonisation ambiguë, 1858-1954, op. cit.*, p. 222).

²⁰ Despite the war against the US, English replaced French in the 1960s as the third foreign language in schools, after Russian and Chinese (Trang P.T.H., thesis cited, p. 85).

²¹ On this period: Journoud P., 2007, *Les Relations franco-américaines à l'épreuve du Vietnam, 1954-1975. De la défiance dans la guerre à la coopération pour la paix*, doctoral thesis in history under the direction of Robert Frank, Université Paris I, p. 327-351.

²² Richer P., 1993, *Hanoi 1975. Un diplomate et la réunification du Vietnam*, Paris, L'Harmattan, p. 64. Numerous French speakers such as Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Truong Chinh and Nguyen Thi Binh remained at the head of government.

²³ Concerning the two other Indochina countries, Raoul Jennar reminds us that « *the American war, the genocide followed by the isolation of the country and the disinterest of the francophone states*) and lastly the United Nations mission dismantled the stronghold of la francophonie that was Cambodia when Charles de Gaulle gave his famous speech at Phnom Penh in 1966”: Jennar R., 1997, “La francophonie en Asie: Cambodge, Laos et Vietnam”, *Politique et Sociétés* n°1, vol. 16, , p. 123). The genocide wiped out 90% of the intellectuals and artists that were the beacons of la francophonie: “*Like in Cambodia, French had long been used in Laos as a common language. Until the early 1970s, French was the language of learning in secondary schools, and the working language in government administrations and diplomacy. This status was changed in 1974, with the Lao language becoming the official language.* (ibid., p. 124).

²⁴ Bao Y., and Treglode (de) B., 2009, “Doi Moi et mutations du politique”, in Dovert S. and Treglode (de) B. (dir.),

the Spratly Archipelago, the fall of the Soviet empire in December 1991 precipitated the end of the considerable economic aid given to Vietnam by its ally and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The USSR was a major financier of the heavily indebted Vietnam (8 billion dollars of debt in 1986, equal to half the GDP), in exchange for products, services and workers. In 1991, unsurprisingly, Russian was still the first foreign language taught in Hanoi. The adoption of *Doi Moi* and the implosion of the USSR radically changed the lie of the land strategically, and consequently, linguistically. While relations remained extremely tense with China, and hesitant with the United States, the legacy of a preference for French language and culture led to two coinciding developments in the early 1990s.

The first, within Vietnam, was seen in the gradual internalising of the “educative colonisation”, by a portion of the Vietnamese elite, like a page in their national history. French language and culture, distinct from the oppressive aspects of colonialism, began to be seen as a layer in the cultural identity of the Vietnamese people – it was “in their bones”, wrote Huu Ngoc. Let us not forget that for the national holiday on 14th July 1989, the famous General Vo Nguyen Giap earnestly requested from his host, the French ambassador to Vietnam, Claude Blanchemaison, books in French that he complained of not being able to find in Hanoi!²⁵ Great intellectuals, purveyors of culture between France and Vietnam, such as the writer Huu Ngoc or the historian Phan Huy Lê, set about promoting the architectural, literary, scientific and linguistic heritage left from colonisation in the press and specialist reviews. The demand for la francophonie, which had been dormant before the Doi Moi policy, exploded when it began to be implemented through the creation of a variety of local clubs and circles, French magazines and French language classes. In a speech given at the French Embassy in December 1992, on the occasion of the first *Ordre des Palmes Académiques* being awarded to a Vietnamese citizen since 1954, Huu Ngoc praised the universality of French culture, citing André Gide’s reflections on the dialogue it encouraged, “*a dialogue of emotion, forever being renewed [...], a dialogue between the secular tradition [...] and free thought, the spirit of doubt and analysis that strives for the slow and gradual emancipation of the individual*”. In 1997, Professor Phan Huy Lê, president of the Association of Historians of Vietnam, paid tribute to those French citizens who, in particular at the *École française d’Extrême-Orient* (EFEO), “introduced new concepts of contemporary history, particular to the West [...], laid the foundations of textology, architecture, ethnography, museology [...], properly studied life as it is now for the different ethnic groups of the country, notably minority groups”.²⁶

The second development is linked to the diplomatic strategy that France used to compensate for the relative lack of strategy in the region between the 80s and 90s: the USSR was suffering; the Cold War was coming to an end; Vietnam struggled to build new relations with China, still affected by the consequences of the Tian’anmen Square repression in 1989. As for the United States, hassled by powerful anticommunist lobbies, they had not yet returned. Defending a more balanced multi-polar order, Paris was also trying to expand its circle of influence in a world largely dominated by the United States, the great victors of the Cold War. True to the notion it had of its purpose in the region since General de Gaulle, or Pierre Mendès France – one of influential power because it was a mediator, exerting its influence mainly in economy and culture, France made this country which it had never abandoned, even during its long isolation during the 1980s, the pivot of its “return” in Asia.²⁷

Vietnam contemporain, Paris/Irased, Les Indes Savantes, (1st ed., 2004), p. 119-152.

²⁵ Interview with Claude Blanchemaison (French ambassador to Hanoi between 1989 and 1992), December 8 2010.

²⁶ Phan Huy Lê 1997, “La Francophonie”, *Études vietnamiennes* n° 124, p. 150-151. On this paradoxical contribution of the EFEO, whose members attempted early on to distinguish the traits of Vietnamese culture from Chinese civilization, thereby facilitating the efforts of the separatists to build a nation state rooted in the national history and culture of Vietnam: Singaravelou P., 1999, *L’École française d’Extrême-Orient ou l’institution des marges (1898-1956)*, Paris, L’Harmattan.

²⁷ Journoud P., 2011, *De Gaulle et le Vietnam (1945-1969). La réconciliation*, Paris, Tallandier; Journoud P., 2012, «La France et l’Asie du Sud-Est, de l’Indochine à l’Asean», in Journoud P. (dir.), « L’Évolution du débat stratégique en Asie du Sud-Est depuis 1945 », *Études de l’Irsem* n° 14, p. 13-51.

Cooperation was renewed by the visit of Alain Decaux, delegate minister at the OIF, and thanks to the exit of the Cambodian crisis in 1991, to which French diplomacy made a significant contribution. Vietnam rapidly became France's geographic priority in South East Asia, in particular in the cultural and linguistic domain. The official visit of President François Mitterrand – the first by a Western leader in reunified Vietnam – in February 1993 was the occasion to celebrate the “Franco-Vietnamese reunion” and to encourage the international reinsertion of the country, with its economy set to boom. In the field of francophonie, the groundwork had already begun, for example with a national forum of Francophone writers in Paris, in December 1989, in which two Vietnamese poets took part; and the opening of the Alliance Française in Hanoi, in 1992.²⁸ Even the defence diplomacy, where France and Vietnam mended relations following the film made by Pierre Schoendoerffer about the battle of Diên Biên Phu,²⁹ helped encourage a modest francophone dimension, appointing a young volunteer to give French classes to Vietnamese officers – mainly doctors – involved in Franco-Vietnamese cooperation.³⁰

It was, however, during the official visit of François Mitterrand, a president who held great regard for the synergies between law and development, that one of the most important cornerstones of the francophone structure was laid in Vietnam: the creation of the Maison du droit vietnamo-française (MDVF – a centre for Vietnamese and French law) in Hanoi. This was to promote a state of law, though separate from its democratic base, to facilitate the economic opening of Vietnam and its insertion into the globalised world, in particular in the major economic and financial organisations that supervise “good governance”. Human and financial resources were accorded for the development of legal expertise (with the provision of aid in the drafting of regulatory texts such as the civil code, penal code, code for civil procedure, corporate law), professional training and teaching of law. As the centrepiece of French bilateral cooperation in legal matters, and as part of the sector-oriented priorities in the Country Strategy Document set out in 2002 (among others, assisting Vietnam in its “legal and political transition”), the MDVF focused its efforts, following the accession of Vietnam to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in January 2007, on economic law.³¹

So, like in Cambodia, and to a lesser extent, Laos, France decided to support firstly the strategic sector of training, in line with the primordial needs of a country on the way to significant reform of its administrative and legal structures. France also contributed to the training of executives and company directors, with the opening of a Franco-Vietnamese centre for management training (CFVG) in Ho Chi Minh City, in 1993; to Vietnamese journalists, with a cooperative project that began in 1993 between the Association of Vietnamese Journalists, the Ecole Supérieure de Journalisme de Lille and the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs; and the development of francophone media³² and television programmes in the Vietnamese media,

²⁸ For more on the revival of la francophonie in Vietnam in the beginning of the 1990s: Daniel V., 1992, *La francophonie au Vietnam*, Paris, L'Harmattan; Geng J., 2001, *La Francophonie comme instrument de la politique extérieure de la France : le cas de trois pays indochinois (le Vietnam, le Cambodge, le Laos)*, doctoral thesis in political science supervised by Claude Emeri, Paris I.

²⁹ Welcomed by Vietnam, which was in need of cash and solid partnerships, the filming of *Diên Biên Phu*, the first Franco-Vietnamese coproduction in cinema, facilitated the opening of a defense attaché position in Hanoi. But it came up against a number of obstacles caused by the consequences of the American embargo (Cheron B., 2012, *Pierre Schoendoerffer*, Paris, CNRS Éditions, p. 160- 176).

³⁰ Interview between the author and General Daniel Schaeffer (first Defense Attaché in reunified Vietnam, between 1991 and 1995), March 3 2011.

³¹ Choukroune L., 2004, « Droit et économie dans le Vietnam du Doi Moi”: l'insertion à la globalisation par “l'État de droit”», *Revue internationale de droit comparé* n° 4, p. 891-916 ; Website *Maison du droit*: <http://www.maisondudroit.org/> (in particular its *Lettre d'information* 2010). For more on the support provided by the OIF, see the second part of this article.

³² A symbol of the revival of the French-speaking press in Vietnam, in 1994, less than twenty years after the *Courrier*

in particular on the television channel destined for Vietnamese communities in exile abroad (VTV4). All these initiatives were supposed to help France circulate its high quality training programmes and raise awareness among its audience of the values of a state of law, attached to democracy and development.

However, as the MDVF example suggests, this "reunion" between reunified Vietnam and la francophonie³³ would not have been possible if the Vietnamese leaders had not decided that it corresponded to their notion of national interest, during a period that was of great importance yet delicate in terms of modernisation and opening the country to the outside world.

The Francophonie: encouraging openness and contributing to Vietnam's strategic glaxis

Vietnam's reconciliation with the Francophonie: bringing Vietnam back to the regional and international stage

At a time when the country was split along the 17th parallel, the leaders of the Republic of (South) Vietnam chose to join the first multilateral francophone organisations, despite the rupture in diplomatic relations with Paris, in June 1965. These were the Common African and Madagascan Organisation (OCAM) when it was created in 1966; next, the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (the ACCT, precursor of the present day OIF), during the Conference of Niamey on 20 March 1970, which marked the birth of the Francophonie as a geopolitical entity.³⁴ The survival of a significant French-speaking minority in higher education also encouraged a number of universities, such as Dalat, Saigon and Huê, to join the Association of partially or entirely French-speaking universities (AUPELF, which became the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie in 1998 - AUF), one of the oldest francophone institutions (1961).

The Republic of Vietnam's membership of the first francophone institutions borne by the Non-Aligned Movement must be placed in the context of the change happening in the 1960s and 70s. The beginning of the withdrawal of the American Expeditionary Force foreshadowed a formidable clash between Vietnam's sworn enemies. Its leaders decided to launch a diplomatic offensive to diversify their international support base and increase their diplomatic leeway in relation to their American ally. France, with whom General Nguyen Van Thieu wanted to renew good relations in order to erase the memory of the rupture of 1965, as well as Africa, were particularly targeted. Paris hosted the US-Vietnam negotiations, both official and secret; it maintained significant economic and cultural interests south of the 17th parallel, in particular in the former colony of Cochinchina where a segment of the population were still sincerely attached to French culture. The shared colonial experience and French language were positive factors in the development of technical cooperation with Africa, from which President Thieu hoped to benefit from diplomatically.³⁵

This integration into the French-speaking world was revived and intensified by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam from the end of the 1970s, despite the ideological rifts that had fuelled a long civil war between

d'Extrême-Orient stopped running in Saigon in 1975, *Le Courrier du Vietnam* stopped its daily print version, in early 2012, to become a digital weekly in colour, filled with new topics. In Cambodia, however, *Cambodge Soir*, the last French language weekly publication, disappeared completely, a victim of low advertising revenue and the success of the English-speaking press (C., December 21 2010, «Le principal média francophone du Cambodge ferme ses portes», *Rue89.com*,).

³³ Several situation reports were published on the website of the French Embassy in Vietnam, in particular: 2003, «La France et la langue française au Vietnam», *Les Cahiers de la coopération française au Vietnam* n° 3.

³⁴ Barrat J., 1997, *Géopolitique de la francophonie*, Paris, PUF, p. 16-18.

³⁵ Interview with Jean Tu Tri, former technical support director to the president of the Republic of Vietnam, (1967-1972), October 1 2012.

the two regimes, with the dramatic exodus of hundreds of thousands of boat people serving as one of the last manifestations. The political-strategic imperatives were the clear priority for the leaders of the country, extremely isolated after its military victory of 1975 and its speedy and abrupt reunification. Long distrustful of multilateral institutions, which they believed to be controlled by the United States and directed against their country, which was excluded, they established a multilateralisation strategy that helped achieve a first batch of memberships: the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation) in 1975, the Non-Aligned Movement in 1976, the UN in 1977 and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1978. After the invasion of Cambodia and the war with China, Vietnam suffered from a double embargo: China added another embargo to the one that the Americans had extended to all of Vietnam in 1975. This was why the rapprochement with the ACCT, which opened the door to promising cultural and technical cooperation, appeared to be one of the rare, indeed the only,³⁶ way to alleviate the consequences.³⁷ As such, in renewing its relations with the Francophone agency, alongside its involvement in UNESCO, Hanoi was soon accorded material assistance that enabled it to distribute scholarship grants, transmit documentations and develop artistic exchanges. The survival of this cooperation throughout the darkest years for its economy (1979-1985) also helped boost the participation of Vietnamese professionals in conferences, seminars and training programmes in France, Canada and a number of African countries. Some research institutes and archives were also granted financing for technical equipment, and it was able to create cultural products to promote the country's people and culture.

The most significant step was however marked in 1986 by the adoption of the *Doi Moi* policy, aimed at creating a liberal economy and culture, and of which the positive results were soon felt. Through a strategy for growth founded on the development of exports and foreign investment, Vietnam rapidly reached food self-sufficiency, before it in turn began exporting.³⁸ The growth rate literally exploded, sparked by the export revenue, reaching 7% on average from 1988. However, the fall of the Soviet bloc caused the leaders, during the 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in June 1991 to accelerate the "multilateralisation and diversification policy" in bilateral relations, to go beyond the now too-small ex-Comecon circle that Vietnam belonged to in order to further its complete reintegration in the regional and international landscape.³⁹ In the search for new strategic and commercial partners, Vietnam very naturally turned firstly to East Asia, settling relations with China, Japan and South Korea, the member states of ASEAN – which it joined in 1995. It then renewed relations with the United States, which led to the lifting of the embargo in 1994 followed by the official re-establishing of diplomatic relations the year after. The increase in relations with countries that were mostly capitalist and English-speaking, along with the urgent need for cash led Vietnam's leaders to raise English, the ultimate business language, to a high priority level in education. This did not ruin the French language's chances, nonetheless.

The deepening of relations with the Francophonie was rapidly identified as a way to strengthen Vietnam's insertion in international relations, to counterbalance the growing presence of the United States and China in the region, and facilitate the anchoring of the "socialist market economy", the much awaited move from

³⁶ Chau P.S, Ket V.D, Binh D.T, 2008, *To chuc Phap ngu va quan he voi Viet Nam tu 1986 den nay*, Hanoi, Éditions Chinh tri Quoc gia, p. 83 et sq. (The author would like to thank Vu Doan Ket for introducing him to this work, to which he contributed, and Nguyen Duc Hien for his assistance in the translation of certain extracts.)

³⁷ It was a similar desire to escape the isolation caused by its exclusion from all international Arab organizations after the signing of the Camp David agreements in 1979, that motivated Egypt to join la Francophonie in 1983: Chaudenson R., 3rd trimester 2007, «La place de la langue française dans la francophonie», *Hérodote* n° 126, p. 136.

³⁸ Allard J., November 16 2009, «Du communisme au capitalisme, la longue marche du Vietnam», *Perspective Monde* (<http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMAAnalyse?codeAnalyse=1095>).

³⁹ Collective book, 1999, *Le Vietnam en voie d'intégration*, Hanoi, Éditions The Gioi, p. 7 et sq.

confrontation to dialogue and the promotion of an environment of peace.⁴⁰ In 1986, Vietnam participated in the first Conference of heads of state and government “partially using French”, at Versailles. Its representative, the great poet Cu Huy Can, former Minister for Culture, deceased in 2005, spoke there of the renewed rise of the French language in South East Asia as a key factor in the development of its economy, which would become the *leitmotiv* of the Vietnamese discourse in the Francophone agencies.⁴¹ From the Quebec summit in 1987, Vietnam participated as a fully fledged member at all francophone summits, joined in 1991 by Laos (associate member since 1972) and in 1993 by Cambodia (observer since 1991). Its active participation in the Francophonie was a clear sign of its desire to create close relations with Western Francophone countries, including France, but also emigrant Vietnamese communities particularly in France and Canada – the *Viet Kieu*, a group whose support was much sought after following the launch of the *Doi Moi* policy, for both political and economic reasons.⁴² Alongside its insertion within the agencies of the UN, ASEAN, the EU and the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), this move towards the Francophonie was also, if not more importantly, a chance to strengthen South-South relations. Having participated in all the francophone summits, Vietnam was ready to host the 7th Summit in 1997, for which it had applied in 1991 with the support of the French diplomatic circle. They expected positive repercussions that could accelerate its integration in the region and internationally, which it badly needed. The success of the Hanoi Summit facilitated the organisation of other multilateral conferences, such as the ASEAN Summit which it would host in December 1998. It also helped convince the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to give full support to the Vietnamese application to APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), before all applications were suspended by decisions made at the Vancouver Summit in 1998.⁴³ By hosting the Summit of the Francophonie, the first of its kind on the Asian continent, Vietnam strengthened the credibility of its foreign policy and francophone integration, right when the Francophonie was reinforcing its political and international credibility with the appointment, chosen by the heads of state and government of its member countries, of a Secretary General mandated for four years.

The OIF had inaugurated, in 1994 in Hanoi, a regional office (Regional office of the OIF in Asia-Pacific - BRAP) acting as representative for the institution and covering all of its fields of activity. The Organisation used this office to provide significant contribution, alongside bilateral aid from France, to the development of legal cooperation and French teaching capacities. In particular, the OIF supported the MDVF from 1998 on, then gave it direct aid between 2001 and 2004, made possible through the allocation of financial resources, provided expert advice and expanded the number of training programmes for legal and justice professionals. The desire to promote the diversity of legal cultures in the francophone zone led Vietnam to focus particularly on regional operations that also included Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. The MDVF regularly hosted the delegations of jurists and conferences aimed at improving the diffusion of information, for example on consumer protection. Vietnam, at first cautious, soon saw the interest of promoting its regional interests without acting like an imperialist power. From 2010 on, the reinforcement of the regional cooperation component of the MDVF, expressly required by la Francophonie, was a driving force behind this shared ambition of making the MDVF a regional centre for expertise and exchange between the jurists

⁴⁰ Chau P.S., Ket V.D., Binh D.T., *op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁴¹ Daniel V., *op. cit.*, p. 22 ; Trang P.T.H., thesis previously cited, p. 117.

⁴² For the most part in the United States (2.2 million Vietnamese), France Australia (300,000 in each country), and Canada

(250,000), the diaspora network contributed around 300 million dollars to the country in 1995, 2 billion in 2000 and 8 billion in 2010 – a record high: Vigne C., April 2012, «Mobiliser les Vietnamiens de l'étranger. Enjeux, stratégies et effets d'un nationalisme transnational», *Carnet de l'Irasc/Occasional Paper*, n° 19, p. 72-73.

⁴³ Chau P.S., 2008, «La francophonie et la logique du pouvoir en Asie», in Guillou M., and Trang P.T.H. (dir.), *La Francophonie sous l'angle des relations internationales*, Lyon, Université Jean-Moulin Lyon 3, p. 228.

of South East Asia that shared the francophone culture.⁴⁴

In terms of support for teaching of and in French, it benefitted from the combined efforts of the OIF, through the intermediary of the Regional francophone centre in Asia-Pacific (Crefap) based in Ho Chi Minh City – for training teachers of and in French, and more generally education professionals – and the Agence universitaire francophone (AUF), which also opened a regional office in 1993, in Hanoi. At the initiative of Michel Guillou, the rector of the Aupelf-Uref between 1991 and 2000, and with the assistance of the French, Belgian and Quebecois governments, a bilingual class curriculum was developed in Vietnam, and, in much more modest proportions, in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. In Vietnam, the number rose from 6 in 1992 to 687 in 2006. Since then, about twenty thousand pupils are taught in French in every subject, for which over a thousand teachers were specially trained (a few hundred pupils are concerned in the three other countries).

This success⁴⁵ enabled the launch in 2006 of Valofrase, a programme to promote French in South East Asia that aims to combine the efforts of all institutional and governmental partners, working closely between the three major educational levels – primary, secondary and higher education. The Vietnamese government, wanting to support this dynamic, signed a new agreement in January 2012, which placed Valofrase within an official plan until 2020. It was a driving force, with the AUF, in the regionalisation of university level Francophonie, to the point that it was a catalyst for Chinese universities that wanted to inaugurate or strengthen their French courses, such as the Medical University of Kunming which joined the AUF in 2003.⁴⁶ The AUF now has two Institutes for la Francophonie, in Hanoi and Vientiane, six virtual campuses and around 80 member institutions and/or universities in Cambodia, China (where the potential is considerable, among the 1,200 universities and around a hundred French departments in the country), India, Japan, Laos, New Caledonia, Thailand, Vanuatu and Vietnam.

This Vietnamese commitment to multilateral French-speaking initiatives, also encouraged by the French diplomacy whose representatives gradually broke away from an exclusively franco-centric vision over the years, resulted in the creation of new initiatives, such as the *Maison des savoirs (numériques)* inaugurated in Huê in 2009.⁴⁷ Hanoi, also attached to the transnational nature of la Francophonie, also strengthened its

⁴⁴ Author's interview with Michel Carrié, head of the "law and justice" programme at the OIF Delegation for peace, democracy and human rights, September 2012; French Ministry of Justice, May 10 2010, «Vers un renforcement de la coopération vietnamo-française», justice.gouv.fr : <http://www.justice.gouv.fr/le-ministere-de-la-justice-10017/vers-un-renforcement-de-la-cooperation-vietnamo-francaise-19761.html>.

⁴⁵ Detractors, however, stigmatised curricula that are disconnected from economic and scientific realities, the growing use of the English language, even in French-speaking media or in certain francophone agencies such as the Francophone Institute for Information Technology (IFI), and ultimately, the lack of any coherent strategy when the language could become a powerful strategic lever in what is perceived as a "cognitive war" between the major powers. Durand C.X. (IFI director between 2005 and 2007), 2006, letter in reply to an article by Guillou M., online on the website of the francophone association Avenir,. See also, by the same author, March 2008, «Pour une renaissance de la francophonie», article online on the *Forum pour la France* website. For an optimistic view of the curriculum, based on the very good results of students having taken bilingual classes at the University: CIEP, March 2006, «Entretien avec M. Vi Van Dinh» (Vietnamese expert on French teaching at the Ministry of Education and Training), *Letter «Billet du bilingue» n°34*: <http://www.ciep.fr/bibil/2006/mars/regards.htm#entretiens>.

⁴⁶ For more on the success of la Francophonie in higher education institutions in southern China: Mouche S., 2008, «La francophonie en Chine méridionale», *Synergies Chine* n° 3, p. 187-190.

⁴⁷ To read more on all of these aspects: interview between the author and Anissa Barrak, OIF representative for Asia-Pacific, Hanoi, October 10 2012 ; email conversation with Daniel Weissberg, former regional director of the AUF for Asia-Pacific until 2004, September 2012 ; OIF website, March 21 2012, «Asie du Sud-Est : l'enseignement du français se consolide»: <http://www.francophonie.org/L-enseignement-du-francais-se.html>. See also the Confrasie website – General conference of presidents of the member universities of the AUF in Asia-Pacific, which Vietnam, a member since 2012 (like Japan, India and China), hosted at the University of Medicine, Hanoi, in October 2012: <https://confrasie.vn.auf.org/>.

ties, in the 1990s, with other francophone bodies or NGOs, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of la Francophonie (APF, formed in 1967), the International Association of Francophone Mayors (AIMF, created in 1979 and now the OIF operator for decentralised cooperation), of which Ho Chi Minh City is a member since 1990, Hue since 1991 and Hanoi since 1994 (as well as Vientiane in Laos, Phnom Penh, Kampot and Siem Reap in Cambodia), and the International Union for the French-speaking Press (UPF), the oldest francophone INGO (1950), the international association of francophone archivists, the international council of French language radio and television (CIRTEF), the Francophone Business Forum, the Conference of Ministers of Youth and Sports (Confejes), and the Conference of Ministers for National Education (Confemen).

As the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tran Quang Co, mentioned during International Francophonie Day in 1996, this thirst for active membership of Francophone institutions and associations was fully in coherence with the *“desire to diversify and find a balance in the external relations”* of Vietnam. In a period of unbridled globalisation, the United States' draw to unipolarity and an economic liberalisation that was a potential destabilising factor for the Communist Party and for Vietnamese society, its leaders intended liberalizations independence and cultural identity, and the need to battle against any form of hegemony.⁴⁸ The desire to find new markets and counterweights also explains the participation for the first time in the history of the francophone summits, of the president of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam at the Summit of Beirut, in October 2002.⁴⁹ Vietnam could expect to develop three circles of francophone solidarity: the Indochina circle (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam) that corresponded not only to Vietnam's traditional zone of influence and security contested with Thailand and China, but also a sub-region, the Mekong, with high potential for development and cooperation. France and the French-speaking countries of the north (in particular those with whom Vietnam had less relations, such as Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland), with whom more targeted cooperation could be developed in the field of modern technology. The third circle comprises the French-speaking southern countries, in particular in Africa.

Promoting multipolarity and South-South relations

Of course, the Vietnamese desire to battle US – and increasingly, Chinese – cultural hegemony is evident, in a country that had not yet resolved the identity crisis caused by several decades of civil war, followed by partial liberalisation and a nervous opening up to globalisation. The evolution of la Francophonie as a political organisation open to the major international linguistic regions, clearly committed to the battle against uniformity and for sustainable development, the protection of cultural diversity,⁵⁰ the *“dialogue of cultures”*, multilingualism, multilateralism, a culture of peace – including in its latest section on peacekeeping operations – is in response to a major concern of Vietnamese leaders: the preservation of the country's cultural identity, and of its domestic and international stability that are indispensable for the pursuit of economic development. This is in fact the main source of legitimacy for the communist regime, next to its victories over France and the United States, the memory of which is fading despite its terrible human and economic cost. The ambition declared by Abdou Diouf during the inaugural conference at the Third Meeting of la Francophonie in 2004, for a political agenda in the OIF as a *“structured hub within multi-polar globalisation, a hub of diversity, solidarity and dialogue”* and a contributing factor in the creation of an *“alternative globalisation”*, was entirely in line with Vietnamese aspirations.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Cited in the *Rapport d'information* n° 1 by the Senate Committee for Cultural Affairs, 1997-1998.

⁴⁹ Agence France Presse, October 15 2002, «Le Vietnam attaché à la francophonie malgré la marginalisation du français», *AFP*.

⁵⁰ The Vietnamese government signed UNESCO's Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity with enthusiasm in 2001, followed by the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2007.

⁵¹ Diouf A., «La Francophonie à l'heure de la mondialisation» (cited in: Trang P.T.H, *thesis previously cited*, p. 22).

The Vietnamese leaders never ceased to encourage the economic aspect of the OIF, their country being a direct beneficiary. During the 8th Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Francophone countries, held in December 1996 in Marrakesh, the Vietnamese delegation signalled its wish for the Summit that it would host in 1997 to be centred on an economic theme. Therefore, in March 1997, the Permanent Council of la Francophonie gave its approval for the central theme of the Hanoi Summit as “*reinforcing cooperation and solidarity among francophone communities for peace and economic and social development*”. The declarations supporting an economic agenda for the Francophone world became numerous at the turning point of the 1990-2000 years, and Vietnam, namely during its first participation in the Conference of Ministers of the Economy in 1999, called for greater solidarity between Francophone governments and corporations, and the heightening of South-South and triangular cooperation (incorporating the OIF), in order to increase trade exchanges between francophone countries.⁵²

Vietnam, disappointed by the results with the francophone countries of the North, whose low level of investment was blatant next to their English speaking competitors in South East Asia, transferred some of its hopes to Africa. By capitalising on the empathy factor from its victorious resistance to colonial and neo-colonial imperialism, Hanoi planned to carve out a place, even a modest one, on the African continent, with its promising perspectives. Given the traditionally complex and ambivalent relationship with its great northern neighbour, Vietnam also had to prevent China from monopolising the soft power, and especially the markets. As a continent that is home to and a cornerstone of la Francophonie, where the majority of Francophone countries are located (31 out of 53 African countries are members of the OIF, including one observer, Mozambique), rich with significant human and natural resources and dynamic population growth (expected to reach 1.5 billion in 2030) and an average growth rate close to 5% up until 2010,⁵³ Africa has also provided a higher return on foreign direct investment (30%) than every other region in the world, since the early 1990s. The memory of the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist solidarity with Vietnam remains vivid. In a context of exacerbated competition between major powers and (re)emerging powers looking for raw materials and prospects on a fully booming African market, la Francophonie has proven a comparative advantage for Vietnam, distinguishing it from the two dominant Asian powers in the region, China and India,⁵⁴ not to mention South Korea, whose administration and industry are becoming increasingly attracted to French-speaking Africa.⁵⁵

This is not a new concern and political relations at the summit have grown gradually stronger. High level visits increased both ways, even before the Doi Moi policy was implemented: in 1978, Vice-President Nguyen Huu Tho visited several African countries, followed by General Vo Nguyen Giap in 1980, President Vo Chi Cong in 1990, Vice-President Nguyen Thi Binh in 1994 and 1995 – when Vietnam made a great breakthrough on the export market, because for the first time its coffee was valued higher than West African and Madagascan robusta⁵⁶ – and the President of the Republic, Trần Duc Luong, in 2002, etc. Despite an increase in the frequency of visits in the years 2000, cooperation developed nonetheless quite slowly. In the second half of the 1990s, experts were sent into the field to study the investment possibilities and the methods of deepening trade relations. Established in August 1997 as part of the food security programme set up to assist African countries in rice growing and livestock farming,⁵⁷ the trilateral

⁵² Trang P.T.H., *thesis previously cited*, p. 114 (citation) and 143.

⁵³ This is a positive effect of the weak integration of African economies in industrial and financial networks worldwide (RFI, September 21 2011).

⁵⁴ Thuy V.T.T., 2009, *Les Relations économiques vietnamo-africaines : vers une stratégie francophone*, Masters dissertation under the supervision of Phan-Labays T., Institut pour l'étude de la Francophonie et de la mondialisation, Université Lyon 3.

⁵⁵ Milhaud M., 2011, « Paradoxe et perspectives du français en Corée », *Synergie Corée* n° 2, p. 27-36.

⁵⁶ Labey A., March 1 1996 « Café: le Vietnam défie l'Afrique », *Syfia Info*, <http://www.syfia.info/index.php5?view=articles&action=voir&idArticle=2580>.

⁵⁷ *Le Vietnam en voie d'intégration*, op. cit., p. 111-112 ; 2005, *La Diplomatie vietnamienne*, Hanoi, Éditions The Gioi, p.

cooperation between Vietnam, the FAO (providing funding) and Senegal was extended at the end of the 1990s to Benin, Madagascar and the DRC and Mali. Several hundred Vietnamese volunteers worked in Africa in the fields of health, education and agriculture (rice growing, irrigation, fruit and vegetable market gardening, freshwater fish farming, fishing, processing and preserving seafood products, etc.). Vietnam wanted to establish a presence in Africa in order to become less dependent on the major Asian, American and European markets, and it thereby helps increase local production and eradicate famine in Africa.⁵⁸

The American market provided tough competition, having broken the Asian market a number of years previously. Asia therefore became the third economic partner of the continent after the European Union and North America. The value of the trade between the two continents, greatly stimulated by the spectacular growth of China and India, has risen from 6% on average between 1960 and 1992 to 16% in 2006.⁵⁹ In this competitive environment, where Japan, South Korea and several ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) are also competing for raw materials and new perspectives, the Vietnamese have managed to develop trade, which remains modest but is constantly expanding. Between 2003⁶⁰ – the year of the first “Vietnam-Africa” forum in Hanoi (in which around twenty African countries participated) – and 2010, they rose from 360 million dollars to 2.9 billion dollars.⁶¹ In 2011, the government’s import and export strategy for 2011-2020 identified Africa and South and West Asia as priority markets for Vietnamese exports: rice, evidently, by far the number one export by a country that has become the second worldwide exporter after Thailand, to a continent where rice growing production is insufficient for its needs and which may take inspiration from the Vietnamese rice growing techniques proven by centuries of experience; other products are coffee, tea, peppers, textiles and clothing, electronic products and parts, shoes, tyres, aquatic products, fruits and vegetables and coal. In 2011, Vietnamese exports to Africa rose by 200%: 3.5 billion dollars compared to 2.4 billion exported to the Middle East (+ 45.4 %) and 2.1 billion to South Asia (+ 46 %).⁶² Despite the competition from China, Vietnam – whose success with the *Doi Moi* policy in the agricultural and sales and marketing fields impressed certain African leaders – could in turn become a major economic power in Africa.

However, while trade exchanges with certain francophone countries such as the Maghreb, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea are developing, the most important in terms of volume remain the English-speaking countries (South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, etc.). In order to compensate for the lack of audience that Vietnam continues to suffer from in French-speaking and particularly sub-Saharan Africa, partly due to its weak diplomatic representation and the lack of a promotion tool for economic South-South partnerships,⁶³ the

103-104.

⁵⁸ See the account by Tông Khiêm, former leader of the agronomic volunteers from Vietnam in Senegal, 6th May 2011, “L’agriculture et les relations FAO-Vietnam-Sénégal”, *Le Courrier du Vietnam*, n° 2225.

⁵⁹ Thuy V.T.T., *dissertation previously cited*, p. 13.

⁶⁰ August 5 2010, « Le Vietnam organisera son deuxième forum avec l’Afrique », *fil-info-vietnam.com*. On this point, the Vietnamese leaders appear to have imitated their Chinese counterparts who, in 2000, began organizing development and cooperation with Africa in the form of forums that meet every three years.

⁶¹ Agence Ecofin website, February 17 2012, « Le Vietnam mise sur l’Afrique pour dynamiser son commerce » *agenceecofin.com* : <http://www.agenceecofin.com/negoce/1702-3471-le-vietnam-mise-sur-l-afrique-pour-dynamiser-son-commerce>).

⁶² Sci Dev website, 9 September 2010 “Vietnam and China to boost agricultural ties with Africa”, *scidev.net*: <http://www.scidev.net/global/biotechnology/news/vietnam-and-china-to-boost-agricultural-ties-with-africa.html>.

⁶³ Trang P.T.H., *thesis quoted*, p. 283. This operator could be created through the Francophone Business Forum, which brings together 150 Vietnamese companies out of the approximately two million in Vietnam, Thuy V.T.T., *thesis quoted*, p. 124 *et sq.*. As for the diplomatic missions in Africa, there are now nine of them (including Libya), and only three are in member countries of the OIF (Egypt, Morocco and Mozambique) and one in Algeria (full list on the official website for the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <http://www.vnembassy.net/>). Five economic missions share the continent: one in Egypt (also catering to Sudan), Algeria (also catering to Mali and Benin), Morocco (catering to Guinea and Senegal), South Africa (also catering to Mozambique and Madagascar) and Nigeria (also catering to Ghana and Chad). The author would like to thank Le Manh Quyen for having provided these details.

OIF made a decisive contribution to the organisation of several major tripartite meetings. Preceded by a few seminars with academics and experts focusing on the relationship between Vietnam and Africa in general,⁶⁴ one of the first meetings, held in Ho Chi Minh City from 25 to 27 November 2008, brought together around sixty rice importers from 14 African countries and 120 Vietnamese exporters. Two years later, with the support of the International Trade Centre (ITC) and the Vietnamese Ministry for Industry and Trade, the first seminar was held on "the trade opportunities that exist between francophone Africa and Vietnam, the drafting of contracts and the settling of trade disputes" as part of the project developed by the OIF to promote the expansion of intra and inter-regional trade between the countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and from the Mekong region.⁶⁵ In 2011, over 150 Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian operators met in Ho Chi Minh City as part of meetings organised with representatives of the wood branch of the UEMOA and CEMAC. In September 2012, Hanoi hosted the "Vietnam – Africa – Middle East, a new partnership for development", a forum that provided the opportunity for Angèle Bonané, head of the "sustainable development and solidarity" projects at the OIF, to stress the importance of the facilitator role of the Organisation in the development of this original form of trade and institutional cooperation.⁶⁶ It has already led to the signing of three tripartite agreements between Vietnam and the OIF and between the Central African Republic, the Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon (underway).⁶⁷

Things began to move, but the results remain modest. Despite the impetus given in 2003, Vietnam's African policy is hesitant, and the network of its diplomatic and trade representatives insufficient. There are many obstacles: a lack of precise information and distribution channels, the competitiveness and financial resources of Vietnamese companies, the majority of which are SMEs that are still not used to international competition; cultural differences, geographical distance, sea pirates, a lack of infrastructure, corruption, political and social instability in Africa, etc. Furthermore, in many countries of sub-Saharan francophone Africa, listed as some of the world's heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC), spending power remains particularly weak and the development of exchanges appears as a medium or long term perspective. Finally, while the Chinese experience of cooperation with Africa may be useful, as in all other domains, Vietnam is especially – on this continent and even more so in its immediate environment – confronted with the formidable economic dynamic of China, often described as a predator.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ For example: Dinh D.D. Mills G., 2007, *Vietnam and Africa : Comparative lessons and mutual opportunities*, Hanoi, Social Sciences Publishers– Proceedings from a conference co-organised by the South African Brenthurst Foundation and the Vietnamese Institute for studies on Africa and the Middle East. It features, in particular, interesting developments on the lessons taken from Doi Moi that are of potential utility for Africa .

⁶⁵ Programme on the OIF website:

<http://www.espace-economique.francophonie.org/Seminaire-sur-les-opportunites,2011.html> ; Tien T., 27 décembre 2011, «"Les exportations vietnamiennes vers l'Afrique et l'Asie du Sud-Ouest rapportent sept milliards d'USD", *Le Courrier du Vietnam*. The economic and financial crisis in the United States and Europe, which encouraged Vietnam and other Asian countries to look for new markets in Africa, also coincided with increased exchanges with Algeria. As the second-largest francophone country after France, though it is not a member of the OIF, Algeria became the 6th greatest importer of Vietnamese products in Africa (coffee, rice, pepper and seafood). (Rich in hydrocarbons, the Petro Vietnam group, with an annual turnover equal to 20% of the Vietnamese GDP, invested in oil drilling and extraction there. Algeria could serve as a springboard for Vietnamese-African cooperation in the oil sector, as its role – already a large one – in the economy of Vietnam could only grow even stronger, considering the growing needs in refined products: Thuy V.T.T., *thesis quoted*, p. 63-64 ; Ubifrance, 2011, «Fiche marché Le secteur des hydrocarbures au Vietnam, *ubifrance.fr*, 2011 ; Haderbach S., June 29 2009, «Boom de 50 % du commerce bilatéral avec le Vietnam», *Algérie-Focus*, (<http://www.algerie-focus.com/blog/2012/06/29/boum-de-50-du-commerce-bilateral-avec-le-vietnam/>).

⁶⁶ Giang H., September 22 2012, «L'OIF, promotrice de la coopération Vietnam - Afrique - Moyen-Orient», *Le Courrier du Vietnam*.

⁶⁷ Interview with Anissa Barrak, October 9 2012.

⁶⁸ Thuy V.T.T., *thesis quoted*, p. 42-44. The number of Chinese businesses set up in Africa, where Beijing wants to show off its new power, rose above a thousand in 2008. Its trade exchanges with African countries, on the rise by 89% in the

Looking forward: a Vietnamese contribution to strengthening francophone capacities in peacekeeping

Another perspective that could further the development of la francophonie could be beneficial in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), to which the OIF strives to provide a more significant contribution. Vietnam's leaders, who long hesitated to commit to such participation, seem to have changed their position from 2006 on, undoubtedly due to pressure from ASEAN. Vietnam, elected as non-permanent member of the Security Council for the year 2009-2010, with the support of the OIF, now envisages enthusiastically the possible participation of the country in UN PKOs, in particular in francophone Africa.⁶⁹ At best, this will be simply be in addition to the aid already given by English-speaking countries such as the United States, Australia, India and the United Kingdom, in language training for Vietnamese officers likely to be called up for future PKOs.⁷⁰ However, the Cambodia experience could be useful. As a result of the Paris agreements on 23 October 1991, France had responded favourably to the request of King Sihanouk and the Cambodian government, contributing to the rebirth of a gendarmerie corps. This is how the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Royal Khmer Gendarmerie (GRK) were provided French education. Since December 2009, they are provided with the services of a language centre within the gendarmerie academy of Kambol. In 2005, Cambodia decided to take part in the peacekeeping operations led by the United Nations in francophone areas (Central African Republic, Chad, and Lebanon). Since then, French teaching has been extended to the hundreds of future peacekeepers that came from the Khmer National Armed Forces (FANK). The agreement signed in 2010, between the Cambodian Ministry of Defence and the French Embassy's Military and Defence Cooperation Mission gave some of them the possibility to pursue specialised training in France.⁷¹ Furthermore, Vietnam could eventually benefit from the cooperation established in 2010 between the OIF and the Cambodian Peacekeeping Training Centre, the NPMEC (National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces and ERW [Explosive Remnants of War] Clearance).

The potential and the weaknesses of francophone strategic depth in Vietnam and Asia

An additional element of independence

In Vietnam, like in most other Asian countries, involvement in the Francophone institution – far from a linguistic and cultural necessity – is therefore essentially geopolitical, and at best it will simply be an extra. This is also its weakness. While it was initially the result of cultural, linguistic and intellectual interaction, sustained by colonisation, today for Vietnam it is mostly a way of strengthening its “strategic depth” – through its many political, diplomatic, economic and cultural dimensions – in a region deeply marked by

past two years, just reached a new record, to a point where the excitement over Chinese investment and energy resources on this continent is a cause of growing concern: Klare M.T., September 2012, «La Chine est-elle impérialiste ?», *Le Monde diplomatique*, p. 1 et 14.

⁶⁹ Singapore Institute of International Affairs, January 10 2006, “Vietnam expresses greater commitment to UN” *siiaonline.org*: <http://www.siiaonline.org/page/insightsDetails/id/2387/ArticleCategoryId/7> ; Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 22 2007, “Viet Nam commits to Francophone community's peace goal”, ; the Voice of Vietnam, March 20 2009 “Vietnam supports UN-AU peacekeeping cooperation in Africa”, *VOVNews*: <http://english.vov.vn/Politics/Vietnam-supports-UNAU-peacekeeping-cooperation-in-Africa/102735.vov>.

⁷⁰ Anh C., July 12 2012, “Vietnamese officers equipped with English for UN peacekeeping operations”, People's Army online magazine: <http://en.baomoi.com/Info/Vietnamese-officers-equipped-with-English-for-UN-peacekeeping-operations/3/283351.epi>.

⁷¹ Written question n°72259 from Patrick Beaudouin to the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, February 23 2010, and reply on May 1 2010 :<http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q13/13-72259QE.htm>; brochure on line on the website of the French Embassy in Cambodia: http://www.ambafrance-kh.org/IMG/pdf/LA_COOPERATION_DE_SECURITE_ET_DE_DEFENSE.pdf.

the gravity of the rivalry between regional and global powers, and, increasingly, by the stand-off between Washington and Beijing. Awareness of this necessity is made even more acute by globalisation, which exacerbates inequalities and the marginalisation of the less wealthy, within Vietnam and also between states, as much as it stimulates growth in exchange and investments, overcoming borders and lowering costs. The rise of China, the strengthening of its economic, financial and cultural presence in South East Asia and the fresh outbreak of tensions caused by the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea all contribute to the quest for geopolitical counterweights anywhere they can be found. While the return of the United States is the most visible consequence in Asia-Pacific – and the most spectacular in Vietnam – la Francophonie thereby contributes to the strategic glacis that this country has patiently been forming since the 1990s, becoming more solid mainly due to the increase in the number of “dialogues” and “strategic partnerships” with the powers that have interests in the region. Its objective, as former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Tran Quang Co stated in 1995, is to “*create an independent position that can give it the possibility to create cooperation relations on all sides*”.⁷² The desire of the Vietnamese leaders to be a part of la francophonie resulted in a new application to host the 15th Francophone Summit, planned for 2014, in Hanoi. Although it was Senegal that was successful, at the end of the 14th Summit in October 2012 in Kinshasa, Vietnam, represented by the Vice President of the Republic, did however deepen its francophone commitment by becoming the first Asian country, and the 25th Member State of the OIF, to sign the convention on French language in diplomacy and the civil service.⁷³ Similarly, it now assumes – with much less complexes – the years of its membership to the multilateral agencies of la Francophonie (1970), even if it owes this legacy to the regime that it fought so long and hard against.⁷⁴

Tangible obstacles

Some hoped that with a consolidated Indochinese core, la Francophonie would grow richer in South East Asia, with the accession of Thailand as full member and that Burma would also join. This development seemed likely to lead to the creation of a structure for regional cooperation and dialogue, the membership of southern provinces of China and therefore creating a French-speaking geocultural area in Asia-Pacific, with strategic scope.⁷⁵ This appealing scenario neglects, however, the varying interests between the Indochinese countries themselves, which are flagrant, for example on the issue of the conflict for sovereignty of the Spratly and Paracel islands, as tensions between Cambodia and Vietnam caused fallout at the last ASEAN Summit in July 2012.⁷⁶ It also dismisses the eventuality of a rise in opponents to the policy of linguistic diversity, currently in favour among Vietnam’s leaders as part of the development plan for 2011-2020. In the Ministry of Education and Training, certain voices no longer hesitate to openly advocate the gradual abandon of the French language.⁷⁷ Here and elsewhere, the pressure from the English-speaking

⁷² Quoted by Hien D., *op. cit.*, p. 185.

⁷³ This was meant to “strengthen the capacities of Vietnamese diplomats and public servants in charge of international projects to work in French, and to promote the learning, usage and presence of French within Vietnam’s Diplomatic Academy (*Le Courrier du Vietnam*, October 13 2012).

⁷⁴ Hà L., October 8 2012, «Le Vietnam, membre actif de la Francophonie», *Le Courrier du Vietnam*, (interview with Ambassador Duong Van Quang, personal representative of the President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the OIF).

⁷⁵ Nguyen J., Son T., 2nd quarter 2012, «Vers l’espace géoculturel francophone en Asie-Pacifique ?», *La Francophonie : une géopolitique, Géostratégiques* n°36, p. 237-245. See also the article by Bagayoko N., and Veleve A., in this publication.

⁷⁶ Bougon F., July 3 2012, « Le contentieux sur la mer de Chine fait échouer une réunion de l’Asean » *Le Monde.fr* http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2012/07/13/le-contentieux-sur-la-mer-de-chine-meridionale-fait-echouer-le-sommet-de-l-asean_1733571_3216.html.

⁷⁷ Nga P.T.A., 2nd August 2 2011, «La présence de la langue française au Vietnam, entre rêve et opportunités», personal

world is strong. Faced with the resurgence of what is sometimes seen in the region as a Chinese “threat”, the United States appears to be the strongest shield, and the other powers that Hanoi is building a network with speak little or no French: Russia, India, Australia, Japan, Germany, the UK, etc. The number of students taking French – which rose from 63,253 in 1991 to 123,539 in 2001 – subsequently fell between 2006 and 2009, from 153,706 to 81,270.⁷⁸ In terms of bilingual classes, there was a slight drop between 2006 and 2011, both at the school level (102 to 91) and the class level (624 to 499) as well as in the number of students (16,951 to 14,056) and French teachers (433 to 303).⁷⁹ A combination of the provision of language services, neatly tied by the US to the lifting of its veto against Vietnam’s membership of the World Bank and the WTO in the mid-90s, as well as to the rising demand, the Anglophone wave almost wiped every other language out (96 % of foreign language students at the end of the 2000s were learning English), including Russian, which was a widely taught language in Vietnamese schools until the decision by the Ministry of Education to replace it with English in the early 1990s. There was therefore a great risk that the Francophile sentiment that came from a cultural attachment would become separate from the language-oriented francophonie, due to the converging Anglophone pressure.⁸⁰ France certainly continues to be of real interest, visible in the development of Valofrase, which is now established in 40 Vietnamese provinces out of 58, 17 of which have bilingual classes where French is the teaching language. The growing number of Vietnamese students that are extending their higher education studies in France is without question another positive sign: with over 6,000 students in 2008-2009, France has become one of the top destinations for Vietnamese students with the United States and Australia.⁸¹ Strengthened by a number of local and regional initiatives, these exchanges help revive the French language, long confined to the ageing generation of Vietnamese who had a Franco-indigenous education, with many of its supporters proclaiming it to be perfectly compatible with the spread of English: *“As the whole world is gradually beginning to speak English”*, says Olivier Garro, regional director of the AUF in Asia-Pacific, *“French is establishing itself as the language of difference. Our French speakers are in fact trilingual, as they speak their mother tongue, French and of course English. This is why they are of greater value in the economic world.”*⁸²

Structural obstacles are nonetheless a reality. Despite the development of a modest French-speaking job market since the coming into force of the code on foreign investment, in 1991, and the promotion of “francophonie in the economy” since the early 2000s, French-speaking students are still faced with an undeniable lack of professional opportunities. The industrial and trade presence of France and other francophone countries appears to be extremely insufficient today still. Another potential obstacle is tied to the issue of values. Certain Vietnamese political leaders declared their attachment to the consolidation of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, priorities established by the OIF in the Bamako Declaration which, in 2000, presented the multi-party system as the best way to access democracy and provides for sanctions if proper democratic governance is not respected. *“Our culture has greatly benefited from the progress and humanism that came from France. The French language is a beautiful language, inseparable from humanist values”*,⁸³ said Nguyen Thi Binh, former Vice President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in 2004. More importantly, he was also former minister of Foreign Affairs for the interim revolutionary government, and signatory of the Paris Agreement which ended the American-Vietnamese war in January 1973.

blog, <http://phamthianhnga.blogspot.fr/2011/08/la-presence-de-la-langue-francaise-au.html>.

⁷⁸ Benoît H.D., 2011, *Le Vietnam*, Paris, Le Cavalier Bleu, p. 42.

⁷⁹ Figures from the Vietnamese Ministry of Education and Training kindly provided by Tran Thi Mai Yen, head of the Crefap in Ho Chi Minh City.

⁸⁰ Geng J., *thesis previously cited* p. 128.

⁸¹ Benoît H.D., *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁸² Interview online on the EducPros.fr website, July 2012.

⁸³ Quoted in: TTrang P.T.H., *thesis previously cited*, p. 72.

Hanoi acknowledged without question that the respect for human rights, in the collective sense to improve the fate of populations, was the cornerstone of any political action.⁸⁴ However, in order to mark its uniqueness, Vietnam insisted on specifying in the Bamako Declaration that there were many routes to democracy, some of which were different from the Western multi-party system, founded on close interaction between development, democracy and the building of transnational economic and cultural cooperation.⁸⁵ In the name of this proclaimed difference, the local authorities occasionally considered that francophone literary, artistic and cultural initiatives, seen as potentially destabilising for the State Party, should be censored.⁸⁶

Motives for hope

Ultimately, the future of la Francophonie, in Vietnam and in the rest of Asia, will especially depend on its capacity to fuel a global dynamic between the English-speaking ASEAN and China: politically as a strategic actor of globalisation and a potential mediator in regional conflict involving francophone countries;⁸⁷ economically, on condition that it develops a significant job market and stimulates synergy between north and south, but especially in southern countries, closely communicating with bilateral cooperation; finally, culturally, as a protector of cultural diversity and the positive image that French still enjoys as a language of culture and humanism. The future of la Francophonie will also depend on the capacity of “*francophonistes*”⁸⁸ to convince their fellow citizens that we can defend the French language, in France and in the French-speaking world, without it being seen as a neglect of foreign languages and particularly English, the language of communication between Asian countries themselves. Finally, and maybe most of all, it will depend on Africans, whom President Abdou Diouf recently described as the greatest defenders of French in the international arena.⁸⁹

Population growth (500 million French speakers in 2050 according to OIF projections) and the growing links that French-speaking countries in Asia are creating with those of Africa will turn this continent into the centre of la Francophonie. Often seen as an obstacle to the development of la francophonie, due to the predominance of English as the language of exchange,⁹⁰ the regional integration processes at work in Asia since the Cold War could, in fact, encourage its revival.

At the infra-state level, firstly, the Vietnamese French speakers from Central Vietnam, grouped together in

⁸⁴ Hanoi even officially submitted its application in October 2012 to the UN Human Rights Council for the 2014-2016 term.

⁸⁵ Chau P.S., Ket V.D., Binh D.T., *op. cit.*, p. 107-108.

⁸⁶ Torrel F., 2004, *La Francophonie en Asie. Monographie de l'espace social francophone de Huê (1999-2001)*, Ph.D thesis in Sociology under the supervision of Professor Huu Khoa Le, Université Lille 3, p. 225-238.

⁸⁷ Maïla J., 2010, « Y a-t-il une spécificité de la médiation en Francophonie? », in Vettovaglia J-P. (dir.), *Médiation et facilitation dans l'espace francophone : théorie et pratique. Prévention des crises et promotion de la paix*, vol. I, Bruxelles, Bruylant, p. 342-346.

⁸⁸ Traisnel C., 1998, *Francophonie, francophonisme, groupe d'aspiration et formes d'engagement*, Paris, Éditions Panthéon-Assas, sciences politiques, p. 151 (cited by Trang P.T.H., *thesis previously cited*, p. 251).

⁸⁹ Le Monde.fr with AFP, June 30 2012, « Abdou Diouf dénonce le désintérêt de la France pour la francophonie », *Le Monde.fr* : http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2012/06/30/abdou-diouf-denonce-le-desinteret-de-la-france-pour-la-francophonie_1727494_3210.html

⁹⁰ Marcoud R., with the support of Gagne M., Autumn 2003, « La francophonie de demain: essai de mesure de la population appartenant à la francophonie d'ici 2050 », *Cahiers québécois de démographie*, vol. 32, n°2 : <https://www.erudit.org/revue/cqd/2003/v32/n2/008997ar.html>. As for the UN, the domination of English within the Secretariat, in comparison to the five other official working languages, has been criticised by the Joint Inspection Unit appointed by the UN (Hoppe D., Octobre 2012, « Qui défend encore le français à l'Onu? », *Le Monde diplomatique*).

Danang and Hue in highly active associations, contribute to a strategy of territorial de-bipolarisation and balancing, encouraging the economic and cultural promotion of a region which has too long been seen as marginalised.⁹¹ They nurture a particularly dense form of decentralised francophone cooperation, which could help rebuild ties with the African continent, where the pockets of non-exogenous French-speakers are numerous. At the supra-state level, interregional relations should also be developed: “*ASEAN can help us expand the influence of la Francophonie*”, says Ambassador Pham Sanh Chau.⁹² In return, la Francophonie, as the Vietnamese Deputy Minister for Education and Training recalled in September 2012, could help promote regional cooperation, in particular with a view to creating the ASEAN Community in 2015.⁹³ Indeed, could we not consider the current rapprochement that has been initiated between the OIF and ASEAN, whose “*respective practices, [...] experience and [...] charters are highly similar*”,⁹⁴ to be precisely the prelude to the development of institutionalised relations between regional Asian and African organisations that support the development of la francophonie? Conquering new markets and the development of exchanges with francophone Africa is already pushing growing numbers of Chinese to take French classes, if it is not to emigrate to Quebec...⁹⁵

However, in order to prevent the competition among Asian countries⁹⁶ from turning into the exporting of their bilateral tensions to the African continent, the Francophonie must not abandon its role as mediator between the two continents, Asia and Africa, which have so much to share; it must not give up on helping them compare their experiences, not only of war, massacre and genocide, but also and especially of peace, reconciliation, economic and cultural exchange, and development. By deepening this “*third intercultural dialogue*” advocated by Huu Ngoc,⁹⁷ the Francophonie would thereby be in a position to realise the founding ideal of Leopold Sedar Senghor of a “*Universal Civilisation*”, and of “*this complete humanism, which is woven around the earth: this symbiosis of “dormant energies” from all continents, all races, that awoken in their complementary warmth*”.⁹⁸

⁹¹ Torrel F., *thesis previously cited*.

⁹² Chau P.S., *loc. cit.*, p. 227.

⁹³ Le Courrier du Vietnam, 2 Octobre 2012, «Confrase : promotion des formations francophones», *Le Courrier du Vietnam*.

⁹⁴ Le Courrier du Vietnam, 6 juillet 2012, «Rapprochement entre l’OIF et l’Asean», *Le Courrier du Vietnam*. On the common challenges shared by francophone Asia and Africa in the field of education: Varly project, 25 janvier 2010, «Afrique francophone et Asie “francophone” : même combat ?», *Varly project weblog*: <https://varlyproject.wordpress.com/2010/01/25/parallele-afrique-francophone-asie-francophone-en-matiere-de-scolarisation-au-primaire/>

⁹⁵ Watt L., March 19 2012, “Chinese hoping ticket out of China is French class”, *Associated Press*; The Centre for Chinese Studies, July 2009, “China’s Growing Relationship With Francophone Africa”, *The China Monitor*, n°42, Faculty of art and Social Sciences Stellenbosch University:, <http://www.ccs.org.za/?p=2600>.

⁹⁶ Maroodza R.G., Mawunou Z., January 29 2011, “South-South Co-operation: Francophone Africa and Asian Emerging Countries”, *Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc*: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1780862.

⁹⁷ Guillou M., Octobre 16 2008, « La troisième francophonie: un acteur dans la mondialisation » *Institut pour l’Etude de la Francophonie et de la Mondialisation*, Chaire Senghor de la Francophonie de Lyon.

⁹⁸ Senghor L.S., November 1962, «Le français, langue de culture», *Esprit*, n°311, p. 844.

■ CANADA'S INVOLVEMENT IN HAÏTI: AN ILLUSTRATION OF LA FRANCOPHONIE AS STRATEGIC DEPTH – "THE COUNTRY ON THE OUTSIDE"

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The American continent, populated by over 900 million people, contains a small minority of French speakers. Nonetheless, French has been one of the official languages of the Organisation of American States (OAS) since its creation.

This is the result of demands and the struggle led by francophone minorities present in both North American and in the Antilles.

This identity and cultural combat, which remains of great importance today still, was possible due to the unique strategic relations that were formed over time between these different communities that share the French language.

In order to give a practical example of the concept of strategic depth, in this short article we shall look at the relationships, in particular within the migrant communities, which have formed between the two biggest French-speaking hubs on the American continent: Quebec and the Republic of Haiti.

More than the specific affinities that come from sharing a common culture, these relationships are the result of a coming together of the needs specific to each of these communities who, faced with cultural hegemony or even political or economic difficulties, needed to call on each other.

The Haiti diaspora

"As a people born of one of the greatest migrations in history, since the great Atlantic crossing, we remain a nation of migrants."

Jacques Édouard Alexis, former prime minister of Haïti.

The word "diaspora" was borrowed from the Greek, in the early 20th century: it means "dispersion" and comes from the religious vocabulary of the Greek-speaking Jews of Egypt. The Oxford English Dictionary, going beyond the religious history of the Jews, defines it by extension as the "*dispersion or spread of any people from their original homeland*".

One of the researchers that have studied the Haitian diaspora, geographer Georges Anglade, brings to light the first waves of widespread emigration in the early 20th century in a map he drew up in 2009.¹ The first was due to economic reasons, bringing immigrants to the sugar cane fields of Santo Domingo and Cuba.² The second wave, according to Anglade, took place between 1965 and 1985, with the dictatorship of the presidents Duvalier (Senior and Junior). François Duvalier came into power in 1957, and the application of his "*noiriste*" ideology caused the mulatto minority, who held highly placed economic and administrative

¹ Juste J., October 19 2011 « Haïti-diaspora: près d'un siècle d'émigration contemporaine », *Haïti Press Network*.

² Bechaq D., 2010, *La Diaspora haïtienne à Paris: significations, visibilités et appartenances*, PhD in social anthropology and ethnology, Paris, EHESS.

positions, along with his political opponents to flee to western cities.³ As the damage caused by the Duvalier dictatorship affected the entire population of Haiti irrespective of class or “race”, it was from the 1970s that the population drain began to worsen, as both middle and working classes began to make up the emigrant population.

These major migratory waves of the 20th century laid the foundations of the Haitian diaspora which continued to grow amid political events (coups d’état, instability, persecution, insecurity) or, more recently, natural catastrophes (hurricanes, earthquakes).

La francophonie in Canada: an island in an ocean of English speakers

Canada has around 31.9 million inhabitants (7.2 million in Quebec) and two official languages: English and French. The federal government is subjected to strict bilingualism. Outside of Quebec and New Brunswick, French speakers (around a million people) are dispersed across the country, living in minority environments.

In Quebec, the only official language is French. It is the only exclusively French-speaking North American continental territory. French is the working language in all spheres of daily life. Since 1977, it is protected by the Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) and the Office de la langue française. Quebec is often seen as the protector of North American francophonie. It is the political expression of French Canada, and the centre and fulcrum of all North American francophones. Without Quebec, there would certainly still be French Canadians, but there would be no “French Canada”.

New Brunswick, populated with 750,000 inhabitants, is the only officially bilingual Canadian province. The French speakers (representing around a third of the inhabitants) are concentrated in the north of the province, at the border with Quebec. They are mainly descended from the Acadians that escaped deportation in 1755.⁴

Immigration as a method of repopulating

“Our government is convinced that immigrants, through their culture, way of life and skills, make Quebec richer. From 2011 on, the Quebecoise population of working age will begin to wane, which will result in a lacking workforce in several sectors of the economy.”⁵

That Quebec takes the issue of immigration to heart should come as a surprise to no-one: Quebec’s very existence, like the rest of the New Continent, is the result of migratory flows. Nonetheless, Quebec is responsible for its own migration policy⁶ and is confronted with a dual challenge that threatens its

³ This “brain drain” continues today because, as specified in the proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 2007, Haiti is one of the countries to experience this phenomenon the most severely, along with scientific nomadism, with over 80% of the country’s educated population having emigrated.

⁴ Presentation of the Association Frontenac-Amériques :

<http://www.frontenac-ameriques.org/notre-association/article/presentation-de-l-association>.

⁵ Minister for Employment and Social Solidarity, *Les Affaires*, October 22 2005.

⁶ René Lévesque was the first Minister for Immigration. Quebec then established a grid to select workers based on economic criteria and professional qualifications. Consequently, several agreements were made with the Federal Government, namely the McDougalle-Gagnon-Tremblay agreement signed in 1991. This agreement gave Quebec control over its immigration. It grants it the responsibility to choose its immigrants according to its own selection

francophone identity:⁷ the first comes from its ageing population, and the falling birth rate;⁸ the second is due to the cultural hegemony of the English language, particularly felt in this region of the world, giving rise to the need for Quebecois policies to constantly protect the French language.

Quebec's migratory policy has developed by taking into account this dual constraint. In this regard, the government of Quebec does not hide its intentions to develop a policy that provides as much protection as possible to the French language, against the status of the English language in all societal environments. Faced with the risk of seeing francophone culture disappearing, it adopted a more political than economic strategy to select a greater number of highly qualified French-speaking immigrants. The goal is to repopulate, and if possible to do so directly with French speakers.⁹

It is no surprise, then, that in this context, Canadians of Haitian origin have over time become one of the largest non-European ethnic groups in Canada. As an example, between 1991 and 1996, Haiti once more became the first contributor country of immigrants to Quebec, and remained in the top ten for the 1997-2001 period. The Haitian community in Canada is mainly concentrated in Quebec. In 2001, 90% of those declared to be of Haitian origin were living in Quebec, compared to 8% in Ontario and 1% in British Columbia and Alberta. That year, almost 75,000 people of Haitian origin were living in Quebec, where they represented around 1% of the total population of the province.¹⁰

If we extrapolate figures from the census of 2001, the Haitian community is made up of around 130,000 people, still concentrated in Quebec, half of which are under 25 (a third of the total population). Among all the members of this community, at least two out of five (41.5%) were born in Quebec and over half (57.4%) were born abroad. The Haitian population represents 48% of all the black communities.¹¹

criteria and imparts the responsibility of integrating immigrants into Quebecois society. Quebec is the only province that is entirely responsible for immigration in its own territory.

⁷ The population of Quebec in proportion to Canada as a whole is decreasing. In 1951, Quebec represented 29% of the Canadian population. In 1961, this percentage rose to 28.8% but in 1986 it dropped to 25.6%, then to 24.7% in 1991 and 19.5% according to the 2001 census. In short, in fifty years the proportion of French-speakers in the Canadian population has considerably diminished, dropping from 29% to less than 20%. According to Statistiques Canada, this continuous drop is mostly due to two factors: the presence of a significant number of immigrants whose native tongue is a language other than French; and the falling birth rate in the French-speaking population since the mid-1960s. In 2001, 85.8% of French speakers in Canada (6.7 million) were living in Quebec (5.7 million), equivalent to 81.2% of the province's population, in comparison to 82% in 1991. This slight drop, which can be attributed to the rise in the number of immigrants with a native language other than French, arose despite the growth of 2.8% in the French population, which came to 5.7 million people in 2001. «La question démographique» :

<http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/amnord/Quebec-2demo.htm>

⁸ In Quebec, like in the other provinces, the "biological" deficit among French-speaking generations in 2001 is approximately 25 or 30% due to the birth rate which is slightly below 1.5 children for every woman, in comparison to the replacement rate which is a little over 2 children for every woman. However, the Gallicisation of Allophone immigrants adds a considerable number of French-speaking children to the francophone population of Quebec. Interestingly, a majority of Allophone immigrants in Quebec since 1971 that have chosen a new language to speak at home chose French over English, consequently transmitting French as a native tongue to their children. Charles CASTONGUAY, "Apport de l'immigration aux populations francophones hors Québec", *Francophonies d'Amérique*, no. 26, 2008, p. 235-247

⁹ Spinazzola A., 2007, *L'Immigration au Québec*, ch. II «Analyse et critique des politiques migratoires au Québec, en France et en Italie », Association internationale des études québécoises.

¹⁰ Statistiques Canada website:

<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-621-x/89-621-x2007011-fra.htm#footnote1>

¹¹ Gabriel A.D., October 2009, *Portrait de la communauté haïtienne au Québec*, SJRM.

The changing relationship between Canada and the Republic of Haiti throughout the ages

"The province of Quebec and Haiti are the two biggest hubs of French culture in America...The door is open to unlimited collaboration."

Abbé Gingras (1941).¹²

The relationship-building between the two countries dates back to the colonial era, when intercolonial trade was established. In 1759, the fall of Quebec into English hands led to a change in maritime routes and the dwindling of these trade exchanges. In 1803, the defeat of the French in Santo Domingo brought them to a complete stop. A century went by before the relationship was restored. This was possible firstly through exchanges among the elite, which records show occurred from 1901 on. In 1937 these exchanges led to the establishing of diplomatic relations, making Haiti one of the first countries with whom Canada maintained a formal connection. However, the two world wars helped intensify this relationship. From this perspective, the religious community's contribution was key. French and Belgian missionaries, who made up the majority of the Haitian clergy, were gradually replaced by French Canadians.

During the two world wars, while France was caught up in the conflict, Quebec temporarily became the world capital for la francophonie. Large numbers of Haitian students opted for Canada.

The long process of communication and rapprochement between the two societies facilitated the integration of the first generations of Haitian immigrants who moved to Canada in the decade 1940-1950. The greatest indicator of this integration is the election of Dr. Monestime as mayor of Mattawa, a small town in Ontario, in 1964. He became the first black man elected mayor in North America. The generations that arrived in the 1960s-1970s were warmly welcomed.

The pioneers of the 1940s and 1950s, smaller in number, mostly came from this elite that Fr. Gingras described as *"more cultivated than our own"*. If we add to this the Catholic religious ideology, which was dominant at that time, shared by the elite of both societies, we can see the main symbolic factors that shaped the friendship and complicity that kept them together.

The Haitian presence in Canada and Quebec was strengthened in the 1980s with the mass influx of Haitians of every social class. With little education and less qualified, these new immigrants arrived in a climate of economic slowdown where competition to find a job and exclusion and discrimination began to make an appearance.

The two sides of Haitian immigration

The Haitian community in Quebec is made up of several waves of immigration, so it is not homogenous and has more than one side.

The first is the positive side, borne by a long historic relationship founded on a common language. Between 1968 and 1972, over half of migrants of Haitian origin were teachers; in the health sector, several doctors were renowned for their achievements, while high numbers of nurses contributed to support the system.

¹² Quebecois clergyman who founded the Canada-Haiti Committee, which aimed to bring the two countries closer spiritually and culturally.

From 1980 on, Quebec became one of the main hubs of scientific and literary production in the Haitian diaspora. This success was perfectly reflected by Michaëlle Jean, the first black woman appointed as Governor General of Canada in 2005.

But the mass influx of Haitian immigration in a less favourable economic context from the 1980s on is the darker side of this presence. It was accompanied by rejection, which especially struck the youth of the second generation, as Lyonel Icar explains very well.¹³

At the socio-economic level, the situation was poor, as the unemployment rate among the Haitian community was twice as high (15.9%) as the rest of Quebec (8.2%). The average income was 19,502 Canadian dollars, or a third less than the Quebecois population. 47% of children of Haitian origin under the age of 15 were living in poverty (compared to 19% of Canadian children). The Haitian community was confronted with a range of difficulties: precarious status, poverty, fragile family situation, high rate of single-parent families, high school dropout rate, unemployment, violence, delinquency and an excessively high number of young people in criminal statistics.¹⁴

This dual reality inevitably reflects the social situation in Haiti. The face of Haitian immigration in the 1960s and 1970s was that of an elite minority: a distorted reflection of reality. From French-speaking and cultivated, the reality of the majority of Haitians – Creole speakers and lacking education – has surfaced in the cross-section of its population living in Quebec. The social divide that has been a reality in Haiti for centuries is being reproduced within the diaspora. Their fate and the conditions and methods to integrate Haitians are tied to the image that the home country projects.¹⁵

There is no doubt that the difficulties experienced by the Canadian population of Haitian origin to integrate into the Canadian model stem from the cracks in the functioning of Haitian society, simply because around 60% of the Haitian community in Quebec was born in Haiti.

Reasons behind Canada's involvement in Haiti: the reflection of a strategic approach

Today, Haiti is the country that receives the most support from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in the Americas and the second at the global level (after Afghanistan).

For the 2006-2011 period, Canada committed to contributing 555 million dollars in aid to Haiti, 485 million of which came from the CIDA, 40 million from Canada's Royal Gendarmerie and 30 million from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD).¹⁶

Furthermore, Canada along with 99 members provides the second largest contingent to the police component of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (Minustah). It also contributes, with nearly 20 million dollars per year, to the mission's operating budget. The reasons for significant Canadian involvement in Haiti are twofold.

¹³ Icart L., 2006, «Haïti-en-Québec : notes pour une histoire», *Ethnologies* n°1, vol. 28 .

¹⁴ Information taken from Statistiques Canada website, *statcan.gc.ca*:
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-621-x/89-621-x2007011-fra.htm>.
 Icart L., *op. cit.*

¹⁶ "Analyse et perspectives sur l'aide canadienne en Haïti depuis le séisme du 12 janvier 2010", *Droit et démocratie*, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Rights & Democracy) p. 3.

The first stems from the international situation in the early 2000s. The United States, engaged in two wars – Afghanistan and Iraq – have prioritised the fight against terrorism since the September 11 attacks. Military interventionism in the Arab-Persian Gulf is particularly reflected in a fall in the geo-strategic value of the Caribbean and a drop in US involvement in terms of cooperation. This is on top of reduced EU interest, absorbed in enlargement issues in the east.

The Canadian government saw an opportunity to occupy a new position for the first time in the Americas. Its aim was to fill the void left in the region by these two major actors, being a member of both the Commonwealth and la Francophonie, playing the cooperation card with the Caribbean states such as Haiti, with whom it has particularly close ties due to the significant present of Haitians in Quebec.¹⁷

The Canadian Foundation for the Americas sums up with acuity the perception held by the Canadians towards the Haitian issue: "Canada has a unique combination of national interests and comparative advantages to work in Haiti. Canada is the only country in our hemisphere with the necessary experience and skills. It was an opportunity for Canada to play a leader's role".¹⁸

According to Pierre Cyril Pahlavi,¹⁹ Canada's interests are especially "geopolitical, geostrategic, for national security and foreign policy". He stresses the fact that Haiti occupies "a central position in Canada's strategic and political calculations". The decision can be attributed not to the fact that this country is a "source of international or global insecurity similar to Afghanistan under the Taliban, but rather it is a source of human insecurity that has a local and regional impact".

In this regard, the concept of classic security, which has oriented international relations since the end of the Second World War, has recently evolved, specifically at Canada's impulse.²⁰ Canada wants to include in this notion, traditionally focused on the security of states and their sovereignty, the issue of insecurity at the individual level.²¹

Although today, Canada, at the initiative of its current government, appears to be focusing less on this approach of its foreign policy, the concept is too deeply rooted in Canadian strategic culture to be entirely discredited.

The concept of human security was first defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in

¹⁷ Dubesset E., November 23 2006, « La coopération régionale et internationale dans la Grande Caraïbe : enjeux et nouveaux défis », in summary report on the *La coopération Canada-Haïti en contexte d'une intégration régionale* conference at UQAM Chaire de recherche du Canada en politiques étrangère et de défense canadiennes.

¹⁸ As above.

¹⁹ Pahlavi P.C., « Le Canada et la diversification de ses partenaires dans les Amériques : les enjeux de la coopération avec Haïti », in summary report on the *La coopération Canada-Haïti...conference*, *op. cit.*

²⁰ "The inclusion of human security on the international agenda is greatly due to the initiatives taken by the Member States of the Lysøen GROUP or the Human Security Network. This network was formed following a Canadian and Norwegian initiative taken after the meeting between the ministers and representatives of the governments of Austria, Canada, Chili, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand and Norway which took place in Bergen and Lysøen in Norway on 19 and 20 May 1999, to address topics related to human security. South Africa participated as an observer state." *Sécurité humaine : clarification du concept et approches par les organisations internationales. Quelques repères* (Human security: clarifying the concept and approaches taken by international organisations. Key points), informative document by the International Organisation of la Francophonie's Delegation for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights, p.13 (translated from the French); see also the Saint Boniface Declaration adopted on 14 May 2006 at the Ministerial Conference of la Francophonie on conflict prevention and human security.

²¹ On the concept of human security, see *Sécurité humaine : clarification du concept et approches par les organisations internationales. Quelques repères*, *op. cit.*

1994, which presents it as “*safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression [...] and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities*”.²² This definition considers human security to be a combination of seven factors: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. However, due to the scope of its application, it was difficult to come up with a policy based on this definition. Furthermore, the UNDP omitted human insecurity caused by violent conflict.

This is why Canada attempted to define the concept with precision. According to the Canadian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, the main supporter of the concept on the international stage, human security is “*to be safe from economic hardship, to enjoy an acceptable quality of life and to be guaranteed their fundamental human rights. [It] presupposes that essential needs are satisfied, while recognising that steady economic growth, the respect for individual rights and fundamental freedoms, the primacy of law, good governance, sustainable development and social justice are all as equally important for global peace as the control of arms and disarmament*”.²³ This vision of security goes far beyond the state context and aims indefinitely for greater scope. The security, humanitarian, health, economic, environmental and legal domains are seen as a priority for the security of the individual.

It would seem that on top of the geostrategic challenge of positioning Canada as an important player in the Americas region for the first time, there is no denying there is a second reason behind its involvement in Haiti. The social and political situation of the country is also a question of domestic security in Canada.

It is precisely because the ties between the two countries are so close that the development of crime in Haiti (drug and weapons trafficking, gangs and kidnappings) and the grave deterioration of living conditions have a chain reaction effect on the Haitian community in Canada, already faced with serious socio-economic difficulties.

This could represent a threat to the Canadian identity and model based on massive foreign immigration if it is not anticipated and sufficiently dealt with.

There is a risk of racism developing, if the “chaos” experienced in Haitian society spreads to the Haitian community living in Canada, causing a rise in criminality or school dropout rates. However, as we have seen above, foreign French-speaking populations are needed if the Quebecois identity is to survive, in order to create an internal balance and stability in Canada.

More generally, Canadians may eventually reject the multicultural model advocated by the authorities in the relationship between the two major linguistic communities of the country since the 1970s.²⁴ The protection of this model, compared to the opposing integrationist model, limits the hegemonic effects of the much larger English-speaking community.

Aware of these issues, Canada decided to make Haiti one of its key geopolitical priorities in order to avoid having to deal with the problems that originate from the political situation in Haiti. This is a solid example of the concept of strategic depth in terms of international relations.

²² UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994.

²³ Axworthy L., December 1996, “Canada and human security: the need for leadership”, Déclarations and speeches, Ottawa, DFAIT, p. 1-2.

²⁴ This model is particularly significant for Canada as a nation as it enables the two main linguistic communities to coexist without assimilation (integration).

OIF as a lever of action

The International Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF) – of which Canada, Quebec (1971), New Brunswick (1977) and the Republic of Haiti are notably members – is a natural place for dialogue and cooperation between these different entities. Furthermore, the organisation's objectives correspond to Canada's priorities in terms of cooperation with Haiti (security, democratic governance, prosperity, sustainable development).

Its presence in Haiti allows Canada to build on its initiatives there and thereby make use of its experience and expertise networks to try and meet the ambitious objectives it has given itself in supporting this country.

The OIF, which counts among its members a number of African countries, is a force that rallies francophone solidarity. There is no question but that the public authorities of the "first black republic in history" – who can be quite supercilious over protecting their sovereignty in classic bilateral relations – have a very positive image of the organisation.

Since the opening of a Caribbean office for the Organisation in Haiti, the ACDI has been an important financial partner in projects borne by the OIF that target culture and the strengthening of the rule of law. This source of funding allows Canada to act discreetly but directly in the fields of intervention where the OIF has had experience over the years in southern member countries.

Canada's collaboration with the OIF in Haiti enables it to blend its efforts into multilateral cooperation initiatives, reducing its visibility and thereby concentrating on state-related fields of action which are the core of its bilateral cooperation (support to national police training and penitentiary administration, building infrastructures, support to the election process, etc.). This "delegation" strategy in terms of strengthening the rule of law provides Canada the possibility of providing suitable advice in a country where the Romano-Germanic tradition is deeply rooted.

Canada correctly assessed that this need for specific expertise in strengthening the rule of law is unfortunately too rarely taken into consideration by the international actors that hurry to assist the ailing Republic. Attempts to import rules or procedures from countries of the common law tradition, which are often done in an extremely clumsy manner, result in the further weakening of an already extremely fragile state.

This is where the concept of independence of judiciary power comes in. This grants almost total independence to magistrates in countries of Anglo-Saxon tradition, not only in their role as judge but also from the budgetary and organisational point of view. Transposed directly to Haiti, it makes it extremely difficult for the executive to attempt any reform or control of the judicial system.

In the same way, questions could be raised over the bail faculty which, under influence of the United States, is growing more common in Haitian courts with no legal foundation whatsoever, while the country is incapable of monitoring the defendants once released.

How can the country combat corruption among judges or high crime levels while certain partners of Haiti are calling for the strict application of the *habeas corpus* procedure in a country where the timeframes of the criminal code are never respected, with the disastrous consequence that all defendants can be released

48 hours after their arrest upon simple decision of a justice of the peace?

These are just a few examples to illustrate, in our view, the need for a normative affinity – understood as a resemblance in origins, a structural and organisational proximity between the normative systems of the two distinct entities – in the process to strengthen the rule of law in the country we wish to help.

Conclusion

Canada's significant commitment to the Republic of Haiti, as well as coming from an elective affinity – the fruit of a rich cultural and historic relationship – also solidly demonstrates the application of the concept of strategic depth. This commitment meets several Canadian needs.

Firstly, it is essential for Canada to continue to encourage repopulation of the territory through the arrival of new immigrants. For Quebec, it is vital that this comes for the most part from French-speaking populations in order to limit the imbalance between English and French speakers, with the latter dropping in numbers year after year.

In this perspective, the Canadian authorities – and particularly the Quebecois authorities – cannot allow distrust or rejection of Canada's Haitian community to set in.

They therefore made the decision to invest massively alongside the international community in its attempts to stabilise and strengthen the country as it exits a crisis. The specific skills required, but which it did not have – in particular in terms of normative affinity – came from the OIF, with whom Canada combined a significant number of its initiatives. This approach presents several advantages from the strategic point of view.

Firstly, by turning to this organisation, the international vehicle of francophone solidarity, it benefited from a positive perception from the Haitians, who, due to their history and roots, remain solidly attached to the African continent, where a number of countries are members of the OIF.

Furthermore, enhancing the credibility of this international organisation in the Americas, it unmistakably strengthens the very idea of the existence of an American francophone community which, though largely a minority, has real capacity for action and consequently a voice that counts in regional and global cooperation openings.

■ STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES FOR NEW MEMBERS AND OBSERVER STATES OF OIF: THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE FRANCOPHONE SPACE

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In 2013, French was neither the mother tongue nor even the working language of all members of the International Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF). During the last two decades, a certain number of States, where French holds neither an official or national status, joined OIF as observers, associate members or members. Every Summit approves new applications or changes of status. At the outcome of the 14th Summit of la Francophonie, where key Francophonie authorities meet, held in Kinshasa on 18-20 October 2012, OIF was made of 77 members, of which 20 were observers.

As French is the official language – alone or with other languages – in only 32 of the member states of OIF, it is becoming clear that the zone of influence of the French language is no longer restricted to the areas containing French speakers alone. The French-speaking community has never been contained within a mere geographical region; today, however, it is increasingly less linked to a unified cultural space descended from a shared legacy. *“The issue of complex and shifting relationships that language maintains with land is strategic. It is an obvious fact that every language has a territorial foundation, since a language is not only a communication tool, but also an identity marker, a material for creation, the expression of a culture and sometimes a tool, knowingly or otherwise, of national affirmation. [...] At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that language, since it is first and foremost a communication tool and a system of “non-tangible” cultural production, is supported by vectors that have no respect for borders and geographical boundaries.”*¹ From now on, the preservation of the culture and language OIF aims to undertake and defend will be attained through openness and enlargement rather than withdrawing into the traditional zone and maintaining its borders.

This enlargement process is an invitation to reflect on the reasons beyond the history and the sharing of a common heritage that explain the appeal of the francophone space to a growing number of states. We must first of all consider the issue of the French language spoken outside the traditional francophone space, i.e. the *“French language with no real territory, because there French is a foreign language, not without political implications, because its proliferate spread throughout the world, outside la Francophonie, exempts it from any colonial suspicions”*.² We must also think about what, aside from francophilia, causes an interest in the francophone space: the appeal of the French culture and language is not enough to explain the high level of interest shown in la Francophonie by a growing number of states, with a variety of cultural and historic backgrounds, and is cause to look further into the reasons – both strategic and political – underlying this interest.³ Finally, we must consider, on the other hand, how the integration of the new states in the francophone space is a way for OIF to further boost its influence on the international stage.

¹ North X., 3rd quarter 2007, «Territoires de la langue française», *Hérodote* n°126.

² *Idem*.

³ Poissonnier A. and Sournia G., cartography by Le Goff F., 2006, *L'atlas mondial de la francophonie: du culturel au politique*, Éditions Autrement, «Atlas/Monde» collection.

Terms of membership of the International Organisation of la Francophonie

The document containing the Statutes and Terms of Membership of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of French-speaking Countries,⁴ adopted by the 9th Summit of la Francophonie (Beirut, 18-20 October 2002) and amended at the 11th Summit of la Francophonie (Bucarest, 28-29 September 2006),⁵ sets out the procedures to follow for the admission of new members to OIF. This text also explains the different statuses applicable (member, observer, associate member), while different talks were held in OIF in order to clarify the rules of membership.

Application procedures

Membership of OIF as an observer or full member is subject to the preparation of an application presented through diplomatic channels to the acting president of the Conference of Heads of State and Government. The request is transferred to the Secretary General of la Francophonie, who submits it to the Permanent Council of la Francophonie (CPF):⁶ *the CPF then forms among its members a “task-specific committee for membership requests or changes of status”, composed of full members only. This committee processes the application and prepares evaluation elements that it sends to the CPF, which then adopts an opinion intended for the Conference of Ministers (CMF). The CMF formulates a recommendation for the Summit, which, after deliberation in an executive session and unanimous vote, will decide to accept or refuse the new member or observer.*

Criteria assessed in membership requests are the following:

- First and foremost, it is the role played by the French language in the country in question that is considered. To achieve observer status, a state must show its motivation to encourage the development of French use. To attain associate member status, it must be able to demonstrate an acceptable situation with regard to the use of the French language. Within the assessment factors, committees distinguish the elements relative to the role of language,⁷ teaching,⁸ culture,⁹

⁴ OIF website : <http://www.francophonie.org/Les-modalites-d-adhesion-a-l.html>

⁵ This document replaced the document prepared following talks at the Summit of Cotonou (1995) and amended at the Summit of Hanoi (1997).

⁶ Three authorities are designated by the Charter for la Francophonie (article 2): the Conference of Heads of State and Government of French-speaking countries, the Conference of Ministers of la Francophonie (CMF) and the Permanent Council of la Francophonie (CPF). The Conference of Heads of State and Government of French-speaking countries, called the “Summit of la Francophonie”, is the supreme authority of la Francophonie and meets every two years. The CMF meets every year in order to monitor the execution of decisions made during a Summit and to prepare the following Summit. Member states and governments and observers of the Summit are represented by their Minister of Foreign Affairs or the minister responsible for la Francophonie. The CPF is presided over by the Secretary General of la Francophonie and is composed of personal representatives duly accredited by the heads of state or government. The Secretary General calls meetings of the CPF, as often as necessary, for extraordinary sessions or summons task-specific select advisory committees. Four specialist committees, made up of delegates of state and governments, prepare the CPF studies: the political committee, the economic committee, the cooperation and programming committee and the administrative and financial committee.

⁷ The role of language is considered with regard to the status of French (national language, official language, status in teaching, second language, preferred language, etc.); legislative measures concerning French; the evolution of the role of French in relation to other languages; the number and percentage of French-speakers; the presence of associations working to promote French.

⁸ The main learning criteria taken into account are: the situation of schooling in French; the number of pupils and hours of French teaching at primary, secondary and university level; the presence of French-speaking higher education courses; the estimated number of national students that continue their education in French-speaking countries; the estimation of the number of teachers from French-speaking countries.

- communication,¹⁰ the economy¹¹ and associations.¹² French does not necessarily need to be an official language of the requesting country, and therefore is not an obstacle to its membership.¹³
- Furthermore, OIF also intends to open up to the countries that share the fundamental values and political principles that it aims to defend. The candidate states must demonstrate real support or interest in the values and principles declared in the Charter of la Francophonie and in the Declarations of the various Summits, which are endorsed in OIF cooperation programmes or when working together with other multilateral organisations. Three types of criteria are highlighted in this domain: firstly, those elements relating to the political-legal space which deal with the evolution of democracy and the rule of law, the existence of official departments responsible for monitoring human rights issues, the signature or ratification of treaties with law as the field of application and the legal cooperation programmes with francophone countries. Secondly are the criteria relating to a country's contribution to the influence of the Francophonie (large-scale events; attachment to and promotion of cultural diversity). Lastly, the contribution to the strengthening of the role of OIF in international fora, in particular through: the revival of the *"francophone acquis"*;¹⁴ the participation in francophone cooperative projects in international fora; participation in groups of francophone ambassadors to international organisations; a commitment in principle to use the French language in international fora when the member state's national language is not recognised as a working language. It is also important to highlight that the Ten Year Strategic Framework, adopted in 2004, stresses that *"membership of OIF is inherent to the voluntary support of its principles and values, mentioned in Article 1 of the Charter"*.

However, candidates for membership are not expected to fulfil all the criteria listed above; the contribution that the requesting state is likely to bring to the development of the image of la Francophonie is also taken into consideration during appraisal of applications.

Changing from observer to associate member or associate member to full member requires a formal request to be sent directly to the Secretary General of la Francophonie. The criteria considered in order to have one's request accepted are related to the substantial levels of progress made in relation to the situation presented when the initial status was obtained, and should show increased commitment in francophone dialogue and cooperation as well as in the use of the French language in the country.

⁹ The main criteria considered are: Francophone events (literature, theatre, music); the presence of French centres or cultural institutes; cultural development programmes in French; the presence of a network of French-speaking editors, printers and distributors of books and press; the existence of a status for francophone linguistic and cultural minorities.

¹⁰ The number of media in print press, radio or TV in French as well as the situation of the country's legislation in terms of freedom of the press and media.

¹¹ Elements examined: direct investment from francophone countries; trade or investment protection agreements with francophone countries; imports from francophone countries and exports towards francophone countries; solidarity with developing countries.

¹² Elements considered: the presence of local associations that relate explicitly to the French language; affiliations between these associations and international francophone associations.

¹³ This position is an obvious choice in the principle of respect for cultural and linguistic diversity fostered by OIF, placing value on partner languages in the francophone space while promoting the French language.

¹⁴ Translator's note: *"l'acquis francophone"* refers to all decisions previously made by the various governing bodies of the Francophonie.

Full members

Full members take part in all of the governing powers of OIF (Summit, CMF and CPF) as well as the various CPF committees. They alone can vote within these authorities. They alone can present their applications to positions available in the institutions of la Francophonie and apply to host the meetings of these authorities. Full members are obliged to make a statutory financial contribution, the amount being fixed by the CMF.

At the outcome of the Kinshasa Summit in 2012, the following countries were full members of OIF: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, New Brunswick (Canada), Quebec (Canada), Cape Verde, Central African Republic, the Comores, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Gabon, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, Laos, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Mauritius, Mauritania, Moldova, Monaco, Niger, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, the Seychelles, Switzerland, Chad, Togo, Tunisia, Vanuatu, Vietnam and the Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles.

Observer status

Observer status is granted permanently. In accordance with the dispositions contained in the document relative to the statuses and membership procedures, the states admitted as observers to OIF are restricted to a smaller number of powers. They can attend: the Summits, but without participating in the debates; the Conferences of Ministers, but can only present one statement after the president's approval; and the CPF sittings, without taking the floor. They cannot attend the CPF committee meetings or the closed sittings of any of the authoritative bodies of OIF; nor can they host meetings of those bodies.

Observers can contribute of their own volition to the funding of multilateral francophone cooperation and pay secretariat fees, the amount of which is fixed by the CPF, in exchange for the documentation that they have access to.

Observer status does not, however, prevent the states from investing in OIF, and they take advantage of the status to launch various initiatives within OIF. On political and diplomatic issues, these countries often take an active part, for example, in the activities of the Groups of Francophone Ambassadors, which have been established notably by the Permanent Representatives of OIF to the multilateral institutions in New York, Geneva, Brussels and Addis Ababa.

It is in view of the importance of these countries to la Francophonie that its Secretary General, Abdou Diouf, broke from an unwritten rule by completing goodwill, courtesy and working visit to the Czech Republic in May 2010, when he met the President of the Republic, Vaclav Klaus. This was the first visit of a Secretary General to an OIF observer country.

In 2012, the following countries figured among its observers: Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the United Arab Emirates, Estonie, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Mozambique, Poland, the Dominican Republic, the Czech Republic, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Thailand, Ukraine and Uruguay.

Associate member status

Accession to associate member status requires much stricter conditions to be met than those of observer. While the texts make no specific reference to the conditions to accede to observer status, they do, on the contrary, specify that the status of associate member is reserved for states and governments where French is already one of the official languages or is regularly spoken, and who also share the values of la Francophonie.

Associate members attend the Summits and the CMF without participating in debates; however, with the president's approval, they can make a statement. They do not attend the closed sittings of these authorities. They take part in the CPF and its committees with deciding votes, but cannot take part in closed sittings.

Associate members cannot request to host the meetings of the governing bodies of la Francophonie. They are obliged to make a statutory financial contribution, the amount being fixed by the CMF.

Lastly, it is important to specify that no state or government can accede to full member without have held a prior associate member position.

In 2012, the associate members were: Cyprus, Ghana and Qatar.

Rules of membership

The 13th Summit of la Francophonie, which took place in Montreux (22-24 October 2010), highlighted that the significant number of membership requests gave even greater rise to the question of enlargement. This Summit called on members of the Organisation to *"reflect on the rules of membership of la Francophonie, to be submitted to the governing bodies in preparation for the 14th Summit"*. The membership rules must not be confused with the rules for joining: their purpose is to show even greater attachment of the states and governments (including observers and associate members) to la Francophonie and their commitment to the project they defend.

The working group on the membership rules of the Organisation,¹⁵ which were envisaged immediately afterwards,¹⁶ established in its report of 9 May 2012 that, *"in the interest of strengthening the unique character of the francophone project on the international stage, la Francophonie reaffirms that the French language is its distinctive cornerstone. It declares that it is a space made up of equal members, united in varying relationships to French. It reiterates its support to the values set out in its Charter and other constitutive texts: the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, solidarity in development, peace, democracy, and equality among citizens"*.¹⁷ It also highlighted the need to *"deepen the feeling of membership to la Francophonie, with respect for the plurality of national models, diversity of*

¹⁵ During the session of 17 March 2011, the CPF took note of the suggestion of the Secretary General to appoint Canada-Quebec to the presidency of this task-specific working group on the rules of membership of OIF.

¹⁶ During their work, the observer states were heard during a special session in order to collect their opinions on the deepening of membership of OIF. Most observers insisted on the essential significance of the contribution to promoting the French language, and particularly the need to provide training programmes in French in the diplomatic sector and the civil service. They also stressed the need for members and observers to actively strive for the promotion of democracy and human rights, explaining that a certain number of them had effectively turned to la Francophonie to help them escape a walled-in totalitarian regime.

¹⁷ «Les règles d'appartenance à la Francophonie».

*methods and the sharing of responsibilities between states”.*¹⁸

Successive accessions to the statuses of observer state and member of OIF

“The reasons behind joining the Organisation are extremely varied. A typology of the reasons for States wanting to join reveals firstly the chronological factor but also other more unexpected elements: a systematic policy of presence; a regional interest (when neighbouring states are members of OIF, a state that may not even be French-speaking, wants to avoid isolation, for example Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Thailand); a desire for political equilibrium; internal factors; the pressure of interest groups (within the European Union for example), or even the particular characteristics of diplomacy (neutral or neutralist states – for example Austria – are willing to join OIF because of the values it promotes).”¹⁹ The reasons for countries wishing to join OIF can be categorised as follows:

- Observer or associate member status allows a country to more freely develop cooperation in the cultural, economic, academic and scholarly domains with countries of francophone tradition.
- Belonging to the francophone space has proven to be a powerful factor to stimulate regional cooperation – in Africa, the Arab world, countries of central and Eastern Europe, and Asia. It is therefore possible to consider that *“the common interests of member countries of la Francophonie are first and foremost regional: plenty of states have joined the Organisation because their immediate neighbours [were] members”*.²⁰
- Observer or associate member status can also be a diplomatic tool and a way of carrying weight in the international equilibrium.

The countries of the ex-Soviet bloc, mainly in Central and Eastern Europe, were the first to express the wish to join la Francophonie, in the early 1990s. Interest in OIF did not however remain the privilege of these central and eastern European regions alone, but expanded to non-French-speaking countries in Africa, Asia and the Americas.²¹

Countries of the ex-Soviet bloc

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 is unanimously considered as the date that marks the beginning of the political and economic liberalisation of the countries of the former communist bloc. However, it is essential to clarify this somewhat vague image of Eastern Europe, not only from a geographical point of view but also a chronological one. From a geographical point of view, the member countries of OIF from the former communist bloc are those in close proximity to Western Europe, those of "Central Europe" (Mitteleuropa),²² and the countries further in the east,²³ "South-East Europe" (the Balkans)²⁴ and lastly, with the accession of the former soviet socialist republics of Armenia and Georgia, the Caucasus, the region

¹⁸ *Idem*.

¹⁹ Badji M., Crouzatier J-M., Ivan R., Soppelsa J., 2010, *Solidarités en (f)Francophonie: réalité ou faux-semblant ?*, Agence universitaire de la Francophonie, p. 104 : http://www.bibliotheque.auf.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=463.

²⁰ Collective publication, 2009, *Francophonie et relations internationales*, Paris, Agence universitaire de la francophonie/Édition des archives contemporaines, collection «Savoirs francophones», p. 66.

²¹ Three new states joined the Organisation at the November 2014 Dakar Summit: Mexico, Costa Rica and Kosovo, all with observer status.

²² The three Baltic former soviet socialist republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Croatia.

²³ Ukraine.

²⁴ Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia.

to the extreme south east of Europe and Western Asia, the bridge between Europe and Asia. Furthermore, from a chronological point of view, we should point out that the “democratisation” processes in this part of the world took place in three phases, according to the regions: the fall of the Wall, the break-up of Yugoslavia (June 1991) and the disintegration of the USSR (December 1991). The countries of interest to us here have, despite a shared Marxist-Leninist past, a different political background. On one side, there are the countries that became politically independent following the implosion of the USSR and Yugoslavia, and on the other, countries which were – at least on paper – politically autonomous.

Among the members and observers of OIF in 2012, 20 states came from the former soviet glacis: Albania, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. They joined the Organisation under different statuses.

The first countries to apply were Bulgaria and Romania: they first joined the Organisation under observer status in 1991 before becoming full members in 1993.²⁵ The decision by Bulgaria and Romania, both particularly active with OIF, to join undoubtedly had a chain reaction effect on the other countries of the region. Moldova joined in the same movement as the two preceding countries, becoming a full member in 1996. It was followed by Albania and Macedonia, which became full members in 1999 and 2001 respectively. Other post-communist countries of Eastern Europe followed, with observer status. In chronological order of the dates joined, these are Poland (1997), Lithuania, Slovenia and Czech Republic (1999), Slovakia (2002), Hungary and Croatia (2004), Serbia and Ukraine (2006), Latvia (2008), Bosnia Herzegovina, Estonia and Montenegro (2010). The post-communist countries of the Caucasus began joining OIF in 2004, including Georgia as an observer country. The Republic of Armenia obtained the status of associate member at the Summit of Quebec in 2008 and full member status at the Summit of Kinshasa.²⁶

For these formerly communist countries, membership of la Francophonie showed a strong act of political wilfulness that notably aimed to indicate their definitive rallying to the democratic values that the organisation is devoted to. We should also note that the particularity that characterises the transitions in central and eastern European countries (CEECs) is the general desire for integration, on the one hand, in the European Union, necessary to guarantee their economic stability and the rule of law, and on the other, NATO, essential to guarantee their military security. This doubly-motivated desire for belonging, which positively shaped the democratisation process, took on the form of a project for the future, filling the ideological vacuum after the fall of communism. It managed to bring together political actors from every spectrum by guaranteeing the continuity of foreign policy of alternating governments. On this basis, joining OIF had been seen and analysed by some as an important step towards membership of the European Union. However, it is much more than this. Founded on considerations that are not only political but often affective and cultural, it revealed a “*desire to change not only partners,²⁷ but also the types of partnerships – no longer one single “Big Brother”, but a multipolar world and the diversification of networks of belonging*”.²⁸ In this context, the reasons behind countries joining the institution of la Francophonie are in

²⁵ Bulgaria’s commitment to the Organisation has made it a host country to significant training institutions in la Francophonie, such as the Institut de la Francophonie pour l’administration et la gestion (IFAG) and the Regional Francophone Education Centre for Central and Eastern Europe (CREFECO), both located in Sofia.

²⁶ For several years, this state strengthened its participation in OIF at the parliamentary (Parliamentary Assembly of la Francophonie – APF) and the university (Agence universitaire de la Francophonie – AUF) levels. It welcomed the Secretary General of la Francophonie on the occasion of an official visit outside of its official duties in the participation in the 37th Congress of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) in April 2010.

²⁷ The sentiment that NATO was a replacement for the Warsaw Pact and the EU for Comecon.

²⁸ See Krasteva A., 2007, «La Francophonie des pays de l’Est», *Francophonie et intégration européenne*, Sofia, Éditions

certain sense less pragmatic than those behind joining the European institutions and NATO, because they often come from a historic and moral dimension: the return, through a shared language which is French, to a cultural heritage, in the greater sense of the term, from which totalitarian regimes had forced a rupture. Bronislaw Geremek, former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Deputy at the time of his address, explained: *"I don't think that a language can bring any strokes of genius, but the French language does carry a certain message, which is the most important message for our countries moving towards freedom and for the countries who would like to see international relations develop on a base of common values. This cornerstone of values is the legacy of classical antiquity, but it is also, for the CEES, the French legacy of the revolution, the idea of liberty, the idea of international cooperation."*²⁹

The 11th Summit of la Francophonie in September 2006 in Bucarest was devoted to *"the significant Europeanization of la Francophonie"*.³⁰ The international colloquium on the theme of "New spaces for international political cooperation for la Francophonie in Europe", held in Sofia a few days before the Summit at the initiative of the Political Club of the Balkans, a foundation that brings together former heads of state, prime ministers, ministers, deputies and intellectuals of the Balkans, was another opportunity to reaffirm the new francophone dynamic created by the accession of the states of Eastern Europe: a dynamic of cooperation, dialogue and intra- and inter-regional exchanges in a redefined space, *"in the world of 'mini-globalisation' that is la Francophonie"*.³¹ This new European dynamic helped give a strategic position to la Francophonie in international relations. These "new spaces" between the francophone Eastern Europe and the other regions of la Francophonie, in particular Africa, have gradually become spaces of inter-regional dialogue within the other international organisations and first of all within the United Nations on subjects of common interest such as pluralist democracy, independence of the judiciary system, freedom of the press, rights of minority groups or the struggle against corruption. As such, OIF has built an image of a likely backer to countries aspiring to membership of the European Union (EU) – for example, Moldova, FYR Macedonia and Serbia – next to those already members. Indeed, the political and strategic configuration of the Central and Eastern European states, that are members of both the EU and members or observers of OIF, helped increase the francophone influence within the governing bodies of the EU, in particular on topics of interest to the Organisation such as the status of minorities in Europe, the stabilisation of the Balkans and maintaining peace in this region, the situation in Lebanon, the peace process in the Middle East, etc. It is also worthwhile to note that, inversely, the act of joining OIF by the majority of the countries of Central Europe encouraged a country in this geographical area that did not belong to the post-communist sphere to join the Organisation: Austria, under observer status in 2004.³² OIF was also seen as likely to help deepen francophone dialogue within the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Belonging to la Francophonie has sometimes been of use in more instrumental strategies. For the CEECs, at the micro-regional – i.e. Balkans and Eastern Europe (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Romania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Albania and Moldova) – la Francophonie represented an extra framework for

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²⁹ Geremek B., 2006 «Les trois paradigmes du message francophone», in international conference *De nouveaux espaces de coopération politique internationale pour la Francophonie en Europe*, Éditions Fondation Club politique des Balkans, Sofia.

³⁰ Preda C., *ibidem*.

³¹ Maïla J., *ibidem*.

³² Aside from its interest in the promotion of democracy and human rights, Austria is particularly sensitive to the protection of cultural diversity that OIF defends. The country was one of the first to defend and ratify the UNESCO Convention on the diversity of cultural expressions in 2005, which OIF actively supported.

international cooperation and solidarity that could counterbalance the occasionally negative effects of the local geopolitical dynamics. A good example is the request for support in resolving the conflict in Transnistria made in 2007 by the Moldovan authorities to the Secretary General of la Francophonie, for which it promised to call up a special advisory committee on the Transnistrian conflict, in application of the Bamako Declaration. This select special advisory committee, made up of representatives of thirteen member and observer states and governments of la Francophonie, and representatives of the European Union and the Council of Europe Venice Commission, in reaffirming in its conclusions the full support of OIF with Moldova in its determination to recover its territorial integrity and respecting its sovereignty, showed once more the importance to the member states of OIF's political role on the international stage. Furthermore, Moldova and the FYR Macedonia on several occasions requested and were granted support from OIF in the presidential and legislative elections, in the form of observation and technical assistance missions. Lastly, OIF has been seen as a good candidate to contribute to the revival of relations between former communist countries and other regions of la Francophonie, in particular with French-speaking African countries. La Francophonie provided new perspectives to the renewed relations between Africa and the countries of the former communist bloc, relations of cultural exchange and cooperation that were very active in the period from 1960 to 1990. Eastern European members of OIF, as they had not been a part of the French empire but had been subjected to authoritarian regimes often extremely similar to those in French-speaking African countries, are today in demand to exchange good practices and provide lessons of transition. The two "Sofia Platform" conferences, with which OIF closely collaborated and which were organised in 2011 at the initiative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria after the revolutions in the Arab world, offered a forum of exchange with the transitioning countries on "the experience of Central and Eastern Europe, and the changes in North Africa and the Middle East", for the first, and for the second, a debate on "democratic institutions, transitional justice and evolving consitutions".

During the 15th Summit of the Francophonie on 28-29 November, 2014 in Dakar, Kosovo became an observer member of OIF. By a "unilateral declaration of autonomy" with regard to the Serbian state, dated 18 February 2008, recognised by 66 countries at the UN General Assembly³³ and approved by the International Court of Justice,³⁴ Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. Kosovo's joining of the Francophonie can partly be interpreted as the pursuit of its independence from Serbia (which is also an observer member of the Francophonie since 2006) and partly as the affirmation of its international status – for which it must join the European Union.³⁵

New African members and observers

Sub-Saharan Africa, a space where the francophone influence was traditionally the strongest, due to the lasting footprint of the French Empire, no longer sees the limits of la Francophonie africaine restricted to the states that belonged to French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa alone: these borders now stretch to other countries of the continent where la Francophonie has reached.

³³ Mazi I-G., 2012, « La déclaration unilatérale d'indépendance politique du Kosovo : Remarques sur sa légalité et sa légitimité », *Lex electronica* vol 16.1: http://www.lex-electronica.org/docs/articles_301.pdf

³⁴ International Court of Justice July 22 2010, *Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo*, The Hague, Reports of judgements, advisory opinions and orders: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf>

³⁵ 22 States out of 27 recognise Kosovo (<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=fr&type=IM-PRESS&reference=20100621IPR76430>)

In 2006, Ghana joined la Francophonie as an associate member without have previously been an observer country. The reasons for this admission are mostly explained by the need for this country, which is surrounded by French-speaking states (Côte d'Ivoire to the west, Burkina Faso to the north, Togo to the east), to better control its strategic environment. During a speech given on the occasion of the 11th Summit of la Francophonie, Nana Akufo-Addo, Ghanaian minister of Foreign Affairs, explained that *"from a strategic point of view, there is a major mutual benefit [of Ghana's membership of la Francophonie], due to the geographic, historical and even blood relationships that tie us to the francophone states. The francophones have always insisted that we accept greater strategic integration with them. Our joining OIF is an important step in this direction. Our lives are closely connected to the francophone world, in particular in our sub-region and this strategic association is huge progress that will allow us to tackle shared challenges together"*.³⁶ The Ghanaian approach takes its inspiration from the country's traditional foreign policy which aims to establish friendly relations with the countries and organisations that share common objectives.³⁷ However, it is especially in light of the process of regional integration underway in West Africa – in particular as part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – that Ghana's accession to la Francophonie should be seen³⁸. In a sub-region marked by the larger number of French-speaking countries, states such as Ghana and Nigeria need French to integrate. Ghana's commitment to la francophonie is a clear way to increase the process of regional integration to which the country is resolutely committed, both from an economic and a political and security perspective: it is a measure given to its francophone neighbours – immediate or further afield – in relation to the Ghanaian desire to build closer ties with them and emerge from its isolation. As French is the language of learning, administration and international affairs in most of the countries in the West African sub-region, the Ghanaian authorities set French education and learning as a priority. Fluency in the French language is therefore presented as a measure of success on labour market in the sub-region. *"Ghanaians, of all backgrounds, must develop their language capacities in order to communicate with ease in the language of those who surround them"*.³⁹ Traditionally, a large number of educated Ghanaians know the language.⁴⁰

However, since 2001, the number of students taking French in secondary school more than doubled,⁴¹ rising from 383,875 students in 2001 to 850,211 in 2008.⁴² Since 2002, French became an obligatory subject in secondary school.⁴³ The security situation in the sub-region was another reason for Ghana's interest in membership of OIF. While the English-speaking countries of West Africa suffered from endemic violence throughout the 1990s (conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone), it is now the francophone states that have become plagued with instability, crime and violence in the past ten years (Cote d'Ivoire crisis between 2000 and 2011; coups d'état in Mauritania and Niger; structural weakness of Guinea; crisis in the Sahel, and particularly in Northern Mali). The situation in Côte d'Ivoire remains unstable, a fact that particularly affects Ghana, on whose territory the forces loyal to former president Laurent Gbagbo are suspected to be

³⁶ Ghana Web, September 29 2006, "Ghana joins "the Francophonie", *Ghanaweb.com*:

<http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=111346>

³⁷ Modern Ghana, October 12 2006, "Ghana joins la Francophonie as associate member", *Modernghana.com*: <http://www.modernghana.com/newstthread1/103263/4/>

³⁸ Legendre J., Faure J., Trucy F., Gaillard Y., juillet 1996, *Ghana, une volonté de rapprochement avec l'Afrique francophone*, report on a mission carried out in Ghana from 28 February to 3 March 1996 by a delegation of the senatorial group of France-West African nations Paris, Sénat: <http://www.senat.fr/ga/ga-7/GA-71.pdf>.

³⁹ Modern Ghana, *idem*.

⁴⁰ Founded in 1958, the Ghanaian Association of French Teachers (GAFT) works to promote French teaching in Ghana.

⁴¹ OIF website May 12 2009, «Ghana: 251 professeurs de français en formation initiale», *francophonie.org*: <http://www.francophonie.org/Ghana-251-professeurs-de-francais.html>.

⁴² Page for the Ghanaian Association of French Teachers on the International Federation of French Teachers website: <http://fipf.org/content/lassociation-ghaneenne-des-professeurs-de-francais#situation-francais>

⁴³ Introduction to the framework document for the France-Ghana partnership (2006-2010), French Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, *diplomatie.gouv.fr*.

hatching destabilisation plans. Furthermore, as the key West African feeder country for peacekeeping troops, deployed both under the aegis of the United Nations and ECOWAS, Ghana accepts the importance of fluency in French to deploy in French-speaking countries of the continent, where the majority of the peace operations have taken place since the beginning of the 200s (Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, etc.).

Aside from Ghana, four of the five Portuguese-speaking⁴⁴ countries in Africa have joined OIF under different statuses. While Guinea Bissau has been a full member since 1979, Cape Verde and Sao Tomé and Príncipe did not join the Organisation as full members until 1996 and 1999 respectively. Once more, the reasons that pushed Sao Tomé and Príncipe to join⁴⁵ can be explained in part by its majorly francophone neighbours – it is an archipel located opposite francophone states such as Cameroon, Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville. In 2006, Mozambique obtained observer status. The granting of this status to Mozambique is mainly attributed to the international prestige that the country enjoys, having instaurated peace and stability after a lengthy period of conflict.⁴⁶ The authorities in Mozambique tend to consider the French language as “*more and more useful to exchange with the rest of the continent and the world*” and therefore worked to encourage people to learn French. In 1992, French became obligatory for students taking arts subjects and in certain sectors of higher education.⁴⁷ Since 2009 it is available to study as an option for junior cycle secondary school students.⁴⁸ According to national projections, numbers will reach 300,000 pupils and require 500 professors between now and 2020. More generally, the move towards la francophonie of the Portuguese language countries should be placed in context with those elements that tie OIF to the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP):⁴⁹ the relations between the two organisations grew stronger over time, with certain francophone states even joining the lusophone organisation as observers.⁵⁰

Lastly, it is important to highlight that other African states have also expressed their desire to join OIF. This is the case for Sudan, a country which, due to the war in Darfur and the west of Sudan, was refused the observer status it requested during the Summit of Bucarest in 2006.

Generally, on the African continent, non-francophone countries may see membership of OIF as a way to deepen or initiate relations with the francophone states, in the majority. Their membership can also be interpreted as a desire for continental integration, by committing to a cooperative space where the relations between the countries of each of the former colonial blocs are less polarised then within the

⁴⁴ The five African member states of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tomé e Príncipe) are often referred to collectively under the acronym Palop (*pays africains de langue officielle portugaise*/ Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa).

⁴⁵ Leclerc J., May 22 2005, «São Tomé-et-Príncipe », *L'Aménagement linguistique dans le monde*, Québec, Trésor de la langue française au Québec, Université Laval.

⁴⁶ Panapress, September 29 2006, « Le Mozambique admis comme observateur à l'OIF », *Panapress*: Support from President Jacques Chirac to Mozambique's application also carried weight in the decision.

⁴⁷ FIPF, September 30 2008, «Le français au Mozambique», *International Federation of French Teachers*.

⁴⁸ Trésor de la langue française au Québec website, February 16 2012, « page Mozambique », Website *Trésor de la langue française au Québec*: <http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/afrique/mozambique.htm>

⁴⁹ La CPLP was created on 17 July, 1996 by seven countries: Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal and Sao Tomé and Príncipe. In 2002 following its independence, East Timor joined the organization as a full member.

⁵⁰ Senegal chose to join the CPLP with observer status. Senegal's interest can be explained by the fact that this country has close ties to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. There is a significant Cape Verde community in Dakar, and relations between Guinea Bissau and the province of Casamance are extremely close. Mauritius also obtained observer status within the CPLP, motivated by its proximity to Mozambique. See, for example, Stéphane Blanc, *Essai de recherche : la communauté des pays de langue portugaise, une nouvelle forme de régionalisme ?*, IEP de Bordeaux, Pessac, 2004.

African Union (AU) and sub-regional organisations.⁵¹ In return, by increasing the number of African members, OIF can hope to strengthen its influence and become a heavyweight actor on a continent which will become the heart of its zone of influence by 2050.⁵²

The Francophonie and the Asian states

Like in Africa, the francophone presence in Asia is no longer limited to the states that were under French domination during the colonial era. It has recently expanded.

Thailand obtained observer status in 2008.⁵³ It submitted its application after the meeting between OIF Secretary General, Abdou Diouf, and King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who was a French speaker that had grown up and studied in Lausanne, Switzerland.⁵⁴ There are 500,000 French speakers in Thailand (around 0.8% of the population). This relatively small number is nonetheless qualitatively influential. The tourist industry in the country also seems to have played a part to support the country's accession to the francophone institutions, in view of attracting more of the francophone community to choose the country as a holiday destination, like the Belgian and French communities that are already very well represented. Thailand *"wants to open up to other horizons and cultures to diversify its external relations and affirm its identity. Furthermore, it wants to have a legitimate reason to join the francophone club of its neighbours in the east in order to exercise its influence"*.⁵⁵ Thailand's membership of the Organisation can also be explained by the presence of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, already members. Thailand still shares borders today with two of the countries from former Indochina (Laos and Cambodia). The ties with Vietnam – they do not share borders but are close – are also crucial for Thailand. Beyond the interest or appeal that the French language provokes in an elite Thai minority, it would appear that membership of la Francophonie is a way for Thailand to better control the eastern flank of its strategic environment or to build profitable business and trade relations. Membership of la Francophonie is also a way to counterbalance other influences, namely Chinese and Anglo-Saxon. The four Asian member states of OIF are today part of a regional zone where the common language is English.⁵⁶ In order to counterbalance this, some like to imagine that a democratised Burma may join the francophone institutions by 2020.⁵⁷

The challenge for OIF today is to increase its influence in Asia-Pacific, a region which appears increasingly as the future hub of economic growth and a political-military power. Thailand's membership – as a country that does not belong to the francophone area that resulted from the French colonisation – helped expand the somewhat weak field of influence of la Francophonie in Asia. Furthermore, the strategy of la

⁵¹ See the article by Guicherd C., in the present review.

⁵² Today, out of the 220 million French speakers, OIF estimates the number of Africans at 96 million. In 2050, with a forecasted 715 million French speakers, 85% will be African.

⁵³ During the Summit of Bucarest in 2006, Thailand was refused observer status because of the military coup that occurred just before the summit in Bangkok.

⁵⁴ Traditionally, until 1945, the king spoke Thai, English and French, as Thailand then shared a border with Burma (British India) and French Indochina to the east.

⁵⁵ Nguyen Thai Son J., 2nd quarter 2012, «Réflexions géostratégiques à partir de la réussite de la Francophonie en Indochine: vers l'espace géoculturel francophone en Asie-Pacifique?» *Géostratégiques* n°36, p. 242 http://www.strategicsinternational.com/36_17.pdf.

⁵⁶ Jennar R., 1997, «La francophonie en Asie: Cambodge, Laos et Viêtname», *Politique et Sociétés* n°1, vol. 16, p. 119-127: <http://www.erudit.org/revue/ps/1997/v16/n1/040052ar.pdf>.

⁵⁷ Nguyen Thai Son J., *op. cit.*, p.243.

Francophonie in Asia also involves growing closer to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).⁵⁸ An OIF delegation visited ASEAN on a working visit in June 2012, in response to the invitation extended by the Secretariat of the latter. The aim of this meeting was to explore the possibilities to establish a context favourable to the development of their institutional relations and the coordination of their cooperation initiatives. In the longer term, the francophone strategy in Asia will undoubtedly include a policy towards China. *“Since 2000, we have observed a certain rise in French learning in the schools and universities in the central (Wuhan) and southern provinces, the richest in the country, as a second foreign language after English but also as a first foreign language. The reasons are the setting up of a lot of French companies, international trade and needs for quality higher education. A growing number of universities are members of the AUF and a lot of students (around 30,000) take up their studies in France, not to mention those, also a high number, who pursue studies in Belgium, Switzerland and Quebec. The growing need for French-speaking professionals explains the leap forward”.*⁵⁹

The Francophonie and the American continent

The region of the Americas is where la Francophonie is the least visible. There are nonetheless 33 million French speakers in the Americas: 9.7 million in Canada (7 million of which are in Quebec), 11 million in the United States, but we must also take into consideration the French speakers of the Caribbean, Haiti and Central America (over a million French speakers in Brazil, for example).⁶⁰ Furthermore, two states of this region of the world have also recently decided to join OIF.⁶¹

In 2010, the Dominican Republic obtained observer status. This country has a long trajectory of integration with francophone values. Its legal system is based on the French civil code and the influence in its literature of 19th and 20th century French authors can be heavily felt. This legacy enabled the dialogue and construction of shared insularity with Haiti, of course, but also with Martinique and Guadeloupe.⁶²

Uruguay officially made its request for membership in May 2012. The basis of its request to join as observer state are its historic ties with a certain number of francophone countries that are the home countries of much of the immigrant populations in Uruguay in the 19th and early 20th century (France,⁶³ Switzerland, Belgium) as well as African populations brought as slaves during the Spanish colonisation in the 18th and 19th centuries (namely Congo, Senegal and Guinea). It is with France – one of the first states to have recognised its independence – that Uruguay signed its first international treaty, in the form of a trade agreement, while the Napoleonic code provided much inspiration to Uruguayan jurisprudence. In 2008-2009, the number of people learning French in the country represented 0.29% of primary level pupils, 1.21% of secondary and 0.56% in higher education.⁶⁴ French is no longer an obligatory language in schools, however, since 1998. The National Association of French Teachers in Uruguay has 300 members. Certain

⁵⁸ See OIF website, June 28 2012, «Rapprochement entre l’OIF et l’Asean», *francophonie.org*: <http://www.francophonie.org/Rapprochement-entre-l-OIF-et-l.html>.

⁵⁹ Nguyen Thai Son J., *op. cit.*, p. 242.

⁶⁰ Grogan Lynch M., «L’Amérique française : le fabuleux destin d’une francophonie enfouie», *InterFrancophonies n°1*, Mythologies de la Francophonie : <http://www.interfrancophonies.org/Molly%20G.%20Lynch.pdf>

⁶¹ See OIF website: <http://www.francophonie.org/Denombrement-des-francophones.html>

⁶² Center de la francophonie des Amériques website, May 10 2011, «Quelles sont les valeurs francophones de la République dominicaine?» *francophoniedesameriques.com*.

⁶³ Among the 33,000 immigrants counted in the census of the time, 17,775 were French, according to the report supporting the membership request by Uruguay to OIF, 2012.

⁶⁴ UNESCO, ISU, Enrolment by ISCED Level, URL: <http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspxm>

French news publications are imported into the country. Since September 2001, the channel TV5 is accessible by satellite. Specific links exist today with France: as part of cooperation in the defense sector, the country boasts a partnership with the French Ministry of Defense for basic French classes given to its troops sent on UN peacekeeping missions.⁶⁵ Uruguay also maintains close cooperation relations with Canada in the field of research, in particular in the programmes supported by the IDRC/CRDI (International Development Research Centre). Uruguay's membership as an observer state within OIF helped expand the domains of political action of la Francophonie in South America, while giving a greater voice to this country, nestled between two of the largest countries on the continent. La Francophonie is notably seen by Uruguay as a tool to bring it closer to African and Arab countries, with whom it hopes to strengthen its relations, in particular as part of the Africa-Latin America Summits (ASA) and South America-Arab Summits (APSA) in the last few years. In return, Uruguay's presence has a strategic dimension for la Francophonie, because the country is a doorway to the South American continent and its common market (Mercosur), of which Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay are also members.

During the 15th Summit of the Francophonie, held on November 28-29, 2014 in Dakar, the Republic of Costa Rica and Mexico became observer members of OIF, joining Uruguay and Dominican Republic. Mexico and Costa Rica are both members of the Organisation of American States (OAS). Costa Rica is the only country in Latin America where French remains obligatory in secondary education. Costa Rica has a highly developed language policy, in particular in regard to Spanish (its official language according to Art.76 of its Constitution) and indigenous languages. This linguistic diversity is reflected in the 2000 Law on Ethnic and Linguistic Diversity. Mexico is the 11th greatest country in the world in terms of population and the biggest Spanish-speaking country where the second language spoken is French. Mexico's membership of OIF can be greatly explained by the ancient and close ties that bind it historically to France. Following Mexico's independence in 1821 and in the early 20th century, the French presence began to grow stronger in Mexico. The Mexican war against the United States between 1847 and 1849 was a factor that increased the number of French citizens moving to the country. There are many references to the "*afrancesamiento*" (gallicisation) of the elite and of Mexican culture, and the development of a Francophile sensibility during this period.

The Arab and Muslim area

The francophone space recently expanded with memberships of countries in the Arab and Muslim world. As such, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) joined OIF as observers in 2010, at the outcome of the Summit of Montreux.⁶⁶ The strong presence of French, Lebanese, North African and Quebecois communities on their territory explains their interest in OIF. Furthermore, since the invasion of Iraq, the UAE are attempting to balance the American influence in the region by playing the francophone card and turning noticeably toward France. Bilateral relations are therefore growing increasingly closer between the UAE and France, which is the main reason for their membership. France enjoys a prestigious image there. For the construction of their major classical art museum in Abu Dhabi, the UAE chose to approach the Louvre, while in 2006 the Sorbonne opened a branch for 400 students in arts and human sciences. The UAE also

⁶⁵ In proportion to its population, in 2012 Uruguay is number one in the world for the number of citizens it has committed to peacekeeping operations and, overall, in sixth place for its contributions to missions in francophone territories. UN website: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote.pdf>.

Uruguayan contingents are deployed in the Monusco in Democratic Republic of Congo, Minustah in Haiti and in the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt (Sanchez-Bustamante C., January 19 2011, "Uruguay and USSOUTHCOM Cooperate on ENOPU Refurbishing Project", Forum of the Americas website dialogo-americas.com:).

⁶⁶ In 2011, the UAE became observer members of the African Union.

maintain ties, in particular economic, with Quebec, evidenced in the presence of Quebecois companies such as SNC-Lavalin⁶⁷ and Bombardier.⁶⁸

Furthermore, during the Summit of Kinshasa in 2012, Qatar joined the Organisation directly as an associate member, as was the case a few years prior for Ghana. In support of its application, Qatar put forward a certain number of arguments, such as the large numbers of francophone expatriates⁶⁹ that the country has welcomed, and its contribution to the financing of French language programmes, in particular for a public radio in French that has been on air in the country since 2010. Since the beginning of the 2012 school year, six Qatari high schools made French an obligatory subject and there are private education centres that teach French. Furthermore, several members of the ruling family speak French. Qatar also called on Francophone experts to draft its Constitution. The country is also committed to multilateral mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, in particular mediation in Lebanon and Djibouti. It contributes to development aid in the southern countries, namely in French-speaking Africa. The appeal of the African market is a factor that can only confirm Qatar's interest for the francophone space. Qatar also hopes to take advantage of the vast influence sphere of OIF – which concentrates almost a third of UN member states and covers the five continents – to strengthen his participation in the governance of international affairs. This entry by Qatar into la Francophonie did not however, happen without certain remarks.⁷⁰

The integration of the UAE and Qatar within the Francophone community is an opportunity to look at the confluence between OIF and the Islamic space. Eighteen African member states of OIF are also members of the Islamic Conference – Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Chad, Tunisia, founding members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OCI) in 1969; Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Comores, Djibouti, Benin, Mozambique, Côte d'Ivoire who joined the OCI between 1974 and 2000 – the same as Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Thailand are members or observers. This helped create, within la Francophonie, a space for solidarity between the countries of Muslim faith.

Conclusion

We must remember that beyond the advantages brought by a global language and common references, OIF is in a position of dialogue, which, though sometimes sensitive, is mostly advantageous and unique, due to its community-oriented and intercontinental nature. OIF, through its composition and its vocation, is a unique observatory and testing ground for international relations, in particular between North and South as

⁶⁷ SCN-Lavalin website, October 3 2003, «SCN-Lavalin obtient un contrat dans les Emirats arabes unis pour la récupération de dioxyde de carbone» *scnclavalin.com*. .

⁶⁸ Cercle Finance.com, November 28 2012, «Bombardier décroche un contrat de navette automatisée INNOVIA pour l'aéroport international de Dubaï, aux Émirats arabes unis», *bfmbusiness.bfmtv.com* : <http://bfmbusiness.bfmtv.com/bourse/bombardier-va-fournir-navettes-a-laeroport-dubai-392722.html>.

⁶⁹ There are approximately 150,000 French speakers in Qatar, out of a total population of 1.85 million inhabitants, most of whom are of North African origin.

⁷⁰ See Le Monde.fr avec AFP, October 13 2012, « Francophonie: l'entrée du Qatar comme membre associé fait polémique », *LeMonde.fr* : http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2012/10/13/francophonie-l-entree-du-qatar-comme-membre-associe-fait-polemique_1775174_3218.html ; JOL Press, October 17 2012, «Francophonie : le Qatar devient membre associé», *economiamatin.fr* : news-francophonie-sommet-kinshasa-qatar-membre-associe-polemique; Lota L., October 14 2012, «Le Qatar se veut francophone», *rfi.fr*: <http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20121014-le-qatar-veut-francophone> ; TV5 Monde, October 16 2012, «Francophonie : des “raisons de fonds” justifient la présence du Qatar», *tv5.org*. .

well as between Eastern Europe/Western Asia and the south. OIF as an institution, whose global dimension was reinforced by the joining of countries where French speakers are a minority, is no longer perceived by those countries as a community solely founded on the sharing of a language and the values that it conveys. By opening up to more and more members, the Francophone space provides an unprecedented opportunity to develop the multilateral model that it chose to adopt. OIF developed with the dynamic of expanding new strategic resources – though not easily quantifiable – in terms of exchange of informations, advocacy, network building, cooperation, political dialogue and good offices. By becoming an international organisation, OIF dedicated its work to encouraging the development and networking of a number of supervisory, regulatory and mediation institutions as well as those that promote human rights and democracy. These networks, that many institutions from several observer and associate member states have joined, are animated spaces for exchange and cooperation that enable ties to be formed and influence levers to be activated to increase the involvement of these countries in OIF.

The issue of enlargement of la Francophonie, outside the countries where French speakers are in the majority, is however subject to discussion. Certain states are reluctant to see this enlargement dynamic take hold, arguing that the francophone identity would be faced with the risk of dilution and reproaching OIF for losing its uniqueness with each addition of a country where the language, tradition and culture are not francophone. For some, *“as the geopolitical dimension of OIF becomes firmer, it seems that the ties between the members and the French language are slackening”*.⁷¹ Others, on the contrary, are in favour of the enlargement to include countries who make the request, considering that new memberships help strengthen the weight of la Francophonie and the values it carries in the world along with the development of the use of French.

However, if we look further beyond these two clear-cut positions, the issue of the enlargement of OIF and the role played within it by the observers, associate members and new members also provides us the opportunity to take a more generalised look at strategic depth through the *“notion of ‘steps’, characteristic of the great empires in which the history of humanity has provided numerous examples, with vague frontiers and, on the edge, buffer zones even more closely monitored, even more protected with troops, that they represented a line of defense that was both real and symbolic, the ultimate obstacle to any outside attack. The notion seems appropriate for la Francophonie even if we remove the Praetorian connotation. The concept of “territory” here is meant in relation to the notions of identity, and the spaces we protect...”* We can see, then, that OIF movement towards enlargement helps enrich the definition of the notion of “steps”: they are no longer seen as strongholds established in the border zones of an empire with the purpose of defending against neighbouring territories, but rather as forward posts (not necessarily adjacent to the territory) that are particularly committed – due to their voluntary joining of OIF—to the task of carrying a project that promotes a non-tangible heritage and political values.

By choosing to promote not only the French language and linguistic and cultural diversity, but also to be involved in resolving political issues in the name of universal principles of promoting human rights and a rule of law, OIF thereby chose an open strategic identity, over one that is fixed or defensive, and now must have at its core the enlargement of its initial base, which is undoubtedly the best vehicle to enable its voice to grow louder on the international stage. It is in OIF’s capacity to rally all of the member states on subjects of common interest – in particular concerning crisis resolution within the francophone space – that the merits of this strategy should be assessed in the years to come.

⁷¹ See « Francophonie et relations internationales » *revueaspects.auf.org*, p. 74.

■ MILITARY FRENCH: AN INSTRUMENT OF FRANCOPHONIE STRATEGIC DEPTH

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The didactics of French as a foreign language has been explored through a number of fields of professional activity, in the context of *français sur objectifs spécifiques*¹ (FOS): tourism, medicine, gastronomy, diplomacy, fashion, design, etc. In these fields, there are specific language training programmes, created by experienced didacticians. However, there is a large vacuum in this family of the FOS: until today, research on French didactics has almost never touched on the military domain. However, for almost a century, the teaching of French to Portuguese-speaking service-members has been an important aspect of the spreading of French influence across the world, actively contributing to its expansion. No official or precise estimate has ever been established, but it would not be excessive to state that no less than 15,000 service members are trained every year, at varying levels, on all continents, in the use of French, and particularly military French (FLMi).

Another fact worth noting, and which provides more material for reflection on the reasons why the discipline is somewhat unheard of, is that FLMi is the pioneer for FOS teaching, with an official birth date that established it as a practice in July 1926.² After the Great War, the employment of colonial troops raised the question of French teaching that aimed to improve their operational capabilities. The language policy of the time lacked structure,³ but did manage to spread la francophonie across the world, via the armed forces.⁴

For nearly nine decades, outside of the research carried out in language teaching, FLMi evolved through the purpose-oriented instinct and good sense of the service members that taught it and who, from its beginnings, gave the discipline a resolutely modern style: the language is viewed pragmatically as a tool that the soldier can use when performing his duties, and it is a language devoted to communication and intercomprehension. This groundbreaking idea for the time brought with it a bold comparison, by affirming that the premises of the action-oriented approach⁵ and the communicative approach,⁶ which today are

¹ Cuq J-P., 2003, « Le français sur objectifs spécifiques (FOS) est né du souci d'adapter l'enseignement du FLE à des publics adultes souhaitant acquérir ou perfectionner des compétences en français pour une activité professionnelle ou des études supérieures », Dictionnaire de didactique du français langue étrangère et seconde, CLE international, p. 109. ("Français sur objectifs spécifiques (FOS) came from the desire to adapt the teaching of French as a foreign language (FLE) to an adult public wishing to acquire or perfect their French for professional reasons or for higher studies").

² Règlement provisoire du 7 juillet 1926 pour l'enseignement du français aux militaires indigènes, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1926 (Translation: Provisional regulation of 7th July 1926 for teaching French to indigenous troops).

³ The committee in charge of teaching French to troops in the colonies was made of service members. No teacher, linguist or missionary participated.

⁴ Poulot B., 2011, « L'enseignement du français aux troupes coloniales en Afrique », *Revue historique des armées* n°265.

⁵ The action-oriented approach as defined by the CEFRL: "The approach [...] is an action-oriented one in so far as it views users and learners of a language primarily as 'social agents', i.e. members of society who have tasks (not exclusively language-related) to accomplish in a given set of circumstances, in a specific environment and within a particular field of action.[...] We speak of 'tasks' in so far as the actions are performed by one or more individuals strategically using their own specific competences to achieve a given result. The action-based approach therefore also takes into account the cognitive, emotional and volitional resources and the full range of abilities specific to and applied by the individual as a social agent".

⁶ The term "communicative approach" refers to the system of methodological selection that aims to develop the

extremely successful in the language teaching field, are without question to be sought alongside FLMi teaching in former French colonies.

This article provides the opportunity to give a situational report on the discipline. In attempting to define FLMi and grasp the modern day situation, we can better understand its special features, before tackling the strategic, economic and cultural issues that are inherent to the discipline, making it a unique tool in the strategic depth of la francophonie.

Definition of Military French

The origins of FLM now allow us a glimpse of its meaning and scope. FLMi may be defined as a protean discipline, with the purpose of sharing language-related knowledge on French use in military contexts. It is important to stress the importance of its protean nature, as a single military language does not exist. The reality on the ground provides a myriad of languages, each corresponding to extremely specific contexts and uses. The challenge of FLMi resides in its diversity; Three main fields may be established in the discipline: operational, industrial and institutional. A second breakdown can then reveal other sub-categories: from humanitarian operations to diplomatic negotiations, military technology changeovers, peace support and peacekeeping operations, training troops in domestic security techniques to defence equipment trade, the key major challenges of FLMi extend beyond the field of didactics, giving it both a highly strategic dimension (in terms of economics, diplomacy, geostrategy, etc.) and a significantly humanist and cultural scope (philosophy, history, linguistics, etc.).

There are no models, examples or predefined rules to follow in the teaching of Military French. Each branch has its own specificities, because each of them operate in different fields, in terms of training, preparation, fields of operation, recruitment, or even skills. The common base of language skills, shared by all soldiers, is quite limited and can be summed up as: respect for hierarchy and obeying orders. Other common linguistic tasks may be identified (community work, medical visits, etc.) but they are merely epiphenomenal and cannot alone be focus of didactic study. In short, in the field it is evident that the soldier and the officer do not share the same language, in the same way as a gendarme speaks a different language to the sailor. It may therefore be wise to use the plural to define the discipline, and refer to Military French Languages. Furthermore, FLMi, directly connected to its professional specialities, is rapidly evolving, and can only be understood by close observation of military environments. Knowledge of the military environment and its sociolinguistic codes is essential for an FLMi didactician.

Is the term “military language(s)” therefore appropriate? Every corporation has its own way of speaking, and the defence is no exception to this rule. While this language may appear obscure to a novice, even if he/she is a French speaker, it rapidly becomes the communication basis in a military context. Its uniqueness is that it is both complex and accessible. While this may be a surprising contradiction, it will not prevent the “newbie” from rapidly and instinctively understanding the linguistic and sociolinguistic bases that govern this language, both written and spoken. For example, it is rarely appropriate for a subordinate to “inform” his superior of something, as his inferior role only allows him the possibility of “reporting” something: words and expressions have a semantic hierarchy that must be known and respected. Another example typical of military language, both written and spoken, concerns the acronyms that are an integral part of military vocabulary. These contribute greatly to the abstruse nature of this language for a beginner. A final

example unique to the oral communication tied to the morphosyntactic construction of sentences is the phrasal structure is not encumbered with literary convolutions, verbs are eluded, successive appositions are preferred and lastly, the desire for concision aims to render the language efficient and functional: the least amount of words possible to obtain the desired effect. Inversely, the long-windedness of some military texts may be disconcerting and might deter even the finest of exegetes. It is important to remember that military service members see language as a tool for their profession, and it is with this concept of language that an appropriate teaching method should be prepared. As such, if the learners are a class of navy sailors, the language must be taught with a focus on their universe: knowledge of the safety procedures on board, orientation on a ship, knowledge of the main types of mission, the various posts on board, etc. These themes, which are generally known to the majority of the learners, allow them to discuss in French the themes they know well: their professional knowledge is what is used as a basis for the interaction.

Current situation of Military French

The francophone military authorities in developed countries have established a number of programmes to reinforce the military influence of French internationally. Among them is the proactive professional training policy for Portuguese-speaking troops; it is extremely diverse, and guarantees firm ties are made between the country providing training and its partners. Systematically pairing professional military training with an FLMi course would be a decisive step in asserting the French language in a military context on the international stage. Today we are far from this ideal, as these training courses are generally given in English, even when the trainer is a French speaker and the training takes place on territory that is part of la francophonie. Since the early 2000s, FLMi has played an important role, in particular through the programmes of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for Security and Defence Cooperation (DCSD), which finances over 10,000 courses a year. France is the spearhead of FLMi, well ahead of other francophone countries: Canada, which already has a lot to do in terms of bilingualism in its own armed forces, prefers to use English when engaging in international cooperation; the Belgian headquarters is mostly Dutch-speaking and with the delicate issue of language there, there is little intention to promote French either in Belgium or elsewhere; Switzerland remains mute on the subject, and other francophone countries do not provide language training. It would be naïve to think that France actively helps spread FLMi in order to promote la francophonie alone; the aim of its actions is first and foremost to increase France's military influence, and this enables us to observe a certain failure of FLMi: without cooperation across the entire organisation, training initiatives supported by a single country have no overall coordination: if France decides to end its FLMi training programmes, the discipline will fall in the line of duty. With regards to the strategic benefit of FLMi for la Francophonie, awareness must be fostered in order to encourage other countries to offer FLMi training.

Sharing one's language is in fact a sign of trust in the place where it is being shared. This means that training allies not only contributes to good joint relations but also to good relations between the men on the ground, while reinforcing intercommunicability and interoperability capacities. The main advantage of FLMi is that it helps assert the armed forces' operational capacities by encouraging cooperation as well as understanding and acceptance of others: as all involved gather together to learn a language and see it as a common good. Its second advantage is that it removes a country from the sphere of influence of an overly powerful neighbour: for example, Brazil chooses French as the language to learn to free itself from the United States, just like Austria, a member of the International Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF) and FLMi contributor, thereby seeking to stand apart from its German neighbour. The third advantage of FLMi

is to promote the culture and skills of the Francophonie countries at a target group.

The humanist and strategic considerations and the flattering overview given above should not conceal the significant lack that prevents the discipline from developing properly. FLMi has always had two sides: that of its origins is innovative and groundbreaking, while the other is not properly formed.

First of all, the lack of specific training for the teachers is a hinderance to the very quality of the teaching. It is unrealistic to try and teach military students without having basic knowledge of the very unique codes that govern sociolinguistic relationships in the defence sectors. Currently, some of the teachers sent into the field are trainees, and though their theoretical capacities in language teaching are undeniable, they often lack solid field experience. Furthermore, their knowledge of the world of defence can mostly be summarised in a list of clichés, without any real basis and no relationship to the reality of the modern military profession.

The issue of certification also has a central role in terms of language teaching, as certification provides the speaker with recognition of his/her language skills. In this domain, civilians and military personnel have not yet come to agreement. For this reason, there is no certification that corresponds to the operational reality. For *FLMi*, two normative frameworks are in direct competition: the civilian norm, the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR),⁷ against the military norm established by NATO, STANAG 6001. The CEFR is the standard for courses funded by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for Security and Defence Cooperation (DCSD). A large number of the personnel that follow the courses have the option of sitting the DELF⁸ diploma for French language study. However, other training bodies for military personnel, such as the CIOR Language Academy (CLA), offers a standardised language profile (PLS) to language learners to assess their level according to NATO standards.⁹ To sum up, there is no certification that is truly suitable. Resolving the issue of certification in *FLMi* teaching is a complex task. As such, it would appear that a cross-cutting certification between the two frameworks (STANAG 6001 and CEFR) should be a priority, so that graduates can be provided with a certification that can be used in both their civilian and military activities as well as in view of a career change.¹⁰

Lastly, the teaching material is confidential due to the extreme difficulty in providing suitable material: the *FLMi* is diverse by nature; however, it is impossible to come up with a cross-cutting handbook for all military specialisations, or inversely to create a handbook for each specialty area, as producing such publications would not be cost-effective. The life span of a classic language text book is five years, but it is shorter for an *FLMi* book, as the world of defence evolves very fast.

Today, there is just one modern *FLMi* handbook that meets the specific needs of African countries. Entitled "*En avant!*" ("Forward!"), in the future it will be incorporated within a more expansive collection designed

⁷ The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, published in 2001, revolutionized language teaching by forming a common basis for the creation of programmes, methods, diplomas and certifications.

⁸ DELF is a civilian diploma that assesses language skills through French.

⁹ STANAG 6001 makes no reference to the speech acts specific to the military, and therefore the use of this normative framework is not suited to military personnel.

¹⁰ This idea does not currently appear to appeal to the Bureau for International Language Coordination (BILC), the NATO reference bureau for language related issues. However, there appears to be a glimmer of light in this somewhat obscure picture: since September 2011, the International Centre for Pedagogical Studies (CIEP) has been working towards the creation of a new certification destined for the European headquarters of NATO in Brussels. This first rapprochement between a state civilian institute and an international military institution may be the beginning of future cooperation.

for the defence and security forces, published by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with OIF. The editorial approach of the collection offers a novel perspective in its approach to language learning in a professional context: the difficulty level of the books corresponds to the position of the military trainee. It is evident that a soldier on a domestic security mission does not have the same language requirements as an officer working on preparations for setting up a peacekeeping operation in a joint effort. In order to meet this requirement, the linguistic level necessary differs according to each book depending on the level of professional ability and are therefore suited to the language needs of each student. The handbook uses lots of illustrations, documents adapted to language learning and sketches of everyday life for personnel in the African forces, which gives it an authentic style and helps the learner to be immersed in a francophone military universe. The aim of this method is to help the military learners become independent in both expressing themselves in and understanding French.

While the editorial policy of *“En avant”* offers a suitable approach to the changing nature of FLMI, it is nonetheless extremely difficult to create books for learning that meet all language needs in the military forces efficiently and in the long term. The future of FLMI teaching material now resides in a paper-free system, through information and communication technology (ICT) in education that can provide an effective solution to the polymorphous nature of the discipline. Lastly, whether it is financiers, certifiers or training providers, there is evidence of a lack of cooperation and coordination between the main operators of FLMI: each has his own teaching codes and his own conception of FLMI. This division does however have certain positive points. As FLMI is of multidisciplinary nature, there is plenty of merit in having several specialised operators in the areas characteristic to the domain. In France, the War College French language class, with its intensive French language course (SILF) offers long training courses for superior officers that are likely to follow high level War College courses; the CLA is destined for NCOs and reserve officers that wish to work at NATO; the Rochefort Gendarmerie International Centre for French organises training courses for non-French speaking domestic security forces and Portuguese-speaking candidates for St Cyr Military Academy. Along with these public operators, there are the many local cooperative projects in France and elsewhere between the armed forces and language schools, French institutes and the Alliances Françaises. A number of military academies also offer French classes, such as Austria's Bundesheeres Sprachinstitut. However, not all the military specialty fields are represented as the desire to draft a coherent, comprehensive military language policy is still lacking. There must be synergy among all FLMI actors, which may be created by setting out a comprehensive strategy for all Francophonie members, in order to further boost the strategic depth of French, at the military, economic and cultural levels.

Major economic and strategic challenges

Interest for the French language is growing in military environments. This interest is proof of the strategic dimension of French as a linguistic military power. At the crossroads of soft power and hard power, language training in the armed forces is how knowledge is spread within the triangle of the armed forces, language and culture. The interconnection between a language and culture(s) is a given, meaning that the armed forces can place itself within a logical syllogism: the armed forces are a vehicle for the spread of a language, which in turn is a vehicle for culture; the armed forces therefore contribute to the expansion of said cultures. In other words, FLMI training fosters the soft power of la francophonie while strengthening the hard power of the target countries. Secondly, military personnel, on completion of their language courses, further the power of the French language and therefore the hard power of francophone countries.

It would be wrong to believe that the impact of the French language is strictly a question of strategic pragmatism. To back up this statement, we have only to question the FLMi classes on the importance French carries for them; it is evident they are truly attached to the language, as it is synonymous with humanist values. Maxime Notteau evokes this sentiment perfectly when he defines the French language as *“a language that, even before conveying thoughts, already bears within it a sense of humanism, a vision and a particular reflection of the world”*.¹¹ It is therefore interesting to note that French is perceived in the military as a conveyer of moral values rather than a working language, as the majority of them believe that English is sufficient for their work activities. In the modern approach to language teaching, FLMi fits in perfectly as it is not just the language that is taught, but the culture that is conveyed by the language.

There is a solid connection between the “francophilia” of foreign armed forces (or at least its staff) and where it sources its defence equipment. Many declare that defence equipment from francophone countries (with France at the head of the list) are better exported to francophile countries. This statement requires further evidence to support it, as no study has yet been carried out to show a clear causal link. However, if there was a link, this would mean that the FLMi is potentially a vector for growth in the defence sector of francophone countries: the DCSD and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Paris (CCIP) have both independently made the remark that a country that signs a large trade contract with French companies generally follows up with requests for French language courses, which leads us to believe that in both the transfer of skills and the transfer of technology, or training in equipment use, French teaching plays an important role. It is our responsibility today to encourage majority- francophone leading defence groups to become more involved in FLMi activities.

The major French-speaking groups in the defence sector are now aware of the potential of FLMi, as evidenced by the recent training campaign for the Lebanese Armed Forces, jointly organised by Total, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Lebanese Ministry of Defence. This historic initiative, which concerns 20% of the Lebanese armed forces personnel, inspires other multinationals and other countries: for example, in Chile, Thalès (a French electronic systems group) takes part in International Day of la Francophonie by jointly organising the the French Embassy an event to promote French in the Armed Forces Language School in Chile. The group also provided funding for French classes for members of the Chilean military. It financed a scholarship for foreign students of specific nationalities (Chinese, Russian, Indian and Brazilian) wishing to study in France: christened “Thalès Academia”, it only lasted a few years and was abandoned.

Today, FLMi concerns a number of units directly in francophone countries. In France, for example, the two units concerned are the Franco-German Brigade and the Foreign Legion. In the Legion, French classes have an important role and the progress made by non-francophones has a direct influence on their evaluation and consequently their promotions. In the francophone world, Canada is a striking example: Canadian military personnel must speak French. In reality, bilingualism in the Canadian armed forces is a pipe dream that the official languages commissioner hopes to see come true. In Belgium, language is a thorny issue, particularly in the armed forces: In October 2010, Colonel Gennard criticised the expansion of Flemish in the Belgian armed forces, stating that the majority of officer positions were held by Flemish speakers, and that most of modern Belgian equipment was sent to Flanders. Was it a strategic redeployment or reprisal for a latent linguistic conflict? On the other hand, the North African countries have seen that French helps facilitate joint cooperation both in training and in operations, as Flavien Bourrat points out in his article on

¹¹ Notteau M., 2nd quarter 2012, «La langue française dans le monde arabe : une multitude des francophonies ?», *Géostratégiques* n°36.

the strategic depth of la francophonie in the Maghreb. The francophone countries of sub-Saharan Africa are ambivalent, aware of the practical advantage that speaking French brings, but also reluctant to show preference for one language over the others in use in this region of Africa. Major emerging countries (Brazil, India, etc.) are also showing an interest in French to form beneficial partnerships with francophone countries and escape the sphere of influence of a very close neighbour (for Brazil, this is the United States). Generally, it is in Asia that FLMi training programmes are less well known, although Vietnam is an exception as Pierre Journoud shows us in his article on francophone strategies in Vietnam, and the Defence University of Mongolia has a particularly active French class.

The evidence shows that in a number of countries where French has official language status, there is a lack of motivation to give it a real place within the military institution. This is quite an interesting paradox, as countries across the world are increasingly interested in FLMi for the benefits it provides in the strategic, economic, diplomatic and cultural fields, while simultaneously, francophone countries are neglecting it.

Nonetheless, there is no question that French training for the allied troops remains essential. Whether this is offered under NATO or the UN, francophone countries work together with their allies for a large number of military operations, and this cooperation requires real understanding between the parties. The language issue, and in particular the French issue, is key, as almost 60% of UN staff were deployed in francophone countries in the past ten years.¹² There is no question but that English is currently the preferred choice of language for military cooperation, but in the long term, French use in a military context will continue to grow. Estimates by the Demographic and Statistics Observatory of the Francophone Space show that the francophone population will rise to almost 715 million speakers by 2050. Francophone demographic pressure will essentially come from the African continent. This continent is unfortunately the theatre of conflicts that require the intervention of the international community for peacekeeping operations. These operations are more effective if the civilian populations, local soldiers and intervention troops can communicate and interact easily. More effective troops on the ground is synonymous with an economy of means, guaranteeing greater security.

Furthermore, the spread and influence of French in the world is potentially due to the military sphere. The reduction in resources allocated to cultural networks across the world causes a drop in the programmes offered and therefore in the influence of la francophonie. However, it is undeniable that France and its francophone partners have been continuously involved in a number of fields of operation in the past ten years (Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, counter-piracy operations in the Red Sea, reintegrating NATO, setting up a base in Abu Dhabi, Mali, etc.), thereby contributing to the spread of French as a language of both civilian and military communication.

However, there are a number of examples across the world that cut short any expression of triumphalism, suggesting rather that there is a significant volume of work to be done within the institutions. Canada sent a contingent on a humanitarian mission to Haiti a few months before the earthquake that struck the island in 2010. The personnel were English-speaking only and needed an interpreter in the field. However, upon reading the article by Stéphane Jans on Canada's presence in Haiti, it would have been a legitimate expectation of this great Francophone country that language would have been coherently managed in this humanitarian intervention. Another example is the European gendarmerie, which chose English as the sole working language although it is made up of countries of Romance languages alone, and the gendarmerie

¹² See the introduction by Ramel F. to this review; Massie J. and Morin D., September 2011, «Francophonie et opérations de paix : vers une appropriation géoculturelle», *Études internationales*, 42 (3).

model is unique to the police forces that originated historically in francophone tradition or influence.

Conclusion

The language issue is a sensitive one in the armed forces. Intercomprehension is a definite advantage on the field of operations; he who controls the means of communication controls understanding, and consequently, cooperation. To paraphrase the words of the linguist Claude Hagège, teaching one's own language in a military context is to teach one's own polemologic approach. The coordination of the different operators and countries providing training is therefore essential.

With a growing number of military and civilian defence personnel across the world, regularly exposed to French, FLMi will be one of the essential components of French teaching with targeted objectives in the near future, or French teaching with a professional aim.

The discipline of FLMi has the potential to positively impact the operability of troops on francophone theatres, increase defence equipment exports from francophone countries and contribute to the development of research fields in teaching methods for French, and in particular FOS. It also contributes to the influence of la Francophonie and the cultures that is comprised of. Is FLMi an instrument of the strategic depth of la francophonie? Undeniably so. The discipline is potentially one of the driving forces of strategic depth, acting on both military and cultural levers, and on soft power and hard power. It is important to note that francophile countries were conquered by the cultures that the French language transmitted, contrarily to the majority of francophilic countries that, in previous centuries, were conquered by arms: while the future of FLMi is by nature inherent to the military, it must not neglect the issue of culture.

Today it is necessary to lay the theoretical and didactic cornerstones of this discipline, to better integrate it in the institutional sphere and incorporate it in the training process of foreign soldiers and officers, so that the French language has a chance to exist fully on the international military stage, and that it can continue to be a conveyer of cultures of la francophonie.

■ ABBREVIATIONS

ACCPUF:	<i>Association des cours constitutionnelles ayant en partage l'usage du français</i> (Association of French-speaking constitutional courts)
AFCNDH:	<i>Association francophone des commissions nationales de promotion et de protection des droits de l'Homme</i> (Francophone association of national committees for the promotion and protection of human rights)
AFISMA/MISMA:	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AHJUCAF:	<i>Association des hautes juridictions de cassation des pays ayant en partage l'usage du français</i> (Association of High Courts of Appeal sharing the use of French)
AIMF:	<i>Association internationale des maires francophones</i> (International Association of French-speaking Mayors)
AISCCUF:	<i>Association des institutions supérieures de contrôle des finances publiques ayant en commun l'usage du français</i> (Association of French-speaking Courts of Auditors)
AMIS:	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM:	African Union Mission in Somalia
AOMF:	<i>Association des ombudsmans et médiateurs de la Francophonie</i> (Association of ombudsmans and mediators of la Francophonie)
APEC:	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APF:	<i>Assemblée parlementaire de la Francophonie</i> (Parliamentary Assembly of la Francophonie)
APSA:	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASEAN:	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF:	African Standby Force
AU:	African Union
AUC:	AU Commission
AUF:	<i>Agence universitaire de la Francophonie</i> (Francophone University Association)
BILC:	Bureau for International Language Coordination
BRAP:	<i>Bureau régional de l'OIF en Asie-Pacifique</i> (Regional office of the OIF in Asia-Pacific)
CASID:	Canadian Association for the Study of International Development
CCIP:	<i>Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Paris</i> (Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry)
CEEC:	Central and eastern European countries
CEFRL:	Common European Framework of Reference for Languages
CEMAC:	<i>Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale</i>

	(Central African Economic and Monetary Community)
CENI:	<i>Commission électorale nationale indépendante</i> (Independent National Electoral Commission)
CFVG:	<i>Centre franco-vietnamien de formation à la gestion</i> (Franco-Vietnamese centre for management training)
CIB:	<i>Conférence internationale des barreaux de tradition juridique commune</i> (International Conference of Bars of Common Legal Tradition)
CIEP:	<i>Centre international d'études pédagogiques</i> (International Centre for Pedagogical Studies, France)
CIRTEF:	<i>Conseil international des radios-télévisions d'expression française</i> (International council of French language radio and television)
CLA:	CIOR Language Academy
CMF:	<i>Conférence ministérielle de la Francophonie</i> (Conference of Ministers of la Francophonie)
CONFES:	<i>Conférence des ministres de la Jeunesse et des Sports</i> (Conference of Ministers of Youth and Sports)
CONFEMEN:	<i>Conférence des ministres de l'Éducation nationale</i> (Conference of Ministers for National Education)
COPAX:	<i>Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Afrique centrale</i> (Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa)
CPF:	<i>Conseil permanent de la Francophonie</i> (Permanent Council of la Francophonie)
CPLP:	<i>Communauté des pays de langue portugaise</i> (Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries)
CREFAP:	<i>Centre régional francophone en Asie-Pacifique</i> (Regional francophone centre in Asia-Pacific)
CREFECO:	<i>Centre régional d'enseignement francophone en Europe centrale et orientale</i> (Regional Francophone Education Centre for Central and Eastern Europe)
CSDP:	Common Security and Defence Policy
DCSD:	<i>Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense</i> (Directorate for Security and Defence Cooperation)
DELF:	<i>Diplôme d'études en langue française</i> (Diploma for French language study)
ECCAS:	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
EFEO:	<i>École française d'Extrême-Orient</i>

	(French School of the Far East)
EU:	European Union
FANK:	(Khmer National Armed Forces)
FAO:	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FIDH:	<i>Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'Homme</i> (International Federation for Human Rights)
FLMi:	<i>Français langue militaire</i> (French military language)
FOFA:	Follow-On Forces Attack
FOMUC:	<i>Force multilatérale de l'Afrique centrale</i> (Multinational Force in the Central African Republic)
FOS:	<i>Français sur objectifs spécifiques</i> French language programme targeting specific objectives
FPU:	Formed Police Unit
FRANCOPOL:	<i>Réseau francophone international de formation policière</i> (International Francophone Network for Police Training)
GRK:	<i>Gendarmerie royale khmère</i> (Royal Khmer Gendarmerie)
HIPC:	Heavily indebted poor countries
IAEA:	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICT:	Information and Communication Technology
IDRC/CRDI:	<i>Centre international de recherche pour le développement</i> (International Development Research Centre)
IFAG:	<i>Institut de la Francophonie pour l'administration et la gestion</i> (Francophonie Institute for Administration and Management)
IFI:	<i>Institut de la Francophonie pour l'informatique</i> (Francophonie Institute for Information Technology)
ITC:	International Trade Centre
MAECI:	<i>Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (Canada)</i> (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)
MDVF:	<i>Maison du droit vietnamo-française</i>
MERCOSUR:	South American Common Market
MICOPAX:	<i>Mission de consolidation de la paix en Afrique centrale</i> (Mission for the consolidation of peace in the Central African Republic)
MINURSO:	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH:	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MONUSCO:	United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo
NPMEC:	National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces and ERW (Explosive Remnants of War) Clearance
OAS:	Organisation of American States
OCAM:	<i>Organisation commune africaine et malgache</i> (Common African and Madagascan Organisation)
OCI:	<i>Organisation de la Conférence islamique</i> (Organisation of the Islamic Conference)
OIF:	<i>Organisation internationale de la Francophonie</i> (International Organisation of la Francophonie)
ONUCI/UNOCI:	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
OSCE:	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PALOP: <i>Pays africains de langue officielle portugaise</i> (Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa)
PKO/PSO:	Peacekeeping operations/Peace support operations
PLS:	<i>Profil de langue standardisé</i> (Standardised language profile)
PSOD:	Peace Support Operations Division
REC:	Regional Economic Communities
RECEF:	<i>Réseau des compétences électorales francophones</i> (Francophone Electoral Knowledge Network)
REFFOP:	<i>Réseau d'expertise et de formation francophone aux opérations de paix</i> (Francophone Peace Operations Expert and Training Network)
REFRAM:	<i>Réseau francophone des régulateurs des médias</i> (Francophone Network of Media Regulators)
ROP:	<i>Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix</i> (Peace Operations Network)
SADC:	South African Development Community
SILF:	<i>Stage intensif de langue française</i> (Intensive French language course)
SIPRI:	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSR:	Security sector reform
UAE:	United Arab Emirates
UEMOA:	<i>Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine</i> (West African Economic and Monetary Union)
UMA:	<i>Union du Maghreb arabe</i> (Arab Maghreb Union)
UNAMID:	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNFICYP:	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNIFIL/FINUL:	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UPF:	<i>Union internationale de la presse francophone</i> (International Union for the French-speaking Press)
WTO:	World Trade Organisation

FRANCOPHONIE AND STRATEGIC DEPTH

Strategic depth corresponds to a set of resources (territorial, material and human) that an international actor can use to keep a threat at bay. This depth is not neglected when adopting a strategic posture during peacetime, as it plays a significant role in forming or reinforcing a defence and security zone. The goal is not to achieve control over a territory but rather to build up relations and partnerships abroad.

This review aims to provide a new angle on the Francophone component of strategic depth. The International Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF) acquired a new dynamic as an institution after the Hanoi Summit in 1997, enabling it to step onto the diplomatic and strategic stage.

Going beyond the analysis of these transformations, the review primarily offers a new definition of the concept of strategic depth by widening its initial dimensions. Applying this concept of depth to the Francophonie (the international organization) and la francophonie (the area encompassing populations that speak French) is envisaged according to two complementary perspectives: the first is functional (the political role of the Francophonie, the enlargement of the Organisation, the use of the French language in military operations), and the second geographic (North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and America).

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